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ABSTRACT  
My dissertation, titled “From the machine mind to the human mind: using machine learning 
to understand (ir)rationality, bias and polarization in human beings,” investigates ways in 
which human minds operate and seeks to uncover the causes of biasedness, limited 
rationality, and polarization of human minds, to eventually devise tools to compensate for 
such human limitations. The chapter 2 of the thesis focuses on the evaluation of information 
and decision making under enormous information asymmetry, in the setting of patients 
evaluating doctors’ medical advice. Patients were found to be poor evaluators who were 
unable to distinguish good from bad due to their lack of medical expertise, and unable to 
overcome their own irrationality and bias. I emphasize the ramification of such limited 
rationality, which might lead to the adoption of suboptimal or bad medical opinions, and 
propose ways to improve this situation by redesigning some features of the platform, and/or 
implementing new policies to help good doctors on the platform. Chapter 3 focuses on 
developing a new metric that reliably measures ideology of the US elites. This metric was 
developed based on congressional reports which made it unique and relatively independent 
from established metrics based on roll call votes, such as DW-NOMINATE. First, I 
 
ix 
leveraged a neural network-based approach to decompose the speech documents into 
frames and topics components, with all ideological information funneled into the frames 
component. Eventually, two different ideology metrics were obtained and validated: an 
embedding vector and an ideological slant score. Later I showed that our new metrics can 
predict party switchers and trespassers with high recall. In chapter 4, I applied the newly 
obtained metric (mainly slant scores) to investigate various aspects of the congress, such 
as the heterogeneity of ideology among the members, the temporal evolution of partisan 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The world is now in the middle of the Web 2.0 era. Human beings are experiencing 
an explosion of information, and the evolution of the machine mind has provided human 
beings with powerful tools to access, process, and evaluate information. The theme of my 
entire PhD research is to investigate what drives peoples’ decision making and eventual 
behaviors facing into such an information era, to understand whether human beings are 
becoming more rational, critical, and better utilizers of information, and to explore the 
overall impact of the likely irrationally and biasedness. More specifically, with free access 
to the opinions of people from the other side of political spectrums to their own, do people 
become more willing to think rationally and to make decisions that best benefit themselves 
and society? Do the leaders of society act in a such a way as to mend their own ideological 
division, knowing well that any division among elites will be greatly amplified in society 
at large through the Internet, traditional media and social media, and thus may be sowing 
the seeds of great social discord and disruption? So far, my study and many others have all 
suggested that powerful information technology does not make us better decision makers 
or information evaluators, nor does it suppress the growing ideological division in the elite, 
and perhaps in society. Going forward, my ultimate goal is to fully leverage the power of 
the machine mind, which is enabled by the development of advanced machine learning 
algorithms, to understand ways in which human minds operate and to uncover the cause of 
biasedness, limited rationality, and polarization of human minds, and to eventually devise 
tools to compensate for human limitations. 
Under my broad interest in understanding the “human mind”, I mainly focused on 
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two settings where limitation or tendencies of human minds are on full display. I will 
discuss them in detail below. 
In the first part of my thesis, I will focus on the evaluation of information and decision 
making under enormous information asymmetry. I staged this study on an online Health 
Q&A platform (OHQP), a type of Web-based consulting service for health-related 
questions. This type of platform was chosen because a) the information asymmetry 
between information providers and consumers (doctors and patients) is significant; b) 
patients were the single evaluators of answers; and c) the scale of the platforms is enormous 
(millions of patients and hundreds of thousands of doctors were participating) and the 
consequence of mis-evaluation of information is huge in the healthcare setting, meaning 
any flawed evaluation and decision making could have a significant influence on patients’ 
lives.  
This research showed that patients in general were indeed poor information 
evaluators, as their evaluations were almost as bad as random choice. They failed to 
distinguish good answers from totally wrong answers. The reason for such poor 
performance could be a combination of limited platform support, large information barriers, 
and the tendency to make biased and irrational choices. Given the fact that millions of 
questions were answered on this type of platform, the consequence of getting bad medical 
advice could easily be amplified.  
One key insight drawn from this study was to address the question of whether patients 
should be granted more power in assessing doctors’ performance and advice, given they 
were generally poor evaluators of medical information and often biased. The problem with 
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OHQPs is by design: They give patients monopolistic power to evaluate doctors’ advice 
(since patients were their main source of income) while offering little to assist their decision 
making. As a result, in order to improve the performance of OHQPs and decrease the bad, 
or at least suboptimal, advice proffered on the platforms, I recommend focusing on 
introducing quality checks and a sounder reputation system based on those quality checks. 
I also offer suggestions to doctors to help those serious participants to increase their affinity 
with patients regarding their answers. 
Going forward, I will shift the focus of my study from patients to doctors to see how 
doctors strategize their answers to maximize their performance, and how they learned from 
the leading performers. In addition, I want to explore whether there is a lack of quality 
control from the platforms, whether the evaluation is performed by bad evaluators, whether 
they still strive to provide the best answers instead of the most popular ones, and if so, what 
drives them to do so.  
The second part of my thesis focused on understanding the temporal and spatial 
distribution of ideology of the US elites, the evolution of polarization and its relationship 
with partisanship, and how congresspeople’s ideology plays a role in bill passing and 
elections. The congressional record data sets were used to complement the traditional study 
on roll-call voting data. At the collective level, I want to understand how the ideological 
division/unification within the senate/house evolves over time and whether the overall 
polarization and division of Congress is driven by extremity or increased ideological 
constraints. Traditional studies on political ideology such as the DW-NOMINATE aimed 
to reduce people’s ideology to a one-dimensional liberal–conservative axis that explains 
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the majority of their voting patterns. With my study I aim to go in the other direction: that 
is, to expand the measurement into a full ideological space where projections over any 
concrete opinion domain can be easily calculated, such that a more nuanced portrait of 
Congress can be provided to depict the location of each congressperson on each issue. 
Distances between pairs or groups of congresspeople and between two parties can be 
measured to proxy the ideological division or unity. This more nuanced portrait is a huge 
improvement over previous metrics because it allows for issue-wide analysis to provide 
(opinion) domain knowledge that cannot be accomplished with metrics like 
DW-NOMINATE1. A side product of these understandings is that now I can deduce the 
“take-off” issue that is driving the social and party discord, and how such issues collectively 
change over time as a symbol of social evolution.  
Going forward, I would love to formulate a more concrete understanding of the 
driving forces of discord among the US’ elites and how and why they become as divided 
as they are, particularly during the Trump presidency. It will also be interesting to know 
whether Trump’s rhetoric and demeanor (aka Trumpism) may play a role here. More 
importantly, the outbreak of coronavirus provides an opportunity to investigate how 
politicians play a game wherein issues that should have been purely scientific and factual, 
such as mask-wearing and social distancing, become politicized and controversial. I seek a 
deep and detailed understanding of the rationale among the party elites, which includes 
how individuals frame their argument to convince the public. 
 





2.1 Outline of the Chapter 
First, I will introduce social and economic background that leads to flourishment of 
OHQPs. In the introduction, I will define what OHQPs are, and review literature done on 
social platforms and healthcare. Next, I will describe the data collection and processing 
methods, analyze the quality of advice on a large OHQP, and estimate the impact of 
heuristic cue features of medical advice on patients’ tendency to select advice. I found 
significant evidence that OHQPs promote suboptimal medical advice, enable or exacerbate 
care avoidance on the part of patients, and amplify the moral hazard for physicians on the 
platform to provide advice that is less accurate but more agreeable to patients in exchange 
for bounty. 
2.2 Background 
The outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan has caused a profound impact on the 
healthcare system and hospitals in China. On the one hand, the healthcare system in Hubei 
province was overwhelmed to the point of near breakdown, and tens of thousands of 
doctors were mobilized into Hubei to cope with the sudden eruption of COVID-19 cases. 
On the other hand, hospitals outside Hubei suffered a drastic decrease of patient inflow, 
mainly due to the complete or partial lockdown of cities and towns nation-wide that 
severely suppressed hospital visits, the closure of departments not related to COVID-19 
treatment to prevent cross-infection and comorbidity, and patient reluctance to go to a 
hospital in fear of getting infected.  
To cope with the sudden unavailability of hospital healthcare, Chinese patients and 
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doctors began to move their activities online. The dominant OHQP (Online Healthcare 
Question & Answer Platforms) websites such as 120ask.com and haodf.com, witnessed a 
sharp increase of daily visits. For example, the number of health-related questions that were 
asked and answered daily on 120ask.com nearly tripled after strict lockdown were 
announced on Jan 23rd. and subsequently national lockdown. 
The pandemic made people rediscover the importance and value of OHQPs, which 
have steadily developed into a multi-billion business in China since their establishment in 
2006. When a global pandemic such as COVID-19 collapsed the healthcare system, 
OHQPs could potentially function as a valuable substitute of regular hospital in-person 
care. The original purpose of OHQPs was to provide swift and cheap medical service to 
patients from anywhere. To date, hundreds of millions of questions have been asked and 
answered on these platforms. 
One question that needs to be addressed, given such enormous impact of OHQPs 
and potentially even bigger role they might assume in the future, is whether OHQPs are 
well-equipped to provide high quality healthcare advice and how much risks patients 
assume by seeking and following advice on OHQPs. Because their impact is largely 
confined to China, OHQPs, despite being very influential and successful, have not yet 
drawn enough academic attention.  
Here in the first part of thesis, I will use 120ask.com as an example to investigate 
the quality of healthcare advice provided by OHQPs, the role of platform design in quality 
checks, and the scale of influence when bad medical advice is propagated by OHQPs. Last 
but not the least, while acknowledging the positive impact OHQPs performed to the society 
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as a complement and supplement to in-person hospital care, I devised a set of suggestions 
targeting both doctors and platforms to improve the quality of care.  
2.3 Introduction: What Is OHQPs and How They Operate in China 
2.3.1 Overview of the study 
Online Health Question and Answer Platforms (OHQPs) are a new type of platform 
that serves to connect patients to physicians on the internet for medical consulting. These 
platforms have enormous societal and economic impact in China. Since 2006, OHQPs have 
grown into a multi-billion-dollar business, attracting over 6% of all registered doctors in 
China. Their success can be attributed to a variety of factors including supplementing 
and/or complementing traditional points of care, providing cheap, convenient and rapid 
access to physician advice, and redistributing the means of access between patients and 
physicians. As such, OHQPs have the potential to alleviate inefficiencies and constraints 
in modern healthcare systems. Because these platforms provide an inexpensive alternative 
to offline medical advice seeking, it is likely that they have a disproportionate impact on 
economically disadvantaged populations.  
No existing research has been done to explain how advice-seekers react to and 
ultimately accept or reject medical advice on OHQPs. While there is substantial research 
on patients’ reaction to advice in offline settings, electronic health advice and on 
information-seeking on related platforms, such as Social Q&A platforms (SQPs), OHQPs 
are distinct in the type of information being sought, the scope of information asymmetry, 
the role that cognitive biases play, and the platform constraints and features that determine 
how information is conveyed and evaluated. So far little empirical study has been done to 
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estimate the quality of advice proffered and accepted on OHQPs, and to understand how 
patients evaluate and accept advice. Put simply, truly little is known about OHQPs and 
given their prevalence, potential and risks, I cannot afford to ignore them. 
To address these concerns, I conducted a large-scale analysis of hundreds of 
thousands of questions and answers collected from one of the most popular OHQPs. Using 
a panel of experienced physicians, I obtained empirical estimates of the quality of advice 
that is proffered and accepted across a wide range of medical topics. I leveraged natural 
language processing techniques to capture a rich set of features of platform cues and advice 
conveyed to patients, including physicians profile information and platform reputation, 
aspects of prognosis, suggestions for care, and the psychometric aspects of communication. 
To understand how patients evaluate and ultimately accept or reject medical advice, I 
deployed deep learning neural networks models trained to mimic patients’ actual decision-
making. Using a novel bootstrapped feature perturbation protocol, I estimated the impact 
of these features on the probability for patients to accept advice. To my knowledge this is 
the first study that provides large-scale empirical evidence of the quality of advice and how 
patient respond to advice on OHQPs. The results reveal several troubling aspects of how 
OHQPs function in the real world and have immediate implications for platform providers, 
physicians and public health. 
2.3.2 The Social and economic impact of OHQPs 
OHQPs have grown into a multi-billion-dollar business since 2006, filling a 
demand for access to physician consultation, and complementing brick and mortar point of 
care visits. Physicians are a scarce resource in China – only 3M doctors are available to 
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attend to 0.2B patients each year (Sohu, 2017). Physicians in China are typically 
overworked, with more than 50% of them working in excess of 60 hours per week 
throughout the year (Changyexinxi, 2017). Moreover, the allocation of care resources to 
patients is vastly skewed, with 3A rank hospitals (the highest ranked hospitals according 
to the Ministry of Health of the People’s Republic of China), which comprise only 7% of 
all hospitals in China, undertaking 49% of all clinical care and 43.1% of all hospitalization 
(according to the National Commission of Population and Family Planning, 2017). OHQPs 
have the potential to alleviate these supply-side disparities by matching patients with 
physicians from smaller or lesser ranked hospitals, overcoming constraints of proximity or 
geography. OHQPs also have intrinsic advantages in facilitating convenient, economical, 
and timely interaction between patients and doctors. For example, one of the top OHQPs, 
120ask.com (the platform I studied) has attracted more than one hundred thousand 
providers of medical advice who have collectively answered approximately 360M 
questions (Baike, 2019b). Recent events emphasize the important role that OHQPs (and 
online healthcare in general) play in meeting patients’ needs and complementing or even 
supplementing offline healthcare. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic that 
ravaged China in Feb and Mar 2020, I observed a significant increase in newly registered 
patients and the number of questions asked on OHQPs, which nearly tripled during the 
nation-wide lockdown. This is likely because OHQPs provided an alternative to in-person 
care at hospitals which many patients avoided due to high concentrations of patients 
infected with COVID-19. 
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2.3.3 How OHQPs operate 
OHQPs provide online medical consultation by connecting patients with medical 
questions to physicians, medical practitioners and other advice-givers through a Q&A 
interface. Most OHQPs offer hierarchical consulting, with baseline medical consultation 
available through a very low-cost or free (for patients) Q&A interface, and more extensive 
higher cost consultation with advice-givers on the platform through online messaging (e.g., 
WeChat) or phone conversation.  
In a typical Q&A interaction on OHQPs, a patient posts her question and one or 
more physicians, medical professionals, or other advice-givers post their responses. After 
evaluating all of the available answers, the patient can select one as the winner, who collects 
the bounty, and may elect (at additional cost) to ask more questions or schedule a follow-
up consultation with the advice-giver who supplied the winning answer. Advice-givers may 
elect to be verified by the platform, in which case their personal and professional 
information (name, picture, hospital affiliation, qualifications, past activity on the platform) 
is either disclosed directly on the Q&A page or available through a hyperlink. In OHQPs, 
askers are patients who typically lack medical expertise and information asymmetry 
between askers and advice-givers (e.g., physicians) is high. Importantly, doctors are often 
monetarily incentivized to have their answers chosen, either directly through question 
bounties (that are rewarded based on patient choice), through higher cost (follow-up) 
consultation, or reputation increase which improves the chance for other patients to initiate 
higher cost consultations. 
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2.4 Literature Review 
Over the past decade, a wealth of research has examined how information systems 
interact with healthcare in terms of Electronic Health Record or Health Information 
(Agarwal et al., 2010; Angst et al., 2010; Angst & Agarwal, 2017; Atasoy, Chen, et al., 
2018; Atasoy, Demirezen, et al., 2018; Mishra et al., 2012; Yaraghi et al., 2015), online 
physician reviews (Gao et al., 2015; Hao et al., 2017; Lu and Rui, 2015), online 
communities, social support, social media (Bavafa et al., 2013; Gu et al., 2018; Lapointe 
et al., 2014; Yan and Tan, 2014), and m-health (Ghose et al., 2017). However, little to no 
research has been done on OHQPs, despite their vast popularity in China and potential to 
emerge globally as a channel for patient-doctor interaction. Five streams of research are 
relevant to OHQPs, including research on Social Q&A Platforms (SQPs), patient response 
to advice in offline settings, information processing when information asymmetry is high, 
evidence of multiple forms of documented cognitive bias in patients responding to medical 
advice, and research on post-choice decision-making. 
2.4.1 Social Q&A platforms (SQPs) and OHQPs 
The most similar platforms to OHQPs are Social Q&A platforms (SQP) such as 
Yahoo! Answers and Stack Overflow, which allow askers to ask new questions and search 
answers to previous questions from archival records. Given the growing popularity of these 
platforms and their relevance to connected populations, it is unsurprising that they have 
received substantial attention from academic researchers, particularly in the field of 
information systems (Harper et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2008; Morris et al., 2010; Oh et al., 
2012; Song et al., 2016; Zhang, 2010). However, OHQPs differ from SQPs in multiple, 
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critically important ways, including the extremely high information asymmetry between 
askers and advice-givers, inclusion of monetary incentives (bounties), a single evaluator 
for each question, disclosure of the solvers’ real identity (to prevent fraud), lack of peer 
rating mechanisms, and poorly implemented search functionality  (Liu et al., 2011, 2017; 
Nie et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2008),  whereas SQPs rely heavily on their peer-reviewed 
and multiple evaluator rating systems to promote high quality answers and convenient 
search functionality to ensure good availability of information (Chirag Shah, 2009). The 
healthcare context is also an important distinction. The stakes in OHQPs are personal, most 
relevant to the asker, and can be significantly higher, given that poor medical advice may 
have detrimental and even catastrophic consequences. There is some research on healthcare 
on social media and SQPs (Bae & Yi, 2017; Jin et al., 2016; Yi, 2018). For example, Jin et 
al. (2016) examine how patients evaluate advice from solvers in the online health SQP 
Baidu Knows. They found that patient responses depend on emotional support in advice, 
source credibility of advice, and competition between advice givers. However, the Baidu 
Knows SQP differs from OHQPs in many ways as highlighted above. The most important 
distinctions are that advice-givers get no bounty for answering questions, are from the 
general population and therefore typically lack medical expertise, have peer review 
systems and much stronger search functionality. The role of information asymmetry, source 
credibility, motivation, empathy, competition and other factors they consider are clearly 
different when asker and advice-giver share similar expertise or are both patients, 
compared to when they are patient and physician (as is in OHQPs). Overall, findings from 
research on SQPs, even in the health context, are unlikely to carry over to OHQPs.  
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2.4.2 How patients respond to professional healthcare advice 
Extensive research has been conducted on patient response to healthcare advice in 
more traditional offline, in-person care settings (Francis et al., 2010; Haskard Zolnierek & 
Dimatteo, 2009; Kaplan et al., 1989), but little research exists on online healthcare 
consulting environments. Cao et al. study how patients select a physician to consult online, 
but not their response to the advice they receive through consultation (Cao et al., 2017). 
Wu (2018) studied online healthcare communities (which often co-exist in parallel with 
Q&A sections of OHQPs) and found that perceived usefulness and patient satisfaction 
explain most of the variance in patient’s continued use of these communities. Some work 
has shown that patients behave irrationally in the context of in-person medical care (Bass 
et al. 2006, Case et al., 2005; Reach, 2015; Rodoletz et al., 2005), but the online healthcare 
setting of OHQPs differs in several important ways. First, in terms of commitment, patients 
spend much more money (hundreds or thousands CNY as opposed to OHQPs which may 
be free or only require a small micropayment of <1 CNY), time and effort (physical 
presence vs. posting online) in the case of offline consulting. The increase in commitment 
in offline consulting likely indicates that patients suspect their concern is serious enough 
to warrant an office visit. Second, in offline consulting there is no explicit competition 
between physicians offering advice as patients typically have a one-to-one relationship 
with the consulting physician and must expend additional resources to attain a second 
opinion. The third difference is in terms of accountability, as in offline consulting 
dispensing poor medical advice is more visible and easily traceable (through official 
records that are historically maintained and subject to review), whereas on OHQPs, 
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physicians bear little consequence for giving poor advice as the platform does not review 
the quality of advice nor make prior answers easily searchable. While OHQPs do provide 
reputation metrics for physicians, in terms of activity on the platform and the ratio of 
accepted answers, it is not clear whether such signals promote doctors who give more 
accurate advice. Finally, the face-to-face nature of offline consulting allows physicians to 
gauge and respond to patient’s attitudes when they confer advice and places the physician 
in a more authoritative position. In contrast, physicians in OHQPs cannot gauge or respond 
to patients’ reactions and OHQPs make patients the explicit authority by allowing them to 
designate the correct answer and assign the benefit (bounty/reputation increase) to the 
physician who provided their preferred answer. These distinctions make OHQPs a unique 
context where both patients’ and doctors' behaviors may significantly deviate from offline 
healthcare settings. Yet, the prevalence and influence of OHQPs makes it absolutely crucial 
that I understand these behaviors and their impact on advice quality and patient evaluation, 
which has serious implications for public health. 
2.4.3 How individuals process information 
The most relevant theoretical framework for information processing to OHQPs is 
dual-process theory. Variants of dual-process theories have evolved in different disciplines, 
primarily psychology, economics and marketing (Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; 
Glöckner & Witteman, 2010; Wei & Watts, 2008). Despite their differences, these theories 
consistently stipulate that humans engage in two different types of processing when they 
encounter new information: People may logically analyze new information content or 
instead may attend to heuristic cues associated with that content. However, when a person 
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lacks the necessary expertise to analyze information logically, he must rely entirely on 
heuristic cues to decide whether or not to adopt the information (Trumbo, 1999). In OHQPs 
(and other online platforms), the platform determines which heuristic cues are visible for 
users to leverage in their decision-making process. When the expertise gap (i.e., 
information asymmetry) is high, as in healthcare settings, patients must often solely rely 
upon heuristic processing (Jin et al., 2016). In such cases, the platform constraints become 
critically important to the overall performance of the system. It is therefore important to 
understand whether, how, and to what extent patients leverage heuristic cues in evaluating 
healthcare advice and whether and to what extent their evaluations are biased. 
2.4.4 Bias in information processing 
A wealth of research suggests that people are subject to bias when processing 
information in a variety of forms and underlying mechanisms, including information 
selection and avoidance due to confirmation bias (Nickerson and Bias 1998, Pohl 2004, 
Trope and Bassok 1982), cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962; Hyman & Sheatsley, 1947; 
Trope, 1979), the desire to avoid information that evokes anxiety, discomfort, and other 
negative feelings (Case et al., 2005; Rodoletz et al., 2005; Sweeny et al., 2010), the need 
for validation or through defensive reasoning (Hart et al., 2009, Jain & Maheswaran, 2002; 
Kunda, 1990). Substantial research has shown that patients are prone to willingly ignore, 
reject, or avoid bad news, even at their own detriment (Case et al., 2005; Rodoletz et al., 
2005). For example, potential HIV carriers often intentionally avoid seeking test results or 
even blatantly reject them, out of denial (Sweeny et al., 2010). Taken together, prior 
research suggests that patients in OHQPs will be particularly prone to bias, but lacking 
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expertise, must rely on heuristic cues provided by the platform and embedded in physicians’ 
communications. 
2.4.5 Post-choice decision making 
The last relevant stream of research relates to post-choice decision making, which 
is a rich topic of study in psychology and economics. A well-known classical work in 
psychology studied how choice might impact post-decision evaluation and found an 
increase in preference for chosen goods and a decrease in preference for unchosen goods 
(Gerard et al., 1983). A more recent study has confirmed that this phenomenon is not only 
present in subjects’ self-report measures but directly in measures of brain activation (Izuma 
et al., 2010). In addition, the Differentiation and Consolidation Theory of decision making 
predicts consolidation processes which work in favor of the chosen alternative (Svenson, 
1992). Taken together, this research suggests that the patient’s act of choosing an answer 
to their question from the set of alternative answers will increase their tendency to act on 
the chosen advice and influence their downstream behaviors.  
In the remainder of this paper, I describe the data collection and processing methods, 
analyze the quality of advice on a large OHQP, and estimate the impact of heuristic cue 
features of medical advice on patients’ tendency to select advice. wealth of research 
suggests that people are subject to bias when processing information in a variety of forms 
and underlying mechanisms, including information selection and avoidance due to 
confirmation bias (Nickerson & Bias, 1998; Pohl, 2004; Trope & Bassok, 1982), cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger, 1962; Hyman & Sheatsley, 1947; Trope, 1979), the desire to avoid 
information that evokes anxiety, discomfort, and other negative feelings (Case et al., 2005; 
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Rodoletz et al., 2005; Sweeny et al., 2010), the need for validation or through defensive 
reasoning (Hart et al., 2009; Jain & Maheswaran, 2002; Kunda, 1990). Substantial research 
has shown that patients are prone to willingly ignore, reject, or avoid bad news, even at 
their own detriment (Case et al., 2005; Rodoletz et al., 2005). For example, potential HIV 
carriers often intentionally avoid seeking test results or even blatantly reject them, out of 
denial (Sweeny et al., 2010). Taken together, prior research suggests that patients in OHQPs 
will be particularly prone to bias, but lacking expertise, must rely on heuristic cues provided 
by the platform and embedded in physicians’ communications. 
2.5 Data Collection and Methodology 
2.5.1 Data collection and preprocessing 
I scraped data from a Chinese OHQP (120ask.com) spanning a three-month period 
in 2015. 120ask is an online health Q&A platform where hundreds of thousands of 
registered doctors, medical practitioners (e.g., registered nurses) and other advice-givers 
provide medical advice for an exceptionally low cost. The platform has 320k visitors daily 
and has been searched on Baidu about 100M times since its inception. Patient fees and 
advice-giver payment for Q&A consultation differs across different OHQPs and over time, 
but on 120ask in 2015, nearly all questions were free for patients. Advice-givers were 
provided with a small monetary incentive (0.10 CNY) to answer each question. If an 
advice-giver’s answer was accepted by the patient, they received a bounty of 0.15 CNY. 
Both of these payments to advice-givers were subsidized by the platform. It was possible 
for patients to add an extra bounty (1–100 CNY) out of their own pocket to increase 
attention to their question, though this rarely ever happened (in less than 0.5% of questions). 
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Patients on 120ask can also opt for further consulting through WeChat applications or over 
the phone. Such consulting is typically pro-rated by the minute or conversation, at a price 
set by the doctor and listed on their profile page. This site was chosen because 1) it is one 
of the largest OHQP sites, with more than 100k officially registered doctors participating 
and thousands of questions answered on a daily basis; 2) data on all questions and answers 
and doctors’ information can be scraped via conventional methods; 3) by website design 
full text data from questions and answers are highly formatted (i.e., almost all answers 
contain two distinct parts: diagnosis and suggestions), which facilitates natural language 
processing; 4) for each question, a patient is allowed to select only one correct answer, 
which rules out the possibility of multiple selections that can significantly complicate 
analysis. Because I are focused on patient evaluation among a set of multiple alternatives, 
I exclude from this analysis questions that were not evaluated or were answered by less 
than two doctors. The whole data set consists of 114,037 questions and 496,842 answers. 
To ensure time invariance of the findings, I also scraped data from the same site 
spanning a three-month period in 2019 and performed the same analysis on it. I observed 
largely the same results. 
2.5.2 Encoding the features of answers 
Each answer on the platform is highly structured and contains cues provided by 
both the platform (context) and the answer itself (content). Context cues include credentials 
(physicians’ occupational rank, affiliated hospital rank, listed expertise, and activity on the 
platform) and effort (the number of words in an answer, whether the doctor asks detailed 
questions). Doctor’s occupational rank (e.g., chief and associate chief physicians) measures 
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their social status in the field of medicine and can signal their experience, credentials, 
achievement, and reputation. The rank of a hospital where a physician works is also a signal. 
In China, hospitals are officially classified into three levels by the Ministry of Health 
according to metrics such as size, endowment, number of visiting patients, yearly 
performance, and number of highly reputed experts (Baike, 2019a). The highest rank is 
level 3A. The level of a hospital likely serves as an indirect reflection of a doctor’s social 
status. Being affiliated with a more prestigious hospital positively signals a doctors’ status. 
OHQPs also provide reputation information, including the number of questions physicians 
have answered and the ratio of accepted answers. Other context cues include the number 
of informative words in an answer and whether physicians habitually include postface text 
(such as a disclaimer or impersonal coda, outro or closing statement) that is common across 
all their answers. 
Content cues include diagnosis and prognosis (the section of an answer that 
classifies a patient’s ailment and likelihood of future outcomes given that classification), 
suggestions (an indication of what a patient should do, typically in plain language), and 
other communication language (which may include words of comfort or encouragement). 
Diagnoses and prognosis typically contain medical terminology or jargon which can be 
difficult for a patient to understand, and which are therefore less likely to significantly 
impact the patients’ evaluation (in accordance with dual-process theory). However, 
suggestions and other communication contain a great deal of heuristic cues — plain, non-
professional phrases that are comprehensible to laymen and intended to communicate, 
explain or instruct — that a patient can readily use to evaluate an answer. To encode these 
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cues into numeric features, I turn to natural language processing methods applied to 
Chinese text. 
Word choice can provide rich information about beliefs, fears, thinking patterns, 
social relationships, and personalities. It is therefore interesting to explore the psychometric 
dimensions of doctors' answers and examine whether and to what extent they affect 
patients' evaluation. To capture psychometric features of answers, I leverage the Chinese 
LIWC dictionary, a scientific project that captures the tones of Chinese phrases or words 
by attributing to each one or more psychometric dimensions (Huang et al. 2012). For 
example, the dimension "anxiety" includes words such as 焦虑 (anxious), 不知所措 
(unsettled), 漫无目的 (aimless), 危机 (danger). The Chinese LIWC dictionary is very 
inclusive but can be prone to mismatched characterizations because many Chinese words 
and characters are polysemantic. To avoid erroneous characterizations, I excluded 
dimensions that are mismatched more than 50% of the time from this study. This procedure 
resulted in 18 LIWC dimensions including ‘discrepancy’, ‘affiliation’, ‘male’, ‘female’, 
‘sexual’, ‘differentiation’, ‘certain’, ‘feel’, ‘cause’, ‘achieve’, ‘death’, ‘family’, ‘eating’, 
‘anxiety’, ‘risk’, ‘reward’, ‘tentative’, and ‘friend’. 
In addition to issues of mismatched characterization, I also found that LIWC alone 
failed to capture a variety of common phrases used by doctors to express their attitudes 
toward patients' situations (e.g., expressions of empathy, attempts to soothe, declaration of 
warnings, downplaying the severity of a condition). To account for this, I built a heuristic 
dictionary of common phrases to compliment Chinese LIWC features. To ensure that the 
heuristic dictionary was meaningful and appropriate, I consulted several experienced 
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Chinese physicians. The initial heuristic dictionary was constructed by manually inspecting 
the content of 3000 answers. This dictionary was then sent to a panel of experienced 
Chinese physicians who were instructed to examine whether words or phrases were 
correctly assigned to each dimension, whether such dimensions were sufficiently inclusive, 
and to provide corrections when appropriate. Finally, the content of an additional 1000 
answers was manually examined using the dictionary to ensure that each dimension did not 
exclude or miss pertinent words or phrases. This resulted in the addition of three prominent 
dimensions: optimism, comforting, and frankness. Importantly, I allowed for soft matching 
of phrases with interstitial words (in the form of wild cards). For example, 没有*问题 
(where "*" indicates the wildcard) matched both 没有问题 "not an issue" and 没有大问
题 "not a serious issue". 
Beyond the psychometric dimensions associated with word choice, patient 
evaluation likely depended upon the types of suggestions they received from doctors. To 
capture this, I constructed a dictionary of phrases to match common types of suggestions 
given by doctors, using a similar procedure as described above in consultation with a panel 
of Chinese doctors. This resulted in five types of general suggestions: suggestions 
involving diet, in-person checkup, in-person treatment, getting rest, and exercise. I 
excluded suggestions to take medicine as almost all doctors' answers contained such 
suggestions and there was significant heterogeneity in medicine type. Soft matching of 
phrases with interstitial words was performed for suggestions in the same manner as 
described above.  
To map the features of doctors' answers onto psychometric and suggestion 
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dimensions, I used regular expression matching. The powerful regular expression system 
allows for accommodation of flexible terms, negation, conjunction/disjunction of different 
phrases with the matching terms, and positive/negative look-back. For example, it captures 
你最好赶紧去医院 (“you need to go the hospital immediately”), 建议立即手术 (“I 
suggest immediate surgery”) and 去正规医生检查  (“should visit a doctor to get 
examined”) while negating 别去医院 ("do not go to hospital"). Phrases with similar or 
the same meaning (such as 去医院 and 到医院, which both suggest going to the hospital) 
were all captured by introducing disjunction in matching terms. To ensure the equivalency 
between regular expression terms and phrases in the constructed dictionaries, I performed 
extensive tests using the manual inspection of content from a randomly selected sample of 
1000 answers to ensure that regular expressions matched all desired phrases and terms 
inclusively. A complete list of all answer features categorized by context cues, phrases, and 




Table 1. Description of Content and Phrase Cues 
Feature variable Type What the feature means How its measured 
ans_postface binary  
A binary which measures the 
usage of a highly formatted phrase 
that occurs at the end of 30% of 
posts ("this is my replay to 'xyz', I 
hope it helps. Wish you get well as 
soon as possible") 





The use of comforting phrases, 
such as: 
It's okay; don't worry; no big deal 
A binary dummy indicating the 
quartile of the count of all 
comforting phrases from a list 
constructed with collaboration 
from experts 
Controls for negation before the 
phrase (not, not likely, etc.) 
ans_greeting  binary 
Measure whether an answer 
includes greetings or farewells, 
such as: hello, greetings, best 
wishes, hope it helps 
1 if exists, 0 if not 
sugg_checkup binary 
Whether a post contains 
suggestion of going to hospital for 
examination/inspection 
1 if exists, 0 if not 
controlling for negation before 
the phrase (not, not likely, etc.) 
sugg_treat binary 
Whether a post contains 
suggestion of going to hospital for 
treatment/operation 
1 if exists, 0 if not 
controlling for negation before 





Doctors' judgments regarding the 
future prognosis/consequence/risk 
of the disease, overall optimistic, 
such as: 
can/could be cured, no life-
threatening, prognosis is good, low 
risk 
A binary dummy indicating the 
quartile of the count of all 
optimistic phrases from a list 
constructed with collaboration 
from experts 
Controls for negation before the 





Doctors' judgments regarding the 
future prognosis/consequence/risk 
of the disease, overall pessimistic, 
such as: 
consequence could be serious, life 
threatening, prognosis is bad, 
difficult to fully cure/recover, 
could get worse 
A binary dummy indicating the 
quartile of the count of all frank 
phrases from a list constructed 
with collaboration from experts 
Controls for negation before the 
phrase (not, not likely, etc.) 
sugg_eat binary 
Whether a post contains 
suggestion of diet (either eating 
more or less or not) 
1 if exists, 0 if not 
make sure there is no negation 




sugg_rest binary Whether a post contains suggestion of rest 
1 if exists, 0 if not 
make sure there is no negation 
before the phrase (not, not likely 
etc.) 
ans_inquire binary 
A binary indicating whether a 
physician asked a question in their 
answer 
1 if they asked, 0 if not 
doc_occupation categorical 
The answering doctor's category of 
job, includes: 
Level 0 – unlicensed 
Level 1 – Nurse practitioner  
Level 2 – Resident 
Level 3 – High ranked doctor 
These levels are decided 
according to the platform 
 
Table 2. Description of Context Cues 
Feature variable Type What the feature means How its measured 
ans_postface binary  
A binary which measures the 
usage of a highly formatted 
phrase that occurs at the end of 
30% of posts ("this is my replay 
to 'xyz', I hope it helps. Wish you 
get well as soon as possible") 
1 if exists, 0 if not 
ratio_help_accpt float 
Percentage of a physicians’ 
answers that have been 
designated correct by patients  






Logarithm of a physician’s total 
number of answers on the OHQP 
Quartile indicator of  
log (# posts) 
doc_hospType binary 
A collection of binary dummies 
to indicate the official ranks of 
the affiliated hospitals of 
physician 
Binary dummies to categorize the 
rank of the hospital according to 
the Chinese Ministry of Health: 
Large (level 3), medium (level 2), 
small (level 1), other (non-
hospital medical institute such as 
local community health center, 
private clinics), none (no hospital 
affiliation) 
doc_intro_video binary 
A binary indicating whether 
solvers chose to show an 
introduction video of themselves 
1 if solvers chose to, 0 if not, NA 
if not available 
doc_gender binary A binary indicating physicians’ gender 





Table 3. Description of Psychometric Language Cues 








1 需要: need, should,  
2 刺激: stimulate, stimulate; excite; provoke; 
irritate; activate, stimulus 
3 作用: act on, effect, impact, affect, 
4 影响: influence, affect, effect 









1 帮助: help, assist 
2 家: family 
3 伴: to company, companion, partner, to 
follow 
4 配合: matching, fitting in with, compatible 
with, to correspond to, fit to, conform to, 
rapport, to coordinate with, to act in concert 
with, to cooperate 









1 不适: uncomfortable, uneasy 
2 担心: worry 
3 紧张: nervous, tension 
4 压力: pressure, burden 









1 引起: cause, lead to 
2 使: cause, lead to,  
3 根据: based on 
4 导致: cause 









1 需要:  demand, need, necessary, want 
2 无: one, do not (usually combined with 
need, want), -less, not 
3 没有: same as 无,  (it's) nothing, to not 
be, hasn’t   
4 一定: certain, certainly, surly  











1 死: death, to die 
2 杀: to kill, to disinfect 
3 死亡: death 
4 活的: alive 








1 不: not, no, cannot 
2 或: or, perhaps, maybe 
3 而: as well as, and, but, but also, in 
addition, rather 
4 除: besides, to remove, in addition to, to 
wipe out, to divide, except 








1 可: can, possible, not bad 
2 要: will, need to 
3 能: can, could, able to 
4 可以: can, may 









1 怀孕: pregnant 
2 孩子: kid, child 
3 宝宝: baby 
4 母: mom, mother 









1 皮: skin, epithelium 
2 痛: pain, hurt, painful 
3 重: serious, important, heavy, to repeat 
4 手: hand, cell (phone), novice 










1 女: daughter, female 
2 女性: female 
3 母: mom, mother 
4 妈: mom, mother 











1 帮助: help, assist 
2 接触: contact, touch 
3 朋友: friend 
4 团: group, bloc, team 









1 好: good, easy to, well, very, fine 
2 加: to join, to participate, to add, to take 
part 
3 最好: had better, best,  
4 好的: OK, no problem, good, nice 









1 注意: pay attention to, notice 
2 问题: problem, question, issue  
3 没有: no, none, same as 无,  (it's) nothing, 
to not be, hasn’t   
4 避免: to avoid 









1 他: he, him 
2 男性: male 
3 拔: to pull out, to remove, to stand tall 
4 男孩: boy 









1 性: sex, sexual, nature, property, 
characteristics, gender, -ness 
2 激: hormone, to provoke, to excite 
3 孕: pregnant 
4 干: dry, (swear) fuck, to do  





Measure the tentative 
dimension 
1 可以: can, may, not bad 
2 或: or, perhaps, maybe 
3 问: ask,  
4 行: run walk, popular, OK, to do, to execute 




2.5.3 Evaluating the accuracy of online advice 
To objectively evaluate the accuracy of doctors’ diagnosis and suggestions, I 
conducted a survey among eight experienced physicians (referred to as evaluators) in China 
who had not participated in any OHQPs at the time of the survey. I selected evaluators with 
strong qualifications and experience. Those expert evaluators were trained in China, in a 
reputable medical school, received broad and systematic training across all fields prior to 
specialization, and have approximately 8–30 years of experience practicing medicine in 
China. They were recruited through an informal social network forum where physicians 
exchange medical advice and network professionally. Each was paid 2000 CNY 
(approximately 300 USD) for their effort, which is approximately one half to one third of 
their monthly salary. They spent on average 20 to 30 hours over the course of 3 weeks to 
complete their evaluations.  
I randomly sampled 3000 questions (from a pool of 114k), where each question had 
multiple answers. This sample generated 12,767 different question/answer pairs (survey 
units) with two items “How much do you agree with this doctor’s diagnosis?” (from 
1=totally disagree to 5=totally agree), and “How confident are you in this judgement?” 
(from 1=totally unconfident to 5=very confident). To remove the potential for bias 
associated with doctors’ identity or status, I provided questions and answers only, with no 
supplemental information on the doctors who provided the answers. Each survey unit (i.e. 
a question/answer pair) was evaluated by three independent evaluators.  
Evaluators were instructed to evaluate the entirety of advice within an answer 
(diagnosis, prognosis, suggestions for care) on the 5-point Likert scale. Evaluators were 
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instructed to rate confidence at 1 if they felt that the question fell outside of their expertise. 
They were explicitly encouraged to say “I don’t know” when not sure, to improve the 
credibility of the evaluation. Evaluators were also encouraged to use any outside resources 
that they felt were necessary to aid in assessing the advice given. In a follow-up survey that 
I conducted, 3 out of 4 the physicians who responded indicated that they consulted outside 
resources. To ensure that the physician panel of respondents were reading the questions 
and answers carefully, I incorporated an attention check randomly into the survey. The 
attention check instructed them to report specific answers, which, if not followed, would 
invalidate the respondent’s evaluations entirely. None of the expert evaluators failed the 
attention check.   











where 𝑆!  is the rating score of the answer 𝑖 ; 𝑐!,# 	 is the confidence of the 
evaluation of answer 𝑖 by evaluator 𝑗 (restricted to the same question); 𝑟!,# is the rating 
of answer 𝑖  by evaluator 𝑗 (restricted to the same question); the sums are taken over all 
evaluators 𝑗 that evaluate answers to the question, provided that their confidence exceeds 
2. In other words, the score of each answer was constructed is the confidence-squared 
weighted average of all scores of confidence level 3 or higher (scores from evaluations 
with confidence level of 2 or lower were omitted to mitigate professional uncertainty). 
For each question, the answer with highest overall aggregated score was designated 
 
30 
as the correct answer. When two or more answers to the same questions were tied by 
aggregated score, I used the highest confidence level from any of the evaluators as the 
tiebreaker. In ties where the highest confidence by any evaluator were equal (8% of total 
answers), I allowed for multiple answers to be designated as correct. Summary statistics 
on evaluator ratings are provided in Table 4. 
Table 4. Summary stats on evaluator rating 
Statistics Weighted score Average confidence level 
Mean 4.28 4.14 
Std 0.67 0.55 
min 1 1 
25% 4.0 3.67 
50% 4.53 4.33 
75% 4.76 4.67 
max 5 5 
N 12,762 12,762 
 
Overall, the ratings were consistent across different evaluators. The average 
deviation of each physician’s rating from the weighted score was only 0.57, much less than 
the mean of weighted score of all answers (~ 4.3).  In addition, evaluators agreed 
approximately 80% of the time to within 1 rating score, and more than 80% of time at least 
two out of three evaluators reached consensus. The most common ways of measuring inter-
rater reliability such as Cohen's kappa, intra-class correlation, and Krippendorff's alpha 
cannot incorporate confidence which is unique yet important in the settings.  
From the analysis I conclude that good healthcare advice is represented among the 
answers to most questions. For each question, at least one of the answers had an average 
rating above 3 with a stated confidence of 3 or higher by at least one evaluator, implying 
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that patients had at least one reasonable option to choose from.  
To understand why some answers were poorly rated (score < 3), I randomly selected 
70 such answers along with their questions (half of which were chosen by patients) and 
recruited 4 evaluators from the original panel of 8 professional evaluators to re-evaluate 
the answers and provide more details. I first asked whether they agreed with original 
evaluations given by their peers (93% of the time, they did). I then asked them to write a 
brief paragraph on why they agreed or disagreed. Each answer was evaluated by 2 
evaluators. 
2.6 Results 
2.6.1 Analyzing patients’ evaluation performances 
To assess the accuracy of patient evaluation, I compared answers accepted by 
patients to those designated as correct by the expert-evaluators. The results are striking. On 
average, patients selected the best answer (as designated by the evaluators) in only 31% of 
all cases (922 out of 2,968). Furthermore, in approximately 29% of the cases (857 out of 
2,968), patients selected the worst answer (as designated by the evaluators). Approximately 
one fifth of all answers that were designated as “entirely incorrect” (score < 2) by the 
evaluators were chosen by patients (113 out of 519), indicating that extremely bad advice, 
although less common, was likely to be chosen when given. In addition, patients are almost 
as likely to choose answers within the top 25% by evaluation score (chosen 24.5% of the 
time) as they are to choose answers in the bottom 25% (chosen 21.7% of the time). a shows 
the distribution of answer scores chosen by patients and that are the best answers. b shows 
the distribution of the difference between the score of the best and the patient chosen answer. 
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It could be that patients seem to perform poorly not because they are poor evaluators, 
but because for some questions, the quality of answers may be low and also may not vary 
substantially – i.e., perhaps many questions have answers that are of similar quality and the 
patient must choose amongst these. To ascertain whether this is true, I plot the distribution 
of scores of top rated and bottom rated answers to each question, in c. The distribution of 
the difference between the scores of the best and worst answers are displayed in d. From 
these plots, it can be seen that the best and worst answers are fairly distinguishable. 
However, to determine whether patient choose poor answers because they lack good 
alternatives, I repeated the estimation of how often patients chose incorrect answers by 
only looking at questions that had a “clear cut” winner – as defined by questions where the 
quality score of the best answer was at least one full point above that of the second best 
answer. In this case, patients chose the best answer only 40% of the time and the worst 
answer 44% of the time. For questions with a “clear cut” winner, on average patients were 
better at choosing the best answer (40% for clear cut winner; 31% for all questions), but 
much more likely to choose the worst answer (44% for clear cut winner; 29% for all 




a b  
 
c d 
Figure 1. Distribution of Evaluation Score 
2.6.2 Patients performance across disease categories  
While choosing low quality medical advice can lead to harmful health 
consequences, not all categories of advice seeking are equally consequential. It is likely 
that the consequence of misjudgment varies over different types of conditions or disease 
categories. For example, in categories related to cancers or tumors, pediatrics (a vulnerable 
group where even a mild condition could be life-threatening if not properly attended) and 
internal medicine (mostly internal organ disease such as heart and liver problems), the 
damage caused by following bad advice could be much more severe. I analyzed patients' 
performance of evaluation by condition or disease categories. The results are displayed in 
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Table 5 (I omit the max score as it is identically 5 across all categories).  














cat_recreational Healthy life style 84 4.151 1.333 0.793 65.2% 
cat_sex STD 207 4.351 1.300 0.678 42.0% 
cat_pifu Dermatology 497 4.255 1.000 0.705 39.8% 
cat_chuanran Infectious disease 273 4.349 1.000 0.673 36.4% 
cat_pingxing Skin related condition 587 4.359 1.364 0.559 34.1% 
cat_waike Surgical department 2077 4.289 0.000 0.646 34.0% 
cat_wuguan Ear, Nose and Throat 841 4.197 0.000 0.740 31.7% 
cat_other Others 137 4.364 0.000 0.732 31.4% 
cat_zhongyi Chinese Medicine 323 4.227 1.000 0.724 30.4% 
cat_fuchan Obstetrics & Gynecology 2618 4.358 1.000 0.627 30.2% 
cat_zhongliu Tumor 347 4.090 1.455 0.761 29.3% 
cat_xinli Psychiatrics 306 4.325 1.800 0.601 28.6% 
cat_neke Internal medicine 2630 4.241 0.000 0.701 27.7% 
cat_meirong Cosmetics 206 4.272 1.158 0.614 27.7% 
cat_zhengxing Plastic Surgery 891 4.288 1.000 0.600 26.9% 
cat_erke Pediatrics 728 4.229 1.000 0.726 26.3% 
 
Interestingly, patients assessing answers to more vulnerable categories of questions 
are even more prone to poor judgment, as accuracy from all three categories ranked in the 
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bottom 6 of 16. The average difference between the score of the answer the patient chose 
and the score of the best answer has similar ranking across disease categories. Patients did 
particularly poor in pediatrics (ranked last) where most of the askers are parents of babies 
or toddlers. It is unclear why this is the case. In general, I speculate that reasons for poor 
performance by category could include: 1) diseases from these categories are more 
complicated; 2) external sources of information in these categories are more varied in 
quality, including sources of misinformation; 3) patients may be more prone to bias when 
affected by such conditions, leading to irrational judgment. Indeed, cursory analysis of 
questions from these categories reveals a higher level of anxiety (higher counts of words 
that match the Chinese LIWC dimension of “anxiety”).   
I can estimate the annual proliferation of poor medical advice through OHQPs 
without outside intervention by extrapolating such figure. On average 2M questions are 
answered and selected each year (extrapolating from the ~0.5M questions I collected over 
a 3-month period). Assuming the proportions of poor medical advice given and selected by 
patients as constant, I can expect 88k poor answers (scored lower than 3) from all categories, 
of which 17k are selected by patients. In the three vulnerable categories I identified 
(pediatrics, tumor and internal medicine), I can expect 31.3k low quality answers given 
each year, of which 5.5k answers will be chosen by patients. Even if patients act on only a 
fraction of selected advice, the consequences for public health are serious. Moreover, as I 
will show, several mechanisms on the platform incentivize patients to do so, including the 
physician reputation system, the lack of searchable records of patient-physician interaction 
and any kind of physician accountability. 
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When patients choose poor advice 
While I found that patients select suboptimal advice, this may not be particularly 
problematic if the quality of the advice they select is still high. On the other hand, when 
patients select advice that is poor (quality score <3) and considerably worse that the 
available alternatives this can lead to serious adverse health outcomes. Even though I found 
that answers of poor quality were rare (~6%) on the platform overall, because patients lack 
the ability to discriminate advice based on its quality, they still choose poor quality advice 
a substantial percentage of the time. Figure 2 displays the average percentage of the time 
that patients choose poor quality advice compared to the quality of the best alternative 
answer.  
 
Figure 2. Patient tendency to select poor quality advice 
Even when the best answer available was of relatively high quality (score > 4), 
patients chose poor quality advice 2–15% of the time. Given the large scale of the platform, 
the tendency for patients to select poor advice when it is offered can lead to thousands of 
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patients acting on bad advice.   
Here I gave a rough estimate the annual proliferation of poor medical advice 
through OHQPs, if the platform continues unchecked. On average, patients selected 
answers in approximately 440k questions each year (extrapolating from the ~110k 
questions where patients had more than one choice and selected an answer from the 3-
month data period). Assuming the proportions of poor medical advice given and selected 
by patients as constant, I can expect 124k poor answers (score < 3) from all categories, of 
which 23k are selected by patients. In the three vulnerable categories I identified (pediatrics, 
tumor and internal medicine), I can expect 32k low quality answers given each year, of 
which 5.7k answers will be chosen by patients. Even if patients act on only a fraction of 
selected advice, the consequences for public health are serious. Moreover, as I will show, 
several mechanisms on the platform incentivize patients to do so, including the platform 
reputation system, the lack of searchable records of patient-physician interaction and 
physician accountability. It is reasonable to wonder why poor-quality answers are given on 
the platform and why an answer would be rated poorly by an experience physician. I 
explore bad answers and bad actors on the platform in the next section. 
2.6.3 Characterizing bad answers and bad participants on the platform 
To understand why the panel of physician evaluators evaluated the quality of an 
answer as low, I conducted a follow-up survey with some of the physician evaluators from 
the original panel. I randomly sampled 70 answers that were poorly rated (approximately 
1/3 of answers rated 2 or below) and asked four evaluators from the original panel to 
indicate whether they agreed with the evaluation and to explain why or why not. In 93% 
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of all cases, the follow-up evaluators agreed with the original assessment. I then manually 
coded their explanations, yielding the categories shown in Table 3 (in descending order, 
according to the number of answers assigned to each category). 
Table 6. Categories of bad advice 
Category Description of bad advice 
1 The answer does not match the question. 
2 The advice-giver provided a partial but not complete answer. 
3 The answer is medically incorrect. 
4 
The advice-giver appears to be promoting a specific drug with little concern for the 
patient’s issue. 
5 The answer downplays the severity of the patient’s problem. 
6 
The answer is not concise, often containing too much information that is not related 
to the question. 
The second and third categories are somewhat generic for poor quality answers – 
involving advice that is not medically correct or is incomplete. However, other categories 
reveal more interesting facets of bad advice. 
The first and sixth categories seem to pertain to advice-givers on the platform that 
answer a large volume of questions, often with less care. Some advice-givers seem to have 
adopted the strategy of answering questions by copying and pasting the same answer to 
many questions, possibly by copying the information from other resources. My hypothesis 
is that some advice-givers have adopted a volume strategy by answering many similar 
questions with less tailored answers, in order to obtain bounties. 
The fourth category, which relates to potential drug promotion, is interesting 
because it reveals some unexpected incentives of some advice-givers on the platform. I 
note that the platform does not enforce that all advice-givers to be licensed to practice 
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medicine, and while they encourage advice-givers to provide their license information and 
become verified, it is not required. The opportunity for drug promotion in this unregulated 
channel is troubling.  
The fifth category may indicate that advice-givers might be acting in a manner to 
appease patients, which may be driven by (unconscious or conscious) tendencies to comfort 
the patient by downplaying the severity of their issue. 
These findings suggest that although most advice-givers provided high quality 
advice and seemed to have good intentions, there are clear signal of bad actors on the 
platform, including spammers and drug promoters. Traditionally, reputation systems are 
one solution to fend off bad actors on a platform. However, because the reputation metric 
for advice-givers on 120ask is the ratio of accepted answers, it depends entirely on patient 
choices. As a result, because reputation does not involve any sort of peer review and 
because patients do not perform well as evaluators, the current reputation system on 120ask 
does not identify good actors and distinguish them from bad ones.  
I found further evidence of “spammy” advice-givers. I define a spammer 
operationally as an advice-giver who gave the same answer to at least 5 different questions. 
Using this criterion, I identified 383 spammers out of the 16,828 advice givers (2.3%) in 
the data. These answers sometimes matched answers from other advice-givers who were 
not identified as spammers, suggesting that they may have been copied from other advice-
givers. For example, one physician gave 3 variants of nearly identical answers to 1,479 
questions in the area of gynecopathy that promotes the synthesized medicine 育宫培麟丸. 
Another advice-giver (who was not a licensed practitioner) focused on late-stage cancer 
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related questions, and for 8 questions on multiple types of cancer (liver, stomach, lung), 
gave exactly the same answer that suggested generically using traditional herbal medicine.  
Beyond spammers, I also looked for specific evidence of active drug promotion. In 
the follow-up survey that I conducted to understand bad answers, the evaluators identified 
3 suspicious promoters (whose answers were designated as category 4 — The advice-giver 
appears to be promoting a specific drug with little concern for the patient’s issue), out of 
whom, two were confirmed as dedicated drug promoters by looking at their entire answer 
history. The two specific drugs were:  Lukfey and  微络康洗胰清糖素.  Lukfey is 
suspicious as it claims to be a world-renowned western medicine but is in fact a synthetic 
herbal drug that was invented and manufactured by a domestic Chinese firm. It was 
advertised on Baidu, but I could find no mention of it outside of China. One physician 
dedicated approximately 500 answers to promote Lukfey. The other drug, 微络康洗胰清
糖素, is a healthcare supplement product that is marketed for reducing blood sugar. I 
consulted with three physicians from the panel who claimed to have never heard of the 
drug, believed it to be suspicious, and cautioned that it should not be used a replacement 
for blood sugar reducing drugs. One chief physician dedicated approximately 300 answers 
to promoting this drug as an elixir for diabetes.  
I can understand why some advice-givers might be financially incentivized to adopt 
a “spam” or volume-based approach to answering questions, in order to benefit directly 
from micropayments. I estimate that such advice-givers, who may answer thousands of 
questions each month, can earn up to 350 CNY. 
Overall, this evidence suggests that bad actors do exist on the platform, some of 
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whom are licensed to practice medicine and verified by the platform. Platform peer review 
mechanisms could help to limit bad actors. 
2.6.4 Modeling patient evaluation with neural networks (NN) 
To understand why patients are poor evaluators, and more specifically, how they 
use available information to evaluate answers, I estimate the impact of the available 
heuristic cues, including cues from content, phrase and psychometric language use within 
answers and contextual information provided by the platform (such as doctor credentials, 
hospital ranks, etc.) on the likelihood of a patient to designate an answer as correct, 
conditional on answers belonging to the same questions. Conventionally, this could be 
accomplished through discrete choice modeling implemented through conditional logistic 
regression (clogit). While this approach provides clean interpretability of coefficient 
estimates, it also requires several assumptions including the specification itself and the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption. Moreover, it may not achieve maximal 
predictive performance. To overcome these issues, I adopted a deep neural network (NN) 
modeling approach, a commonly used technique in machine learning. Neural networks can 
accept the entire feature set of all answers presented to the patient as an input, combining 
these features parametrically though hidden layers, which allows for arbitrarily complex 
mathematical dependence contingent on neural network depth, width, and non-linear 
activation. These aspects of neural network models allow us to relax assumptions about 
specification, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and more closely mirror the decision 
problem faced by actual patients. 
The Universal Approximation Theorem states that a feed-forward network with a 
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single hidden layer containing a finite number of neurons can approximate continuous 
functions on compact subsets of Rn, under mild assumptions on the activation function 
(Hornik et al. 1989). This theorem proves that neural networks can achieve mathematical 
equivalency with conditional logit regression (if such a specification is indeed 
appropriate), provided that the neural network is complex enough and well 
parameterized. Indeed, a comparison of estimates from a discrete choice clogit model and 
the neural network model yield consistent results. However, I found that the neural 
network model outperformed the clogit significantly in terms of predictive power, 
achieving an accuracy of 58.09% (95% CI: 58.06%, 58.13%) as compared to 54.01% 
(95% CI: 53.28%, 54.74%) for clogit, which is approximately a 10% relative increase 




Table 7. Discrete Choice (clogit) regression of patients’ evaluation of answers 




phrase_optimism 0.010 1.010 0.007 1.370 0.171 
phrase_comforting 0.076 1.079 0.012 6.534 0.000*** 
phrase_frankness -0.023 0.978 0.008 -2.956 0.003** 
sugg_eat 0.172 1.187 0.011 15.069 0.000*** 
sugg_exercise 0.155 1.167 0.026 6.064 0.000*** 
sugg_rest 0.021 1.021 0.015 1.354 0.176 
sugg_treat -0.186 0.830 0.012 -14.940 0.000*** 
sugg_checkup -0.138 0.871 0.011 -12.532 0.000*** 




num_info_words 0.002 1.002 0.000 26.101 0.000*** 
missing_info 0.129 1.137 0.021 6.257 0.000*** 
ans_greeting 0.011 1.011 0.009 1.223 0.221 
ans_postface -4.229 0.015 0.051 -82.754 0.000*** 
doc_occupation 
[chief physician] 1.560 4.759 0.019 82.817 0.000*** 
doc_occupation 
[non-registered] -21.110 0.000 172.500 -0.122 0.903 
doc_occupation 
[medical_practitioner] 0.252 1.286 0.020 12.470 0.000*** 
doc_occupation 
[residents] 0.439 1.551 0.017 25.889 0.000*** 
doc_intro_video1 -0.038 0.963 0.018 -2.090 0.037* 
doc_intro_videoNA 0.785 2.193 0.105 7.508 0.000*** 
doc_gender1 0.091 1.095 0.019 4.898 0.000*** 
doc_genderNA -0.261 0.770 0.104 -2.513 0.012** 
doc_hospType[medium] -0.072 0.930 0.020 -3.528 0.000*** 
doc_hospType[high] 0.198 1.219 0.024 8.151 0.000*** 
doc_hospType[nonhos] 0.178 1.194 0.023 7.751 0.000*** 
doc_hospType[private] -0.353 0.702 0.030 -11.977 0.000*** 
doc_hospType[no affil] 0.011 1.011 0.025 0.452 0.652 
doc_activity 0.000 1.000 0.000 -22.023 0.000*** 




L_achieve 0.008 1.008 0.002 3.337 0.001*** 
L_affiliation -0.006 0.994 0.004 -1.459 0.144 
L_anxiety -0.003 0.997 0.005 -0.581 0.562 
L_cause 0.008 1.008 0.002 4.182 0.000*** 
L_certain -0.021 0.979 0.003 -7.486 0.000*** 
L_death 0.023 1.024 0.008 3.046 0.002** 
L_differentiation 0.007 1.007 0.002 4.307 0.000*** 
L_discrepancy 0.015 1.015 0.001 11.037 0.000*** 
L_family -0.008 0.993 0.004 -1.772 0.076 
L_feel 0.005 1.005 0.001 4.642 0.000*** 
L_female 0.022 1.023 0.004 5.256 0.000*** 
L_friend 0.050 1.052 0.009 5.450 0.000*** 
L_male -0.008 0.992 0.008 -1.068 0.285 
L_reward -0.003 0.997 0.003 -1.292 0.196 
L_risk 0.015 1.015 0.003 5.382 0.000*** 
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L_sexual 0.017 1.017 0.002 10.325 0.000*** 
L_tentative -0.001 0.999 0.002 -0.327 0.744 
 L_achieve 0.008 1.008 0.002 3.337 0.001*** 
*: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.01, ***: p < 0.001, R2= 0.241 (max possible= 0.426) 
Likelihood ratio test= 170905 on 45 df, p=<2e-16 
 
 I built and trained two neural networks: a real patient NN, to simulate the decision-
making of actual patients (trained on 80% of the 110k questions whose answers were 
evaluated by actual patient), and an ideal patient NN, to simulate the decision-making of a 
hypothetical ideal patient who leverages heuristic cues to make the best possible decision 
(trained on 80% of the 3k questions whose answers were evaluated by the panel of experts). 
Both are supervised learning process trained on the same heuristic features of the same 
datasets (for fair comparison) with only one major difference. For the real patient model, 
the predicted outcome is encoded by a one-hot vector where the 1 corresponds to the 
answer chosen by patients and 0 otherwise. For the ideal patient model, the predicted 
outcome is encoded by a one-hot vector where the 1 corresponds to the answer designated 
as the best answer. In other words, the ideal patient model would try to make the most 
correct choice, after seeing the same input as the real patient model. The ideal patient NN 
allows us to compare the performance of actual patients to a hypothetical “best-performing 
patient evaluator” to determine the relative gap in performance. I can leverage the real 
patient NN to estimate the impact of features on patient evaluation and further compare to 
the ideal patient NN to understand how a hypothetical ideal patient would weigh heuristic 
features of answers differently from real patients. In order to accomplish this, I need an 
approach to derive explanations from the predictions of real and ideal NN models. I 
describe such an approach below. And the description of the heuristic features of answers 
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and how they were encoded could be found in the previous methodology section.  
Neural Network Structure and Training Procedure 
For both real and ideal patient neural network models, I prepared the input data 
corresponding to each question and set of answers in the following way. I extracted all 
possible heuristic features (a total of 34) that represented the content or context information 
of each answer. Next, I converted each feature to a vector of binary indicator variables 
(through binarization or discretization) and concatenated all feature vectors for each answer, 
yielding a 7x147 input vector for each question2. For features that are naturally binary (e.g., 
an answer either includes the suggestion to go to the hospital or it does not), I coded 
inclusion as 1 (0 otherwise). For features that represented count variables or log-
transformed count variables, I discretized values and introduced dummies for low, medium, 
and high values, corresponding to values that fall into the bottom 25%, middle 50% and 
top 25% quantiles, respectively. Binarizing features yields a standardized representation 
across different variable types and allows us to meaningfully compare the content that 
patients were exposed to when they evaluated answers to their question. By including all 
answers to a given question as an input, the neural network is able to capture the actual 
evaluation task that patients faced. 
The structure of the neural network is displayed in Figure 3. It is composed of a 
7x147 input layer (where 147 is the length of feature vector of each answer correspond to  
 
2  While almost all questions received at most 7 answers, many received fewer (only 5% of 
questions received more than 7 answers). I represented the feature vector of a missing answer as 
all zeros. This precludes the neural network from assigning a nonzero probability of selection for 




Figure 3. The structure of the neural net with shared weights between branches 
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a branch), two intermediate layers (of size 34 and 11) for each branch, and a scalar output 
layer for each branch, corresponding to whether the answer was chosen. The resulting 
output is a vector of 7 scalars. For training purposes, a softmax activation layer was added 
after the original output layer, designated as the true output (y), to permit training with a 
cross-entropy loss function. The true output represents the probability for each answer to 
be chosen. As switching the order of inputs (e.g., switching the order of the first and second 
answer) should in theory not impact a patient’s choice, the neural network was constrained 
to be symmetric with regards to the seven branches, so that all branches share the same 
weight matrix. 
To train and evaluate the predictive performance of the real and ideal patient neural 
network models, I followed the standard approach and divided the data into training (80%) 
and test (20%) sets3. For the loss function I used the cross-entropy between training output 
and actual output (y). Weights were updated during training through RMSPROP4, an 
improved version of stochastic gradient descend. Each model was trained for up to 20 
epochs with early stopping to prevent overfitting. 
I assessed the robustness of the neural network structure by repeating the analysis 
with an additional intermediate layer and by changing the number of nodes in each layer. 
For each alteration, I re-sampled training/test sets and re-ran the training procedure. Overall, 
 
3 Due to limitations of data size, particularly for ideal-patient model (for which I have only 3000 
professionally evaluated answers), I did not use formal cross-validation to explore the 
hyperparameters of the model (such as the number of intermediate layers and the number of nodes 
in intermediate layers). Instead, I explore variations to model structure separately, as tests of 
robustness, and determined that such variations did not yield substantial performance increases. 




I observe little to no variation in training accuracy (<1.5%), affirming the robustness of my 
method. The real patient NN was trained and tested on an 80% training split of the dataset 
of 110k questions evaluated by real patients, minimizing the cross-entropy between the 
neural network’s prediction of the patient’s selected answer and the actual answer selected 
by the patient. Overall, the real patient NN mimicked the patients’ choice with an accuracy 
of 58.0 ± 0.1%. To determine whether this performance was meaningful, I estimated a 
baseline performance by training the real patient model on the same input, but with the 
output randomized. This randomized baseline model only selected patients’ choices about 
25.0 ± 0.0% of time, suggesting that the real patient NN is a significant improvement and 
a reasonable approximation of an actual patient. The ideal patient NN was trained on an 
80% training split (2.5k) of the 3k questions and answers that were evaluated by the panel 
of experienced physicians in China, minimizing the cross-entropy between the model’s 






Figure 4. Comparison of actual patients to real and ideal patient NN models 
In the dataset of 3k questions evaluated by the panel, the actual patients selected 
the (evaluator determined) best advice only 25.4% ± 0.4% of time.  
To fairly compare how the real and ideal patient NN models performed in selecting 
the best advice, I assessed them on the 20% test split of the 3k questions evaluated by the 
panel (which was not used to train either model). The real patient NN selected the best 
advice with similar performance as actual patients (25.0 ± 0.4%). This is to be expected5 
as the real patient NN was trained to mimic the actual patients. However, I should expect 
the ideal patient NN to pick the best advice more often since it is trained to make the best 
choice. As shown in Figure 4, the ideal patient NN (30.4 ± 0.4%) outperformed the real 
patient NN (25.4 ± 0.5%) on choosing the best advice by 6.0% (t-stat = -60.06, p<0.001). 
 
5 Data from these estimates exclude questions where best answers are tied and those with more 
than 7 answers, yielding a slightly lower patient evaluation accuracy of 25%, relative to the 
accuracy of 31% for the entire data set.  
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This hypothetical ideal patient model allows us to estimate the best-case scenario for 
patients’ evaluation, using only heuristic processing. The gap in performance between real 
and ideal patients can be attributed to a combination of subjective bias in patient evaluation 
and a tendency for physicians to incorporate heuristic features that evoke a negative 
response in good advice. However, the overall performance is still poor. That is, even an 
ideal patient is limited in her ability to make the best choice due to her lack of medical 
expertise and reliance on only heuristic cues. This implies that the platform should do more 
to reduce the need for patients to rely on heuristic cues to evaluate advice. In particular, 
incorporating peer review of answers would convey signals of professional consensus to 
the patient. Features that permit advice-givers to comment on, up- or down- vote answers 
could accomplish this and are commonplace in many SQPs (e.g., StackOverflow). Given 
that medical practitioners are willing to answer questions on the platform in exchange for 
micropayments and platform reputation, similar incentives to evaluate and respond to 
advice on the platform would likely be viable. 
2.6.5 Interpreting neural networks via the perturbation protocol 
One of the challenges for neural networks is interpretation, as weights in the 
network are not directly associated with contributions of features. Multiple methods have 
been developed to explain neural network predictions: Garson’s algorithm interpreted the 
relative importance of predictors in connection with predicted outcomes by analyzing the 
model weights. The Lek’s profile method explores the relationship of the outcome and a 
predictor by holding other predictors at constant values. Partial dependence plot visualized 
the relationship between an outcome and one or two predictors (reviewed by Zhang et al., 
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2018). However, a widely accepted and popular modern approach to achieve 
interpretability is a technique known as LIME (Locally Interpretable Model-agnostic 
Explanations). LIME is a model-agnostic method that provides local interpretability by 
perturbing the input of individual data samples to understand how the predictions change 
for those samples (Ribeiro et al. 2016). My approach is most similar to LIME in that it also 
uses perturbations to understand predictions, however, I am interested in understanding the 
impact of a feature on predicted outcomes globally, across a large set of predictions made 
by the model. 
Extending from LIME’s technique of connecting local perturbation with predicted 
outcome, I developed a similar perturbation procedure that allows us to make global 
explanations of the input features’ contribution to predictions. Using this protocol, I can 
identify how the presence or absence of heuristic features relate to the likelihood of a 
patient to select an answer. Recall that all feature variables are binary indicators that encode 
inclusion (for naturally binary features) or discretized level (for count or log-transformed 
count variables). I define a tune-up perturbation of a feature as a change from absence to 
presence (for naturally binary features, such as existence of a preface or disclaimer in an 
answer) or from one discretized level to the next higher level (e.g., from low to medium, 
for count or log-transformed count features, such as the number of words that express 
comfort). I define tune-down perturbations similarly. Tune-up or tune-down perturbations 
of a particular feature are not operationally possible for every answer to a question. For 
example, answers that express the highest/lowest value of a discretized feature cannot be 
further increased/decreased. I define an answer as eligible for tune-up/down perturbation 
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for feature X if it is operationally possible.  
My perturbation analysis procedure is performed as follows: For each feature X, let 
𝑈* (𝐷+) define the set of all answers that are eligible for tune-up (tune-down) perturbations. 
I first check if the size of these sets (|𝑈*|, |𝐷*|) are sufficiently balanced (and stop, if they 
are not). I bootstrap sample |𝑈*| (|𝐷*|) times with replacement from these sets to obtain 
the sets 𝑈*, , 𝐷*, (where s indexes the sampled set). I tune-up perturb feature X in each 
answer in the set 𝑈*,  , leaving the features of all other answers to the same question 
unchanged, and feed the entire feature vector for all answers into the neural network model. 
I define Δ𝑃-$,+ as the fraction of tune-up perturbed answers that the neural network model 
chose. I repeat the procedure with tune-down perturbation, yielding Δ𝑃.$,+. If the effect 
of tune-up and tune-down perturbations on the predicted outcome is consistent, then I 
expect Δ𝑃.$,+ to be similar to Δ𝑃-$,+ in magnitude but opposite in sign. I repeat this 
procedure 100 times and pool the results together to form the set 4Δ𝑃,,+5 = 4Δ𝑃-$,+5 ∪
{−Δ𝑃.$,+} of size 200. Finally, I estimate the mean (Δ𝑃*), lower and upper 70% and 90% 
confidence intervals from this set. If tune-up and tune-down perturbations have an 
inconsistent effect on predicted outcomes then this measure will vary substantially across 
samples, ultimately yielding large confidence intervals.  
To determine which heuristic features explain patient choice, I performed the above 
perturbation protocol on the real patient model by selecting and perturbing questions from 
the entire dataset of 110k questions evaluated by patients. I am also interested in how 
features increase the likelihood of patients selecting the most correct answer. To determine 
this, I repeated the perturbation procedure on the real patient model by selecting and 
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perturbing the features of the best answer of the subset of questions in the evaluated dataset 
where actual patients had selected a suboptimal answer (this occurred in approximately 
2.2k questions) However, I found that the estimates were nearly identical, though with 
wider confidence intervals due to the limited size of the data. This indicates that features 
have the same impact on patient evaluation regardless of the extent to which the answer is 
correct. In other words, real patients (and the real patient model) respond to features of any 
answer in the same way, regardless of its quality, as they cannot discriminate the quality of 
answers. It also ensures that any potential correlation between features and the tendency 
for an answer to be correct are not driving these findings. The impact of all feature 
perturbations on the probability for a patient to accept an answer are displayed in Figure 5. 
Mean estimates Δ𝑃*  and lower and upper 90% confidence intervals are displayed in 




Figure 5. The impact of features on patient selection 
(a) Content and Phrase features (c) Psychometric features 
(b) Context features 
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I can also leverage the perturbation protocol to understand how an ideal patient 
might weigh heuristic features differently. To do so, I performed the above perturbation 
protocol on both the real and ideal patient models. For each feature, I calculated the 
difference Δ𝑃*!/012 − Δ𝑃*3012 and its lower and upper 90% confidence intervals. The 
results are displayed in columns 4–6 of Table 8. 
Table 8. The perturbation impact of features on patients’ probability to accept an 
answer (𝜟𝑷) 
 (Real Patient Model) % （Ideal – Real） % 
Features Δ𝑃 LCI UCI Diff(Δ𝑃) LCI UCI 
ans_postface -23.52 -28.51 -18.38 30.06 24.91 34.00 
doc_activity -9.39 -11.95 -6.86 20.44 16.36 24.66 
sugg_check -4.23 -4.71 -3.86 15.93 13.96 17.71 
sugg_treat -2.21 -2.50 -1.93 12.27 9.32 15.48 
sugg_rest -2.13 -2.57 -1.81 -26.46 -31.70 -23.46 
doc_miss_info -1.85 -3.04 -0.93 - - - 
L_friend -1.82 -3.28 -0.34 -8.12 -9.82 -6.84 
ans_inquire -1.26 -1.79 -0.46 - - - 
sugg_exercise -0.82 -1.16 -0.45 -8.54 -11.4 -4.39 
ans_greeting -0.53 -1.11 0.06 3.23 1.71 5.08 
L_risk -0.31 -0.71 0.12 3.62 2.24 4.94 
sugg_eat -0.06 -0.44 0.28 -7.57 -8.92 -6.11 
L_tentative -0.04 -0.54 0.45 -3.63 -4.99 -2.28 
L_achieve 0.07 -0.22 0.33 -8.29 -9.67 -6.99 
doc_intro_vid 0.15 -0.17 0.40 - - - 
phrase_frank 0.34 -0.25 1.00 -9.21 -13.4 -6.32 
L_reward 0.53 0.31 0.76 -1.01 -1.85 -0.04 
L_certain 1.00 0.51 1.48 1.18 -0.25 2.75 
L_sexual 1.23 0.94 1.54 0.83 -2.04 3.95 
L_male 1.34 0.81 1.97 6.43 4.31 10.10 
L_death 1.40 1.15 1.88 -17.82 -23.64 -10.08 
phrase_optimism 1.45 1.2 1.6 4.05 -0.17 7.83 
L_affiliation 1.45 1.13 1.76 -4.58 -5.54 -3.49 
L_anxiety 1.53 1.32 1.81 -12.89 -14.38 -11.07 
L_differentiation 1.58 0.87 2.30 2.01 -1.69 5.92 
doc_hosp_type 1.82 1.60 2.08 - - - 
L_cause 1.82 1.68 1.96 0.22 -0.60 1.16 
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doc_gender 1.96 0.75 3.22 - - - 
L_family 2.18 1.50 2.78 -2.84 -4.2 -0.54 
L_discrepancy 2.40 2.01 2.81 0.50 -0.87 1.65 
L_feel 2.78 2.37 3.18 -2.29 -3.90 -0.59 
L_female 3.17 -0.04 6.24 -7.98 -11.39 -3.61 
phrase_comforting 3.26 2.69 4.06 -4.39 -7.39 -2.84 
doc_occupation 4.40 3.82 4.97 -5.62 -9.37 -1.95 
ratio_help_accept 7.36 4.79 9.93 -4.52 -10.17 1.15 
num_info_words 11.6 7.44 15.7 -17.38 -33.14 -2.02 
 
From these results I can draw several inferences on how patients respond to advice 
on OHQPs. Below, I describe these inferences in terms of contextual cues, content and 
phrase cues, and the psychometric aspects of language used in advice. I include effect sizes 
as increases or decreases in a patient’s probability to accept the answer when the feature in 
question is perturbed. Some of these findings have immediate policy implications: doctors 
can be encouraged to incorporate features that contribute positively to patients' decision 
and discouraged from incorporating features that contribute negatively. It is important to 
note that any potential policy should refrain from making recommendations that would 
alter actual diagnoses, prognoses, treatment or care suggestions. Instead, policy 
recommendations could focus on the manner that advice is communicated in terms of the 
psychometric characteristics of language used and other aspects of advice (such as overall 
length or inclusion of copied postface text) or platform participation (such as doctor profile 
completeness).  
2.6.6 Contextual cues 
The quality of a doctor’s reputation and participation on the platform could send a 
strong signal to patients when evaluating advice. These findings show that patients had 
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preference for advice from doctors with larger ratios of accepted advice, with an 7.4% 
increase in probability to accept advice for each quantile increase in the ratio of accepted 
advice (e.g., from below 0.15% to below 5%). Notably, the ideal patient model weighed 
platform reputation less (though the difference is marginal). When coupled with my 
previous finding that patients on average accept the best advice in less than one third of all 
cases, this is extremely troubling. The reputation metric of accepted advice ratio provided 
on the platform increases the tendency for patients to accept advice from physicians who 
are prone to give suboptimal advice. Moreover, it increases the moral hazard for physicians 
to offer less accurate but more enticing advice for a better chance of having their advice 
selected. In other words, physicians who dispense less accurate advice that is more 
appealing to patients not only benefit from bounty, but also from increased platform 
reputation. Indeed, doctors who ranked in the top 25% in the ratio of accepted advice on 
average scored lower in their answers (4.17 vs. 4.33) and were less likely to provide the 
best answer according to the evaluators (21.8% vs. 25.3%), yet had answers that were more 
likely to be selected by patients (19.0% vs. 12.0%) than those who ranked in the bottom 
25%. The evidence points to a flawed reputation system that tends to misguide patients and 
encourage moral hazard of advice-givers. Patients also seemed to exhibit a decreased 
preference for advice from physicians who are highly active on the platform, with a 9% 
decrease in probability to accept advice for each quantile increase in number of questions 
answered (e.g., from below 100 to below 10,000). In contrast, the ideal patient model 
tended to prefer answers from doctors that were more active on the platform. 
Patients also reacted to cues that reflect doctors' credibility and ability, such as 
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doctors' qualification and the rank of their hospitals. These findings show that patients are 
4.4% more likely to accept advice from doctors with higher qualification (from non-doctor 
medical practitioners6 to nurses to residents to chief physicians). In contrast, the ideal 
patient model tended to discount the rank of doctors. I found that higher rank doctors on 
average did not provide higher quality advice. Patients are also more likely to accept 
answers from doctors coming from larger hospitals, with a 1.8% increase in probability. 
They seemed to dislike advice from doctors with incomplete profiles, with a 1.9% decrease 
in probability to accept advice from doctors when their profile was perturbed to include 
missing information. There is also evidence that patients exhibit a gender bias, preferring 
answers from male doctors, with a 2.0% increase in probability. This is consistent with 
studies that have shown patient preference for male doctors in offline settings (Schmittdiel 
et al., 2000); though, the online nature of OHQPs rule out some explanations for gender 
bias (such as comfort with physical examination) that pertain to offline settings.  
2.6.7 Content and phrases 
Regarding informational content of answers, patients appreciated longer answers (a 
possible indicator of physician effort), but only when the content of advice was 
personalized and informative. Increasing the number of informative words in an answer by 
one quantile (e.g., from below 100, to below 300) leads to a 11.6% increase in probability 
for patients to accept the answer. In contrast, many doctors active on the OHQP habitually 
concluded with a postface – large sections of text in their answers that are identical across 
 
6 Non-registered medical workers — referred to as “medical members” by the platform — are 
those who may know medicine but do not possess a license to practice medicine. 
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all advice they dispense. Patients strongly disliked the inclusion of such uninformative text 
in answers, with an 23.5% decrease in probability to select an answer when uninformative 
text was included, perhaps because it increases cognitive load. In contrast, the ideal patient 
model preferred answers with such postfaces, perhaps because they are correlated with 
advice quality.  
Regarding diagnosis, prognosis and suggestions, patients disliked the suggestion to 
go to a hospital for further examination (4.2% decrease in probability to accept advice when 
this suggestion is included) or treatment (2.2% decrease in probability to accept advice 
when this suggestion is included). In contrast, the ideal patient model strongly preferred 
such suggestions. Indeed, in 22% of all cases where patients opted for suboptimal advice, 
the answer they selected did not suggest in-person care or treatment, while the best answer 
(according to the panel of evaluators) did. This does not only occur for suboptimal answers 
that were close in quality to the best answer. There are 138 questions (out of ~3k questions 
that were evaluated by the panel of physicians) where the average quality of answers that 
recommend in-person care exceed those that do not by more than 1 rating points. Amongst 
these, patients selected the lower rated answers (that did not suggest follow-up care) in 42% 
of all cases (52 out of 138 questions). Taken together, this is strong evidence that OHQPs 
enable or exacerbate care avoidance by providing patients with advice from a medical 
expert that sanctifies their preference to avoid in-person care. Patients also disliked 
suggestions to exercise (0.8% decrease in probability if included) or rest (2.1% decrease in 
probability if included).  
In terms of common phrases used in advice, patients showed preference for use of 
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comforting phrases (“It’s okay”, “don’t worry”, “not a serious issue”) by 3.3%. The ideal 
patient discounted answers with comforting phrases. Patients also seem to prefer the use of 
optimistic phrases by 1.5% (e.g., “can be cured”, “not life-threatening”, “prognosis is 
good”, “low risk”). On the other hand, patients do not react consistently to frank language 
pertaining to prognosis (“consequences could be serious”, “prognosis is bad”, “difficult to 
fully cure”). 
2.6.8 Psychometric Aspect of Communication 
In terms of psychometric aspects of communication, patients preferred language 
that communicates understandable explanations and the limits of understanding in terms 
of discrepancy (2.4%) (e.g., 可能 possible, 可以 could, able to, may), differentiation 
(1.6%) (e.g., 不能 cannot, 可能 perhaps, 而 rather, 除了 except, 比较 compare, contrast, 
etc.), and cause (1.8%) (e.g., 引起 cause, 导致 lead to, 基于 based on, etc.). They also 
prefer language that acknowledges what they are feeling (2.9%) (e.g., 痛 pain, 伤害 hurt, 
严 重 serious [feel], heavy [feel]) or acknowledges anxiety (1.5%) (e.g., 不 适
uncomfortable, 担心 worry, 紧张 nervous, etc.)7. 
Suggestions that incorporate language that are specific to genders such as female 
(e.g., 母, 妈 mom, mother) or male (e.g., 他 he, 男孩 boy), is preferred by patients 
with a 3.2% (though with a relatively wide confidence interval) and 1.3% increase in 
 
7 For brevity, I include changes in percentage of probability for a patient to accept an answer 
parenthetically for the psychometric feature dimensions described in this paragraph. For the sake 
of interpretability, I include both original Chinese characters and phrase translations for typical 
examples of words or phrases within answers for each psychometric dimension from LIWC. 
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adoption probability, respectively. Languages relating to the social involvement of others 
in patients’ lives such as affiliation (e.g., 帮助 help, assist, 伴 companion, 伙伴 partner), 
family (e.g., 宝宝 baby 怀孕 pregnant), and sexual (e.g., 孕 pregnant, 性 sex) were 
preferred by patients (respectively, associated with a 1.45%, 2.2% and 1.2% increase in 
probability to accept advice), though this may not be relevant to all medical questions. 
My perturbation analysis reveals how features are correlated with the probability 
of answers being chosen by patients. High positive estimates for features suggested 
potential favorability, though I cannot conclude that such features lead to the selection of 
an answer. I also explored how the combination of features of an answer increased its 
overall agreeableness to patients. I define the overall agreeableness score of an answer by 
combining the contributions from the large set of heuristic weight estimates for features 
that are present in the answer, using the standard inverse variance weighting procedure. I 
defined more/less agreeable answers as those with an agreeableness score within the 
top/bottom 20%. I compared the quality scores of professionally evaluated answers to their 
agreeableness and found that more agreeable answers had slightly lower quality (4.33 for 
agreeable, 4.15 for less agreeable; p-value of difference <0.001). However, the percentage 
of agreeable answers that were rated as poor quality (score <3) was significantly larger for 
more agreeable answers (11% more agreeable vs. 5% less agreeable; p<0.001). This 
indicates that heuristic features that were favored by patients were higher in answers with 
lower quality. 
Knowing how patients react to the language used by physicians on the platform 
could be leveraged to guide doctors in communicating advice to patients online. For 
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example, I could suggest physicians provide “a spoonful of sugar to help the medicine go 
down”. I can estimate an upper bound on the efficacy of such a policy by using a variation 
of the perturbation protocol. Starting with all questions where patients chose the wrong 
answer, I simultaneously perturb up (down) all features that evoke positive (negative) 
responses that could reasonably be changed by such a policy without altering diagnoses, 
prognoses or suggestions for care8. Doing so leads to a 53% increase in the proportion of 
correctly chosen answers. 
2.7 Discussions 
Online Health Q&A Platforms have become a major business success likely 
because, compared to traditional brick-and-mortar hospital or office visits, they provide a 
channel for patients to reach out to doctors that is more economical, convenient and fast. 
To understand patient evaluation in OHQPs, I collected and analyzed data from one of the 
largest OHQPs. The data consists of 496,842 answers to 114,037 questions, and profile 
information from 16,828 doctors. To my knowledge, ours is the first large-scale study to 
use empirical data to analyze patients’ decision-making processes and evaluation behavior 
and quality of medical advice on OHQPs. My findings acknowledge the importance and 
contribution of OHQPs in providing online care to patients. OHQPs and other online 
healthcare consulting platforms seem to be a valuable complement to in-person care and 
as such, could see substantial growth worldwide. More importantly, OHQPs may be vital 
in circumstances when access to traditional points of care is limited. For example, in 
 
8 Features that could reasonably be changed include: all psychometric features, comforting phrases, 
missing information in the doctor’s profile, use of postface text, and number of informative words. 
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Wuhan during the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly vulnerable or immunocompromised 
patients (such a cancer survivors), were advised to delay hospital visits due to the 
possibility of contracting the coronavirus. In such circumstances, OHQPs can play a vital 
role in providing medical advice to patients in need. Overall, while I find that the OHQP I 
studied on average promoted good medical advice, my results also reveal problems with 
patient evaluation. While patients had a reasonable answer to choose for most questions, 
they chose suboptimal advice in over two thirds of all cases and often chose poor advice 
when it was offered over high-quality alternatives. Accepting poor-quality advice is likely 
a precursor to bad (and potentially even catastrophic) healthcare outcomes. This is 
particularly the case for patients with more serious conditions (cancer, heart and liver 
disease) or vulnerable patient groups (pediatrics), where patients tend to perform even 
worse than average in selecting good answers.  
To understand why patients perform poorly as evaluators, I estimated the impact of 
heuristic cues on patient evaluation behavior. Using extensive natural language processing 
of the full text content of answers, I codified a rich set of heuristic features on the content, 
phrases, context, and psychometric language in advice. I estimated the impact of these 
features on the tendency for patients to select advice using state-of-the-art deep neural 
networks trained to mimic the decision-making of patients. I found that heuristic processing 
can explain a substantial amount of the variation in patient decision-making when selecting 
advice. Importantly, I identified the extent to which patients respond positively or 
negatively to different features. My finding that patients have a strong negative reaction to 
suggestions to seek offline follow-up care or treatment suggests that OHQPs enable or 
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exacerbate care avoidance. A recent study shows that about 48.9% of the Chinese 
population did not to seek in-person treatment when they were sick, and 29.6% chose not 
to be hospitalized when they should have been  (The 3rd National Health Service 
Investigation and Analysis, 2016). Such care avoidance behavior is more prevalent in 
poorer, more rural areas, where OHQPs may be preferred over other points of consultation 
and care, due to their lower cost. This study suggests OHQPs exacerbate these tendencies 
as they yield professional advice that provides further justification for not seeking 
treatment. There have been multiple reports that patients delayed their treatment due to 
blind trust of online opinions that nearly lead to death (QQHealth 2013, Sohu 2015) . 
Practical efforts to address the problems with OHQPs may include policy interventions that 
affect patients, physicians, or alter other platform mechanisms. 
My findings indicate several aspects of the design of these platforms that seem to 
threaten patient reception and subsequent adoption of high-quality health advice. The lack 
of search functionality that is typical in most OHQPs limits patients’ ability to assess 
existing advice on the platform that may be related to their condition. On the other hand, 
better search functionality could reduce the volume of new questions (and ultimately, 
platform revenue) by removing the need of asking new questions (as they can more easily 
find the best matched answers to their questions by searching). Lay evaluation of advice 
solely by the patient, who I found is unable to assess the accuracy of medical advice and 
susceptible to multiple forms of cognitive bias, seems clearly problematic. The lack of an 
expert peer review or rating mechanisms permits the few bad actors to provide poor advice 
off-the-official-record, without negatively impacting their online reputation, and without 
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conveying any kind of expert consensus to patients. Moreover, when combined with 
bounties and platform reputation, this can create a moral hazard for those bad actors who 
may be incentivized to tailor advice to meet patient preference at the expense of medical 
accuracy. 
This study also provides insights that apply beyond the immediate context of 
OHQPs. For example, it is important to understand how patients react to medical advice 
when it is delivered digitally, as this can affect patient follow-through and satisfaction. As 
remote, telemedicine and digital consultation care provision grows, this will only become 
more important. This study also brings up several issues surrounding regulation and 
oversight of digital healthcare provision. While reputation is a common metric adopted by 
many platforms, I was not aware of any specific regulations regarding reputation metrics 
on health-related platforms. Yet, if it affects patient decisions then care should be taken to 
ensure that reputation is correlated with quality of care. This holds not only for OHQPs but 
also for other sites and platforms in the digital healthcare ecosystem (such as patient review 
portals). I stipulate that post-hoc evaluation of advice by peer experts should be an essential 
component of any online healthcare consulting platform, as it provide a confirmation of 
advice quality and an alternative (or supplemental) measure of reputation that is correlated 
with giving quality medical advice. For example, the platform askdr.co relies on offline 
reputation (such as providing and certifying doctors’ credentials and displaying doctors’ 
offline reputed performance) to ensure quality of performance online. However, I in the 
OHQP I studied, I found that the quality of answers did not differ significantly between 
higher-ranked doctors (e.g., chief physicians) and lower-ranked doctors (e.g., residents). 
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While post-hoc evaluation of advice viable in OHQPs (where physicians seem willing to 
perform work in exchange for micropayments and reputation), it may be more difficult to 
implement in other online health consulting environments. Such post-hoc evaluation (or 
peer review) would require extra work that may necessitate additional incentives, or that 
alternatively may need to be subsidized by platforms. By its nature, digital healthcare is 
more susceptible to abuse from bad actors than traditional care provision and regulation is 
also less established. I posit that in digital healthcare settings, expert peer review and/or 
auditing can increase quality of care, guard against bad actors, and deliver signals of 
professional consensus to patients to enable better choices. 
Other policy changes include educating patients to be better evaluators (such as 
sending a tip to patients to encourage them to carefully evaluate advice that may be hard 
to hear) or educating physicians on “digital bedside manner” to better communicate advice 
on the platform analogous to training for bedside manner in offline interactions between 
patients and doctors (Anderson et al. 2007, Rhee and Bird 1996). Of the two, I believe the 
latter may be more effective. My findings suggest that policies targeting patients and 
physicians on the platform could increase the probability of the patient selecting the best 
advice by up to 6% or 53%, respectively, which translates to selection of optimal advice in 
83k or 731k more questions each year, under the best-case scenario. Real-world tests of 
the efficacy of physician or patient guidance policies warrant the rigor of randomized 
controlled experiments. More generally, a variety of interventions on both the supply and 
demand side of OHQPs are possible, in terms of communication or platform mechanism 




This study revealed the existence of bad actors on the platform, who, though in the 
minority, could benefit at the expense of harming patients. This is to be expected as the 
platform did little to mitigate the risk of moral hazard. Though, the results showed that in 
general patients received good advice. I suspect this is due to professionalism and 
conscientiousness of physicians on the platform. Still, OHQPs and other online healthcare 
platforms should take deliberate measures to weed out bad actors.  
Beyond contextual insights, this study demonstrates the use of deep learning 
methods on large data on individual choices as a viable improvement over more 
conventional discrete choice modeling. The method is versatile enough to yield models 
that are mathematically equivalent to conventional discrete choice models without 
requiring specification assumptions that may be incompatible with the true data generation 
process. Indeed, I found that the deep learning method yielded superior predictive 
performance over discrete choice modeling. In terms of methodological contribution, the 
perturbation protocol that I describe is based upon established methods in machine learning, 
is quite general and allows for interpretable estimation of the impact of input features on 
the predicted outcome (output) of the neural network. The method can also be applied to 
other online expert consultation platforms with similar settings (such as legal advice). 
My approach is not without limitations. The OHQP I examined was one of the top 
three by usage and I believe that these findings should generalize well to other OHQPs and 
even some other online healthcare environments, though there may be cases for which this 
does not hold. For example, the presentation of and response to context cues (such as doctor 
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reputation, profile information, and so on) may vary across different platforms. Askers may 
also be sensitive to subtle changes in how platforms present information in general. I 
explored heuristic features that were understandable to the layperson and a good fit with 
my aim to understand the determinants of patient choice. However, the NLP approach 
would not be suitable for pulling out features of detailed medical diagnoses and prescriptive 
advice, given that the necessary medical lexicons are not well-established (particularly in 
other languages). Furthermore, it may not work for cases where patients (or Askers, in 
general) possess varying levels of professional knowledge.  
Although neural net models are less susceptible to some kinds of bias because they 
function as universal approximators, they are still susceptible to omitted variable bias. 
Though, in this context, the threat of omitted variable bias is somewhat reduced because I 
have all the information that the patient sees and I have endeavored to encode a rich set of 
features that that are comprehensible to patients (who lack expertise to base their decisions 
on complex medical aspects of the advice). 
Overall, this study affirms the potential of OHQPs in delivering quality medical 
advice that is timely, economical and can circumvent resource-based, geographic or 
circumstantial barriers that limit access to care. I view the problematic findings of poor 
patient evaluation, a problematic reputation metric, exacerbation of care avoidance, and 






3.1 Outline of the Chapter 
This chapter will focus on the development of a new methodology for measuring 
the ideology of the elites in Congress (Senators and House Representatives). In particular, 
it aims to explain the rationale, model assumption, model construction, training procedure 
and validation of the new methodology. In Sections 2 and 3, I will briefly review the 
background and relevant studies for this research. Section 4 will be the main section, which 
explains the new neural network model and offers validation of two main products of the 
model: an ideological embedding vector and a slant score that correlates with partisanship. 
In the final section, I will discuss the contribution of this research to the field, things that 
need to be improved, and potential future directions. 
3.2 Background 
One thing that has been puzzling many researchers this year is why the US Congress 
has so far failed to roll out a uniform message to combat COVID-19, which is seen by 
many scientists as a major threat to not only the lives of citizens but also to the whole 
economy. Comparing it to the other two major crises of the 21st century (9.11 and the Great 
Recession), it is not difficult to spot the striking difference. During the first two crises, 
Congress, despite enduring a long and tiresome partisan fight, eventually reached some 
degree of consensus wherein both sides yielded some ground. A plan was rolled out, and 
every congressperson, whether or not in agreement, eventually followed through on such a 
plan. For example, the AUMF bill was passed unanimously 3 days after 911, and the US 
army was quickly mobilized to prepare for the war. For COVID-19, no clear consensus was 
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reached. Messages from the federal level were often met with resistance at the state level, 
and politicians from all levels constantly backtracked and contradicted each other’s 
message, or even themselves. 
I believe we should trace these abnormalities from the top down, as the influencers 
in the White House, the Senate, and the House of Representatives (the House) typically 
have a profound impact on society, especially in the face of a crisis that cannot be solely 
handled at the state level. As will be reviewed, the elites typically wield disproportional 
power over influencing, swaying, and shaping the opinions and beliefs of the population in 
society. The divisions in the population over how to handle COVID-19 stemmed from and 
mirrored the partisan division in the elites, especially among members of Congress, who 
were the most powerful group of politicians in the US, aside from the President.  
I used the COVID-19 example here to demonstrate the necessity to understand the 
beliefs and ideals held by the elite members of the political system, namely Congress.  
Voting behavior is not sufficient to establish whether and when they were for or against a 
bill. To understand why Congress might act in a partisan way for one issue and a bipartisan 
way for another, we need to understand why they were for or against it. The ultimate goal 
of this project is to a) offer an alternative measurement of ideology that is not based on 
votes, but is consistent with all existing vote-based metrics; b) derive a construct that can 
capture the information needed to infer why the congressperson is agreeing or disagreeing 
with a stance on a particular topic.  
In this thesis, I will be developing a neural network-based model that can leverage 
congressional speeches to provide insights into both a slant score that matches vote-based 
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metrics such as DW-NOMINATE (Dynamic Weighted Nominal Three-step Estimation, 
henceforth DW), and an embedding in the ideological space that captured the frames of 
arguments to reveal the more nuanced stance of any congressperson. I will focus on the 
justification of those two constructs in this chapter, and on insights from the slant score in 
the next. Insights based on the second construct (i.e., ideological embedding) will be the 
focus of the next upcoming project. 
3.3 Literature Review 
3.3.1 Defining opinions, ideology, and polarization 
Ideology, once dubbed “the most elusive concept in the whole of social science,” is 
an extremely challenging concept to define (McLellan, 1986). A general definition given 
by Erikson and Tedin (2015) is a “set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how 
it can be achieved.” A more detailed account given by Parsons (1991), and later by Denzau 
and North (2000), is that ideologies are the shared framework of mental models that groups 
of individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a 
prescription for how that environment should be structured. For an identifiable group, class 
or society, a specific ideology crystallizes and communicates the widely shared beliefs, 
opinions, and values (Freeden, 2001; Knight, 2006).  
Opinions, beliefs, or in some literature attitudes, are the preference or judgment 
over an issue by a subject. Ideology should not be treated as just a collection of opinions 
or attitudes, but rather as an interrelated set of attitudes and opinions that are coherent, 
stable, and consistent with each other (i.e., highly correlated). So an ideology is a state 
wherein a group share opinions or beliefs that are coherent, logical, and stable; e.g., all 
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fiscal conservatives would oppose taxation but would also oppose gun bans and abortion, 
rather than each member picking up a random opinion on those issues (Converse, 2000; 
Feldman, 1988, 2003; Kinder, 1998).  
Since ideology shall be viewed as a collection of opinions that are coherently 
aligned, studies have adopted a dimensional framework to depict ideology, wherein each 
axis would represent a belief or a set of closely correlated beliefs (Converse, 2006). In early 
studies, ideology was often depicted by a single left–right dimension. In the US, the 
left – right dimension was commonly substituted by “liberal–conservative”. The left, or 
liberal side of ideology was often associated with “social movement”, “equality”, and 
“progressiveness”, whereas the right, or the conservative, side was typically associated 
with “small government”, “patriotism”, and “social conservatism.” Recently, “pro-life” or 
“pro-choice” has become an increasingly important label for left or right. As a 
parsimonious model, the left–right construct has fared surprisingly well both theoretically 
and empirically. However, later studies using exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses 
found that evaluations of “liberal” and “conservative” constructs often load onto different 
latent variables that are partially independent of one another. 
Recently, quite a few studies have suggested that the social components of ideology 
should be separated from economic ones. Some researchers went a step further by claiming 
the social dimensions are orthogonal to economical ones, although later studies showed 
that those dimensions are still positively correlated, but not completely redundant (Duckitt 
et al., 2002; Layman & Carsey, 2002).  
Now I move on to define polarization, which in itself is also a difficult task. 
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According to DiMaggio (1996), polarization is not some random political conflict, nor is it 
a summation of some noisy opinion difference. Polarization may be either a state or a 
process. As a state, polarization measures the extent to which opinions oppose each other 
relative to a theoretical maximum. As a process, it describes how such opposition increases 
temporally. In his paper, DiMaggio summarized the properties of polarization as followed: 
the dispersion principle, the bimodality principle, the constraint principle, and the 
consolidation principle. The first two principles describe the properties of polarization as a 
single distribution, while the latter two refer to relationship among distributions, as 
polarization is multidimensional in character. Here, I will focus on the latter two principles.  
Opinion constraint is a property that refers to the extent to which the distribution 
of one opinion correlates with any other opinion in an opinion domain (i.e., a set of 
thematically related issues). Higher constraint indicates that the subject populations have 
coherent beliefs, and thus higher polarization.  
Consolidation refers to opinion differences between groups defined based on 
observable parameters (e.g., age, income, and gender).  
Both constraint and consolidation measure association; the former describes 
association among opinions (ideological polarization), whereas the latter describes 
association between opinion parameters and structural parameters (identity-based 
polarization). The property of constraint also links polarization with ideology, which is 
essentially a collection of closely corelated, highly constrained opinions.  
3.3.2  The polarizing elites and their impact on the public 
Ideological polarization and conflict among party elites (such as congresspeople, 
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party leaders, activists, etc.) has a substantial impact on society. It has been shown that the 
American political elites are typically more extreme in their ideology than the general 
population (Hare et al., 2014; Brady et al., 2007). Social ideology can form through 
processes that are either top-down (i.e., elites constructing and disseminating the discursive 
superstructure of a political ideology, and thus influencing the public) or bottom-up (i.e., 
underlying psychological needs and motives that influence an individual’s receptiveness to 
specific ideological positions.) The top-down process allows the small group of elites to 
wield overwhelming power over their followers in shaping the socially shared content of a 
discursive superstructure; that is, its specific bundling of opinions, attitudes, values and 
beliefs (Graber, 2004; Habermas, 1989). As stated before, the elites possess abundant 
means (such as platforms to influence the public via newspapers, TV channels, commentary, 
and social media such as Twitter) to communicate and disseminate their political ideology 
to their followers. Furthermore, numerous studies have shown that the opinions of the 
public can easily be swayed, or even reshaped, by the elites of the party they are affiliated 
with. For example, studies have shown that the partisan coverage of partisan cues by media 
enhances audiences’ partisan identities, and thus increases cognitive and affective 
polarization (Levendusky, 2013). Arcenaux and Johnson (2015) argued that, by reporting 
polarized party stances, the mainstream media creates a polarized environment that affects 
their viewers, who will take cues from the elites. Numerous studies have suggested that 
exposure to polarized reporting makes readers more polarized, even when they were 
exposed to arguments from both sides, as biased viewers will be more willing to agree the 
with frames and stance of their own side, and ignore an even stronger frame of argument 
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from the opposite side, due to confirmation bias and motivated reasoning (Druckman, 2013; 
Engesser, 2017; Levendusky, 2017; Prior, 2009). Some research has even showed that 
being exposed to the argument from the parties on the opposite side would enhance viewers’ 
biased beliefs (Bail, 2018). 
The advent of the age of social media has motivated such polarization even more. 
The lack of fact-checking on social media has allowed the spread of a diversity of 
inaccurate information and unfounded theories. Studies have also shown that partisan bias 
could even motivate people to ignore scientifically proven truth if it contradicts their 
partisan preferences, and accept inaccurate information if it confirms those preferences 
(Druckman, 2013; Tucker, 2018). The recent politicization of mask wearing during the 
COVID-19 pandemic is a perfect illustration of partisanship interfering with the acceptance 
of scientific consensus in society. 
From here on in this chapter, I will specifically focus on the most powerful and 
influential group of party elites, the legislators in Congress (i.e., the senators and house 
representatives). For consistency, they will henceforth be referred to as congresspeople. 
3.3.3  Resources for studying polarization: pros and cons 
One of the most used methods to study the polarization of the public is the 
mass-scale survey, including the General Social Survey (GSS) and the National Election 
Study (NES). However, such methods cannot be used to study polarization of elite 
congresspeople, since very few of them have taken such surveys, and even when they have, 
the results have been anonymous, and thus useless for analyzing the ideology of each 
congressperson. Fortunately, there are two other data sets, namely roll-call voting records 
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and congressional reports. 
3.3.3.1 Roll-call voting data and DW-NOMINATE 
The ideological inertia of Congress is well established, and it is reflected in the 
consistency of congresspeople’s legislative behavior: For various reasons, US 
congresspeople rarely change their stance on important issues in their vote, there have been 
very few party-switchers, and a majority of congresspeople vote along with their own party 
most of the time (Poole & Rosenthal, 1995; Jackman, 2001). While the true ideological 
belief of each congressperson is unobservable, it is often proxied by metrics using their 
legislative behavior such as roll-call voting records. A commonality of all methodologies 
involving roll calls relies on a key assumption that the true ideology should remain stable, 
both on the individual level and on the group level (fractions, caucuses, parties, or the 
whole Congress). 
The DW, developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1995, 2001), is one of the most-used 
metrics so far that measures the ideology of congresspeople using roll-call data. According 
to the DW, ideology is represented by an ideal point, which is defined as the location of the 
most preferred political outcome of a congressperson in the policy space. Accordingly, the 
outcome of a roll call is also represented as a pair of points in the same space, either of 
which corresponds to a vote outcome (Yea or Nay). The actual vote of a congressperson 
regarding a roll-call bill would be decided by the distance between their ideal point and the 
outcome, assuming one would always choose the outcome closer to their ideal point.  
3.3.3.2 Criticism and defense of the DW-NOMINATE 
To date, the DW has been the de facto metric for measuring the political slant of 
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congresspeople, dominating many areas of political studies. However, critics of the DW 
have also been fierce in their raising of suspicion about whether it functions sufficiently 
and whether other metrics that do not rely on roll-call data are necessary to complement it. 
One of the harshest criticisms of DW is that, since its main purpose is to understand the 
legislative behavior of the congresspeople and DW is essentially derived from processing 
legislative data, this essentially involves a circular argument, and they argued that the 
reason DW explains roll-call voting so well is that it fundamentally uses voting data to 
explain voting data (Jackson et al., 1992). 
Another criticism by Jackson et al. (1992) is that the true ideology of 
congresspeople might not even matter to their vote. Imagine a completely rational 
representative representing their constituents who are also rational and politically aware; 
their best voting strategy would be to completely abandon their own ideology and vote to 
maximize their own utility (such as maximizing party influence, or re-election probability, 
or support within the party). In this case, a case of voting according to one’s own should 
be treated as a deviation from the benefit of one’s constituents and may be treated as a form 
of betrayal (Dougan et al.). So, the argument is that is if a large portion of votes are not 
based upon ideology, then how can DW, which is based on votes, be used to compute and 
analyze ideology? 
Burden et al. (2000), while acknowledging the validity of Jackson’s criticism, 
defend the usage of DW. With regard to the circular argument criticism, they compared 
DW with some other metrics that did not involve roll-call data, particularly the HHS 
metrics (Hill et al., 1997) that used the data from initial campaign statements to determine 
 
78 
the ideological slant of each congressperson. They observed a correlation between DW and 
HHS, suggesting that measurement of ideological slants using roll calls could be consistent 
with other types of measurement. For the latter concern, they argued that while it might be 
impossible to ever infer true ideology from voting patterns, it might not matter if the goal 
is to find the latent force that determined how congresspeople voted. They defined a term 
“operational ideology” as the “ideology” that dictated the legislative behavior, and thus can 
be proxied by a legislative data set. They claimed that even if it is not the true ideology, it 
is adequate to explain all the legislative voting behaviors of congresspeople. 
My stance on this issue is that the circular argument of DW will not be an issue if 
every congressperson is voting consistently, which indicates that the voting pattern in any 
time window will be consistent with and similar to the pattern in other windows. The latent 
operational ideology, as proposed by Burden et al. (2000), could be inferred from these 
patterns for each congressperson, and will be sufficient to explain any future voting patterns. 
However, there might be situations where knowing the operational ideology is not 
sufficient. On such occasions, congresspeople might break away from their usual 
operational position and vote “truthfully”; they might switch party and district and thus 
their strategy might change, since their peers and constituents changed; and as I will point 
out in the next chapters, congresspeople might change their voting strategy or even their 
stance when the country is facing a crisis. All these aforementioned events might result in 
a deviation from past voting patterns or strategies and thus might result in the breakdown 
of the DW.  
In the following section, I will review the limitation of the DW and other similar 
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metrics that are all based on legislative behavioral data (typically roll-call voting records, 
since it is the easiest data to obtain).  
3.3.3.3 The limitation of DW-NOMINATE and the necessity of a new metric to 
complement DW 
To make its calculations, DW makes a few behavioral and statistical assumptions. 
In the following section, I will carefully examine those assumptions, and explain why they 
indicate that DW, while being sufficient for explaining the majority of votes, is poor at 
handling cases such as the legislative behavior when Congress is facing an unexpected 
crisis or a disruptive event.  
The behavioral assumptions of DW are as follows: 
• Roll calls are randomly chosen to cover a variety of political issues. 
• All legislative behaviors are either uniformly truthful or uniformly biased. 
• There is little to no influence and pressure from the party, sponsors, activists, 
and constituents. 
For the first criterion, it has been shown that the contents and issues of roll-call bills 
are systematically different from non-roll calls, suggesting that the roll-call votes are not 
randomly chosen. Indeed, some studies have suggested that party leaders may intentionally 
choose bills to test and monitor the loyalty of party members (Carrubba et al., 2006). 
For the second criterion, much evidence has shown that a lot of congresspeople vote 
not just according to their true preferences, but also based on their expectation of the 
outcome. For example, if one who was planning to vote against their own party or 
constituents and expected the outcome to be the same regardless of the way they voted, 
then they might deviate from their true preference. Another possibility that may invalidate 
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sincere voting is log-rolling behavior, i.e., vote trading. 
As for the third criterion, one cannot simply assume away the influence of the 
congresspeople’s own party (the party whipping impact), the lobbyists, or the constituents. 
Jenkins et al. (2000) examined the “die in the ideological boots” theory, i.e., that 
congresspeople would hold true to their own ideological beliefs firmly throughout their 
career. They found this theory was invalid, as the politicians’ votes were largely stable only 
because of the party structure, which pressured them to conform to the party agenda, 
indicating the strong influence of the party policy and party norm over the individual’s 
legislative behavior. As a consequence, any measurement derived from the voting record 
(e.g., roll calls) attempting to measure ideology will inevitably be biased in some way or 
other.  
Stylistically, if the true ideal point is x, and the party influence is p, the observed 
ideal point x* will be x+p, which is p away from the true value. It is impossible to separate 
the true ideology x from x* without specific assumptions. Clinton et al. attempted to 
identify the party influence, assuming that there was no party influence in the lopsided 
votes and that the extent of party influence is uniform across the party for a given roll call. 
Here, I argue that the assumption is exceedingly difficult to satisfy. For example, 
congresspeople whose ideological preference does not align with the party majority will 
face more party pressure compared to those who sincerely vote with the party majority.  
Other limitations of DW include the following: 
1. The ideology is evolving, albeit slowly. To reflect the ideological inertia at 
both the individual and congress levels, DW adopted a low-order polynomial 
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to model the ideal points of congresspeople whose career lasted over different 
congresses (such as constant or linear). As a result, DW did not usually handle 
disruptions of voting behavior, such as a national crisis, or presidential 
elections or a large number of turnovers in Congress, well. There are a few 
factors that render a crisis uniquely different and that break down the 
presumption DW relies on: a) Pressure from the group, party, and constituents 
may be larger than ever and drive congresspeople further away from their true 
ideology in their votes; or b) the choice of roll-call bill becomes non-random, 
and c) the voting pattern may become even more heterogeneous, as truthful 
voting becomes rarer and strategic voting becomes more prominent. 
2. DW requires a few years’ voting records to accurately pinpoint a newcomer’s 
ideal point, due to the relative scarcity of voting records. In addition, most of 
the roll calls are on non-partisan issues that were passed in landslides, 
meaning they bore no power in analysis. 
3. DW performs well in discerning economical conservatism and liberalism, but 
relatively poorly in social dimensions. The second dimension is sometimes 
called the “issue of the day” dimension, as it does not embody a clearly 
defined opinion domain. 
4. DW can explain but cannot predict votes. It also does not incorporate the 
theme of roll call in its calculation, which makes it difficult to translate the 
value back to a well-defined opinion space. For example, when a 
congressperson is mapped to a very liberal side on the first DW dimension, 
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there is no indication as to why they are designated as such. To do so would 
required knowledge of his or her votes and opinions over specific issues (such 
as gun rights, abortions and fiscal spending etc.). However, such information 
is not incorporated in the computation of the DW.  
5. Since there are systematic, sudden deviations from past voting patterns, the 
majority of congresspeople, along with various interest groups, caucuses, and 
fractions they belong to, may decide to cast aside their personal agenda and 
vote for a bigger cause. This may result in a more unified or diversified voting 
pattern macroscopically. However, due to the statistical model that is built to 
reflect ideological inertia, DW or similar metrics may not be able to adapt to 
the abrupt disruption of voting behavior and ideology. 
6. As with other spatial ideal point models, DW has suffered from both statistical 
and theoretical deficiencies. In terms of the former, it has been posited that all 
these models operated on a questionable statistical basis. Since an ideal point 
for each legislator and a location for each bill has to be estimated, these 
models usually involved a very large set of parameters, making a consistent 
estimator of those parameters nearly impossible. For DW and its variants, the 
computation of standard errors is invalid (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Carrol, 
2009). In terms of the latter, any ideal points model explicitly or implicitly 
operated under one set of behavioral assumptions (such as sincere voting over 
a unidimensional policy space), and thus cannot be generalized to a different 
behavioral model (such as log-rolling). Furthermore, due to the complex 
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computations required for estimating even the simplest roll call model, 
extending these models to incorporate more realistic behavioral assumptions 
is almost impossible (Clinton, 2004). 
Although DW has performed well in explaining most of the voting behaviors and 
has since become a cornerstone for political study, despite all its limitations and caveats, 
researchers still call for new metrics from other data sources. The HHS metrics (Hill et al., 
1997), which used the initial campaign statements, does not outperform DW, likely because 
it does not use any other later data after a congress person has been elected and thus did 
does not permit the possibility of ideology to change or behavior aimed at performing to 
wooing the constituents into its calculation. Besides, there are few follow-up studies to 
validate after the HHS, making it a one-time wonder. In the following session, I will 
introduce another rich data set that can potentially be used as a source of measurement of 
the ideology of the congress people, which is the congressional floor speech reports. 
3.3.4  Congressional reports 
The most dominant lineage of research on political polarization using congressional 
reports was carried out by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010), in which they deployed a Naïve 
Bayes method to identify polarized words and phrases and assign a polarization score to 
each of them. Such an approach (which will be referred to as the GS method) has since 
become a benchmark in political science for the measurement of polarization in text-based 
data.  
Framing, or in some literature, “agenda setting”, refers to the process of alternative 
conceptualizations of an issue or event. Unlike topics that directly refer to the core concept 
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of the subject issue, frames are selective inclusions of a subset of potentially relevant 
considerations (or arguments). A framing effect occurs when “in the course of describing 
an issue or event, a speaker’s emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant considerations 
causes individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions” 
(Druckman and Nelson, 2003). 
One example of the framing effect is whether to bring up Second Amendment or 
mass shooting events when talking about firearms regulation. Studies have shown that 
people are not willing to change their opinions when facing a strongly framed argument by 
party elites from the other side (Druckman and Nelson, 2003). However, several studies 
have focused on diversified framing (as a part of agenda-setting, or “spin”) within different 
fractions of Congress to understand how and why Congress is divided as it is. Blei et al. 
(2011) coupled a topic model over bill texts with the past voting records of members of the 
US Congress in order to predict their legislative voting behavior. Nguyen et al. (2015) went 
a step further by developing a more complicated hierarchical ideal point topic model that 
combines framing from the congressional speech, topics from bill text, and legislative 
voting behavior within Congress, to generate high-dimensional ideal points similar to DW. 
More specifically, they focused on the relationship between the “Tea Party” caucus and the 
“establishment.” However, their definition of frames was a combination of subtopics, and 
thus vastly narrower than ours, and clearly did not separate the concept of frames from 
topics.  
Existing research on framing and agenda-setting so far has not drawn a clear line 
between topics and frames. The frame is generally treated as either a subtopic or a 
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combination of multiple subtopics in topic models and their variants.  
It is imperative to assume that the two key components of formal speech are topics 
and frames, which are separated yet interdependent concepts. Topics generally refer to 
“what to talk about”, while frames refer to “how to talk about it.” Obviously, choice of 
frames is only sensible after topics have been chosen. Such concepts of frames and topics 
are of great importance in the context of studying congressional reports, as the vast majority 
of congressional speeches have to contain both of them, which forms the basis for 
analyzing the political agenda and polarization within Congress through the speeches of its 
members. The core idea of this part of the thesis is to offer a clear-cut definition of topics 
and frames, and to separate topics and frames under certain constraints. The key 
assumptions and rationale that lead to quantification and measurement of ideology and 
polarization will be further discussed in the following section.  
One of the contributions of this thesis is that, to my knowledge, it is the first attempt 
to devise a new measurement of ideology based purely on congressional records, by 
assigning each congressman either a vector or a value to represent their position in 
ideological space. The GS method is mostly a valuable tool for measuring party slants of 
similar texts from other sources (e.g., newspapers), whereas Blei’s and Nguyen’s method, 
while also attempting to measure the congresspeople’s positions as ideal points, integrated 
the roll-call data with congressional speeches and thus was not an independent measure 
from the DW. In the following section, I will detail the ideas and assumptions behind the 
new metrics.  
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3.4 Methodology: from Word Embedding to Ideological Embedding 
3.4.1  Topics, frames, and key assumptions regarding topics and frames 
In general terms, topics are the subjects of speeches. To distinguish from topics in 
topic modeling where the concept itself also encompasses subtopics and issues to be 
associated with it, I confined the definition of topics to the broad, top-level concept that is 
being focused on in the discussion. For example, a speech discussing gun regulation to 
prevent mass shootings and a speech discussing the right to own firearms would share the 
same topic “gun.” (In topic modeling such as LDA, either may be assigned to different 
lower-level subtopics such as “gun ban” or “gun right”.)  
Since topics, according to definition in this thesis, only capture the “what to talk 
about” part of a speech, all other components of a speech, such as attitudes, opinion, salient 
sentiment, and emotions, will thereafter be captured in frames; i.e., “how to talk about it.” 
Hence, in the following sections of this thesis, frames will be defined as the discursive 
superstructure one would choose to construct surrounding the chosen topic, which contains 
both the attitudes and the information supporting those attitudes. Following the “gun” 
example above, frames would include associated subtopics such as “Second Amendment 
constitutional rights” (also known as “spins” in some literature), the attitudes (strongly 
opposing gun ban), the sentiment (an emotional plea) and the organization of logical 
arguments (such as “Guns don’t kill, people do.) It was obvious that if one is an anti-gun 
activist, one would have chosen a completely different frame. In other words, frames 
contain all the information necessary to infer one’s stance on a topic, and hence contain all 
the information that could be used to infer one’s ideology. 
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Two assumptions need to be established in order to connect the extraction of frames 
and frame embeddings with the measurement of ideology and polarization:  
The assumption of neutrality of topics 
Naturally, I make the assumption of ideological neutrality of topics: that the topic 
itself should be neutral. A perfect demonstration of validity of such an assumption is the 
issue of mask wearing during the COVID-19 pandemic. By itself, mask-wearing to prevent 
the spread of the disease is a scientifically agreed method that should not bear any political 
inclination. However, somehow it became politicized by US politicians such that people 
from opposite ends of the spectrum held completely different views and attitudes over the 
effectiveness, necessity, benefits, and caveats of mask-wearing. Consequently, even though 
the “Wearing a mask to stop COVID” topic by itself is completely neutral, the Democratic 
and Republican populations held vastly different attitudes over mask-wearing mandates 
(Pew Research Center, 2020). This introduces the next assumption. 
 
Figure 6. Attitudes toward masks among Democrats and Republicans (from Pew 
Research Center, 2020) 
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The assumption of the ideological centroid of frames 
The examples of mask-wearing and gun issues illustrate that, while topics 
themselves do not carry ideological inclinations, they decide what type of frames will be 
used, which also carry all the information related to ideology. As a result, during a speech, 
one would choose a frame that is entirely dependent on topics and centered around one’s 
core ideology. For example, if someone’s core belief regarding gun issues is that firearms 
are dangerous and cause mass shootings and homicide, they would construct a discursive 
framework to support their true belief. If each speech they gave contained a random draw 
from a pool of all possible gun-related frames they might choose, those frames that are 
closer to the true belief would be much more likely to be chosen, while those that deviate 
from the true belief would be much less likely. In other words, the centroid of all possible 
frames would proxy one’s true belief over a certain topic, provided that one does not 
intentionally lie or deviate from one’s true belief in a non-random way (which might 
happen under some circumstances, as will be discussed in the final section).  
The assumption regarding polarization 
Polarization is the systematic difference of beliefs in a population, including both 
ideological extremity and constraints. In the context of the US Congress, where members 
are naturally segregated based on their beliefs, and ideological unification within parties 
and division between parties are expected, polarization can be proxied by the overall 
average difference of beliefs between two opposing parties, which is to say, if the true 
ideology of each party member is known, then polarization can be calculated by simply 
taking the difference between all Democrats and all Republicans. While it is true that not 
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all members from the same party are ideologically homogeneous, overall, the 
Democrat – Republican division, or the Liberal–Conservative division, still represents the 
major axis from which the beliefs and ideologies diverge (DiMaggio, 1996; Laymen, 2002). 
Document decomposition in the embedding of space 
Suppose I represented sentence d in the embedding space (this can be done by 
weighted average of all word embedding, which is an incredibly good baseline model 
according to Arora et al. (2017)), it can be decomposed into 𝑑=	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝜖, where the former is 
the fixed component that can be further decomposed into the frames embedding F and the 
topics embeddings T, and the latter is a stochastic component. Notice that both F and T are 
also embeddings of the same dimensionality as d. F is a function of both topic distribution 
𝜃9 and ideology s (as in, “In which direction is the ideology of the author of speeches 
slanted, Democratic or Republican?”) whereas T is only a function of 𝜃.  
Given d, the goal is to find F and T, such that 𝑑= 	= 𝐹(𝜃 + 𝑠) + 𝑇(𝜃) is as close to 
d as possible, i.e., 
min
4,	6,7
'‖𝑑 − 𝑇 − 𝐹‖ 	 
At same time, T and F shall be constrained by the neutrality assumption and the 
ideological centroid assumption. The former states that T shall be neutral, the mathematical 
implementation of which will be further discussed in the next paragraph. To satisfy the 
 
9 The topic distribution vector 𝜃 is either a sparse probability vector of length 68 (corresponding 
to the pool of 68 chosen topics) that assigned a probability distribution of a speech document 
belonging to a topic, or a one-hot vector which only take the value 1 at the position of max 
probability, by doing so it transformed the soft topic assignment to the hard assignment. 
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latter constraint, I insisted that the frame F of a speech shall contain all information needed 
to infer the ideological slant s of its author, which, given the context, shall be slanted either 
toward the liberal side of Congress (i.e., Democrats), or the conservative side (i.e., 
Republicans). Note that in another context, ideological slant may not be equivalent to the 
party label.  
To enforce the neutrality of T, the polarization (in the context of the US congress) 
shall be the overall difference between the ideologies of the Democratic and Republican 
parties. According to the centroid assumption, if I treat the Democratic party as a single 
entity, its ideology shall be written as 𝐼. = (∑ 𝐹6,/,	1)/‖𝐷6‖6,1∈. . Similarly, for the 
Republican party, I have 𝐼8 = ∑ 𝐹6,/,	1)/‖𝑅6‖6,1∈8 . Here a is the author of the speech, 
and 𝐷6 	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑅6 	 are the total number of speeches by Democrats and Republicans 
respectively. Thus, the Democrat–Republican polarization axis (or D–R axis for simplicity), 
shall be written as 
𝜌(𝜃) = 	 𝐼. − 𝐼8 = ( ' 𝐹6,/,	1)/‖𝐷6‖
6,1∈.
− ( ' 𝐹6,/,	1)/‖𝑅6‖
6,1∈8
 
Now, the neutrality constraint would require the topic-embedding vector T of any 
topic distribution 𝜃  to be orthogonal to the D–R axis 𝜌(𝜃) . This idea is similar to 
debiasing the gender stereotypes in word embedding by identifying a gender subspace in 
the embedding space and neutralizing gender-neutral words (Bolukbasi et al., 2016).  
Construction of the neural network 
The neural network learning topics and frame embeddings contain two branches. The 
top branch samples F from a multivariate Gaussian distribution 𝑁(𝜇(𝑑), 	Σ(𝑑)* as a part 
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of the variational auto-encoder (VAE) (Doersch, 2016). The bottom branch is a simple feed-
forward fully connected neural network that learns the topic-embedding vector T. The 
learning goal is to reconstruct d with the sum of T and F, with F satisfying the constraints 
of being able to predict ideological slant (i.e., party labels in the context of the US congress) 
and T satisfying the ability to predict the topic label. Overall, the loss function shall be 
written as 
𝑳 = 	U𝑑= − 𝑑U + crossentrophy(sigmoid(?̃?) − 𝑠) + 𝐾𝐿(𝐹) 
+𝐾𝐿(𝜃, 𝜃9) + U𝑇d − 𝑇d9U +'𝜃! |𝑇d!𝜌!| 
The last term in the loss function corresponds to the depolarization of T, which is 
slightly tricky to back-propagate, since the D–R axis 𝜌(𝜃) is a function of F, and cannot 
be determined until after all Fs are learned. Inspired by the EM algorithm, I devised an 
alternative minimization procedure where values of 𝜌(𝜃) are fixed when training for F 
and T, which will be updated using all Fs that are trained. Then the network training is 
restarted with the fixed newly updated 𝜌(𝜃), and the procedure is repeated until values of 
𝜌(𝜃) converge. 
 










I collected 75,000 congressional floor speeches given by both senators and house 
representatives from 1991 till 2016, spanning three presidency periods. Speeches from 
approximately 1,500 congresspeople were analyzed. Speeches were separated into either a 
training set or a test set. Speeches from special groups of congresspeople were exclusively 
assigned to the test set. The first group was party switchers who made a switch during 1991 
and 2016. Names of the members within this group will be presented in the following 
section. The second group comprised independents who did not affiliate with either the 
Democratic or the Republican party. The major reason for such assignment was because a) 
the outcome variable is whether he or she was a Democrat (Yes = 1, No = 0), and so being 
an independent would be classified as the same as a Republican, which is not accurate; and 
b) after a careful examination, I found that the party labels from the original data set were 
often wrong for the party switchers, as their party labels tended to be updated either too 
early or too late. Including these mislabeled data (although less than 1% of the total data) 
would decrease the training accuracy and confuse the machine. The training results are 
shown below. Highlights of the results are as follows: 
• The average absolute cosine similarity between T and 𝜌 of all topics is 0.054, 
suggesting the topic T is sufficiently “depolarized.” 
• The out-of-sample prediction accuracy of the ideological slant of a given 
speech reaches 75%, significantly higher than the 69% reported by Iyyer et al. 
(2014). 
• The out-of-sample prediction accuracy of party affiliation of an out-of-sample 
congressperson reached as high as 95%, again, significantly outperforming the 
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GS improved method (60%–80% depending on era) (Genzkow et al., 2016). 
Figure 8. Report of out-of-sample training accuracy. The dashed line is the accuracy 
of Iyyer’s RNN model. 
3.5 Sense-Making and Validation of the Embedding and Ideological Slant of 
Polarization in the US Congress 
First let us take a closer look at the outputs of my neural network and their 
implications.  
There are two important output products from the top branch (the slant training 
branch): a predicted logit score 𝑆= that indicated the likelihood that a speech was given by 
a Democrat, and an embedding vector 𝐹 that captured the frame of a speech. My model 
specifies that the embedding vector 𝐹 will be sufficient to predict 𝑆=, indicating that the 
former would contain more information than the latter. In the following section, some 
sense-making and validation of both the embedding vector 𝐹  and the logit score 𝑆= 
(which I will later refer to as the ideological slant score) will be provided. The 
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methodological contribution and validation will be the sole focus of this chapter, whereas 
the insights it provides will be the focus of the next chapter on “Profiling Congress: 
Understanding the Evolution of Partisanship and Ideological Heterogeneity Among the US 
Elites.” 
3.5.1  Sense-making and validation of the frames embedding vector 𝑭 , and 
definition of the ideological vector 𝑰 and the D–R axis 
According to the ideological centroid assumption of frames, I can calculate the 
ideological slant of a congressperson as well as the polarization within Congress. Assume 
that, when giving a speech on a topic 𝜃, a congressperson would choose a frame that 
centers around their core belief 𝐼16. So, if I observe a collection of speeches 𝐷16 by an 
author a on topic 𝜃 (such as guns, abortion, etc.), and suppose I can calculate all the 
frames embedding vector 𝐹s of these speech documents, the ideological belief of the 
author a on the issue 𝜃 can be approximated by 
𝐼16 = ' 𝐹//‖𝐷16‖
/∈.%&
 
and the overall ideology of a is then  
𝐼1 = ' 𝐹//‖𝐷1‖
/∈.%
 
From now on, 𝐼1 will be named as the individual ideological vector. 
Likewise, as I mentioned above, if I treat the Democratic and Republican parties as 
















The overall partisan difference, or more precisely the Democratic–Republican 
polarization axis (D– R axis), can then be calculated by 
𝜌 = 	𝑰𝑫 − 𝑰𝑹 
Lastly, as a depolarization procedure, I can separate an individual ideology 𝐼1 into 
two parts: the part that projects onto the D–R axis, and the remainder. The project of 𝐼1 
over D–R axis is named as 𝑰.8, and represents how slanted an individual’s ideology is 
toward an extremity of the political spectrum. The value of ||𝑰.8||  would tell how 
extreme/slanted a congressperson is: the larger ||𝑰.8|| is, the more liberal they are on the 
political spectrum. 
Before diving into a detailed analysis of polarization of the US Congress, it is 
necessary to validate this approach of measuring and representing individual ideology, 
party ideology, and the D–R axis. And since beliefs, ideology, party slants and polarization 
are all complex and abstract concepts that cannot be measured directly, I need to resort to 
existing metrics and commonly used proxies such as voting records.  
So far, one of the commonest ways to measure the ideological slant of a 
congressperson is the DW, particularly its first dimension (Poole et al., 1985). If my method 
and measurements are solid, then the value of ||𝑰.8|| should be strongly associated with 
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the value of the first dimension of DW. In Figure 9, I plotted the value of h|𝑰.8|h against 
the first dimension, and indeed I observed a strong association: 
 
 
Figure 9. IDR vs. first-dimension DW-NOMINATE of all congresspeople 
The D–R axis is the general direction in which the overall Democratic party differed 
from the overall Republican party. In some sense, it can be viewed as a proxy of the 
Conservative–Liberal ideology dimension, and the projection on this axis should be treated 
as a proxy for the position over the Conservative–Liberal continuum. Recall that the first 
dimension of DW is also a proxy for the position over the Conservative–Liberal continuum. 
The fact that the projection is consistent with first DE dimension strongly supports the 
contention that the ideology vector 𝐼1 should indeed represent ideology. 



















X axis: values of the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE 
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congresspeople are similarly ideologically slanted, then they tend to agree with each other 
in votes more often. Likewise, if two individuals have similar ideologies, then their 𝐼1 
should be close, and they would also vote similarly. (In other words, their differences in 
voting should be narrower.) As is shown in Figure 10, this holds true for most 
congresspeople, with only a few deviations.  
 
Figure 10. The correlation between voting similarity and closeness of individual 
ideology Ia, each dot representing a congressperson 
3.5.2  Sense-making and validation of the (ideological) slant score 
One of the reasons DW is so widely adopted in political science studies is that it 
assigns a single scalar value to every congressperson who has ever voted, so that it explains 
the difference in legislative voting behavior between any pair of congresspeople. My neural 
network also provides a similar value, the predicted logit score. This logit score is 















X axis: Difference in voting records 
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value is, the more likely the speech is given by a member from the Democratic party. In a 
not-so-strict sense, the logit score measures the “liberalness” of a speech, and the additive 
inverse of the logit score would correspondingly measure the “conservativeness” of such a 
speech. For a given congressperson A, if the logit score of a speech d given by A is denoted 
as 𝑆/, then the average logit score of A is given by 𝑆> =
?
‖.,‖
∑ 𝑆//∈., , where 𝐷> is the 
whole set of speeches given by A.  
Now 𝑆> measured the average “liberalness” disclosed by A through his/her speeches, 
similar to the first-dimension DW, which measured the liberal–conservative index of A 
through his/her legislative votes. As a result, 𝑆> is a decent candidate for the measurement 
of the ideological slant that I was searching for, which was derived from non-roll-call data, 
and could potentially complement DWs. From here on, 𝑆>  will be referred to as the 
ideological slant score of congressperson A (as it measures how much his/her ideology is 
slanted toward the extremities on the liberal–conservative ideology continuum).  
Figure 11 shows that the slant score was consistent with the first dimension of DW, 
with an extremely high R2 value (0.8), meaning that the congresspeople who were 
measured as liberal in votes were also likely to be measured as liberal in rhetoric. Again, 
this lends substantial support for my methodology and my new metrics. 
To summarize, in this section, I developed a solid measurement of individual/party 
ideology, the polarization between two parties within Congress, and the degree of the 
ideological slant of an individual congressperson along the D–R axis. The validity of these 





Figure 11. First dimension of DW-NOMINATE vs. the predicted logit score (the 
ideological slant score), each dot representing a congressperson 
3.5.3  Senators and house representatives who lay on the party margins, and their 
identities 
One interesting perspective gained was how the Democrats and Republicans were 
distributed in terms of their ideological slants over the liberal–conservative continuum. The 
null hypothesis would indicate that they were randomly assigned a value between a 
minimum and a maximum and there were no clear cut “margins” or “borders” between 
those groups. In Figure 12, I plotted the mean and the standard deviation of the slant scores 
of all congresspeople during three presidential terms: the Clinton era (1993–2000), the 
Bush era (2001–2008), and the Obama era (2009–2016). The reason I analyzed by eras is 
that the two parties were quickly pulling away from each other, and what was considered 
as extreme in one era might be considered as moderate in another. (See Chapter 4 for more 
detailed revelations.)  
R2 = 0.81 




















Figure 12. Ideological slants, mean vs. std., among the Senate, during the Bush (top), 
Clinton (middle) and Obama (bottom) eras. Blue/red dots represent 
Democratic/Republican senators, respectively. 
  






















There were a few notable observations: 
• The two parties were well separated, and they were pulling away from each 
other as time passed. 
• The members within each party were increasingly consistent in their slant 
during the later eras as the dots were shifting to the left (although this did not 
mean that the same congresspeople were becoming more stable, as dots from 
different eras could represent different sets of members.) 
• y = –3 and y = +3 can be used as margins to separate Democratic and 
Republican party members. Thus, the Democrats whose slant values < 3 or the 
Republicans whose slant values > –3 shall be denoted as “marginal” members 
of their respective party. 
Similar plots will be generated using the speech data generated by the House 
members. It showed similar trends as the Senate, despite having significantly larger number 
of members (435 house representatives vs. 100 senators). Notice that the +3/–3 margins 
also worked for the House, indicating the relative consistency in ideological slant between 
the House and the Senate. 













Figure 13. Ideological slants, mean vs. std., among House representatives during the 
Bush (top), Clinton (middle) and Obama (bottom) eras. Blue/red dots represent 
Democratic/Republican Senators, respectively 
  






















It is of particular interest to know the identities of the “marginal” congresspeople, 
who seemed to distance themselves from the rest of their respective parties:  
Table 9. The identity of the marginal congresspeople (Senators marked with dark 
shade) 
ANTHONY, Beryl Franklin, Jr. D rep Red 
BATEMAN, Herbert Harvell D to R (in 1976) 
BRIGHT, Bobby Neal, Sr. D to R (in 2011), also rep Red 
BYRON, Beverly Barton Butcher Conservative D, anti-abortion, fiscally conservative 
CAMPBELL, Ben Nighthorse D to R (in 1995) 
CONDIT, Gary Adrian Conservative D 
DEAL, John Nathan D to R (in 1995) 
DWYER, Bernard James Retired in 1992, not much data 
EARLY, Joseph Daniel Retired in 1993, not much data 
FINGERHUT, Eric D. Only served 2 years, not much data 
FORBES, Michael Patrick D to R (in 1999) 
GOODE, Virgil H., Jr. D to I to R (in 2000) 
HALL, Ralph Moody D to R (in 2004) 
HAYES, James Allison D to R (in 1995) 
JONES, Ben Conservative D, support confederate flag, support impeachment of Clinton 
JEFFORDS, James Merrill R to D (in 2001) 
KING, Angus Stanley, Jr. I(ndependent) 
KOLTER, Joseph Paul Retired 1993, not much data 
KRUEGER, Robert Charles D rep Red 
LAUGHLIN, Gregory H. D rep Red, D to R (in 1995) 
MURTHA, John Patrick, Jr. Moderate D, anti-gun control and anti-abortion 
PARKER, Michael (Mike) D rep Red, D to R (in 1995) 
PATTERSON, Elizabeth J. D rep Red, not much data 
PURSELL, Carl Duane R rep Blue 
SKEEN, Joseph Richard R rep Blue 
SHELBY, Richard C. D to R (in 1994), also D rep Red 
SMITH, Adam Moderate D, leader of the “New Democrats” 
SPECTER, Arlen D to R (in 1965) to D (in 2009) 
STALLINGS, Richard Howard D rep Red, anti-abortion 
STENHOLM, Charles Walter D rep Red, anti-abortion and anti-gun control 
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TANNER, John S. D rep Red, moderate, founder of the “Blue Dog Democrats” 
TAUZIN, Wilbert Joseph (Billy) D rep Red, D to R (in 1995) 
Notes  
1. D/R rep Red/Blue: Democrats/Republicans representing a Red/Blue state 
2. D/R to R/D: Democrats switching to Republican party, or vice versa 
3. “Not much data”: The corresponding member did not serve long enough, and thus did not make enough 
speeches for my model to make a reliable computation. This could be due to the census issue, that they 
might leave their position shortly after my observation began. 
4. The rows in dark shade are Senators. The rest are House reps. 
A careful examination showed that the “marginal” congress members designated by 
my methods successfully included almost all party switchers in both Senate and House, 
which is remarkable considering that my model did not train on a single piece of speech 
from those members. This suggests that my method can not only explain the partisan 
behavior of congresspeople, but also predict it. Meanwhile, although the DW also assigned 
those party switchers a moderate first-dimension score (between –0.05 and 0.05), 
consistent with the slant score, it could not perform prediction like the current method since 
it had to leverage the party information for computation.  
In addition to party switchers, the marginal party members also included most 
“trespassers”: Democrats who represented the Red states/districts, or Republicans who 
represented the Blue states/districts. However, there were some disparities in performance, 
as the metrics picked out the “trespassing” Democrats far more reliable than the 
“trespassing” Republicans. For example, Silvio Conte (R representing a Massachusetts 
district), and Benjamin Gilman (R representing a New York district) were not successfully 
identified by the method. The systematic underperformance with regard to identifying 
trespassing Republicans could suggest that unlike the Democratic trespassers, the 
Republicans tended not to toe the party line in their rhetoric, even though their voting 
record (according to DW) suggested their legislative behavior was more similar to the 
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Democratic Party than to other Republicans (although this could be done by only voting 
with Democrats on non-consequential/lopsided bills.) 
This method also missed Zell Miller, a conservative Democrat who represented 
Georgia in the Senate. This is likely due to insufficient data, as I required more than 10 
speeches per year and at least 2 years served during 1991 and 2016 for inclusion. 
To summarize, the marginal members, according to the slant score metric, largely 
consisted of a) party switchers, b) “trespassers”, and c) other conservative Democrats or 
liberal Republicans (though the latter were much fewer.) Out of these three groups, the 
party switchers were reliably predicted with 100% recall (since all their speeches were 
excluded from the training data.) Such a revelation would further validate the legitimacy 
of the methodology and the slant score metric. (The embedding metric is not the focus of 
this paper but will be verified in the future.) This also marked another significant 
contribution of the study, which is that if a newly elected congressperson placed themselves 
between the margins of borders, then they were very likely to belong to one of the three 
above-mentioned groups, and there will be a significant higher chance of party switches 
for that person. 
The trending patterns of party switchers 
In this section, I will seek some insights into whether I can “predict” the timing of 
the switch based on the measured ideological slant score. Here, I will focus on the party 
switchers in the Senate, who were Richard Shelby, Ben Campbell, and Arlen Specter. I left 
out James Jeffords eventually due to the lack of data before 2000, the period during which 
he made the switch.  
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The periods I focused on are the years shortly before, during, and after the party 
switch. For Senator Richard Shelby, who switched from D to R during the year 1995, his 
slant score only remained >0 during 1991 and 1992, and quickly dropped below 0 after 
1993, bouncing slightly back in 1994, and subsequently dived to below –3 after 1997, 
which was the margin for the Republican party. Interestingly enough, his ideological slant 
would subsequently oscillate back and forth in the [–3, 0] interval, with an obvious trend 
toward the more conservative side.  
Similarly, for Ben Campbell, a Senator who switched party from D to R in 1995, his 
slant score also took a nose-dive during 1994 and 1996, from 2 (which was still below the 
margin for the Democratic majority) to –4. However, unlike Senator Shelby, Senator 
Campbell’s position would gradually recover back toward the liberal direction and would 
remain almost completely neutral during his late tenure.  
The last one, Senator Specter, was an interesting case. This senator switched his party 
affiliation twice in his life, back and forth between D and R. For his entire tenure, he 
essentially remained in the neutral zone between –1 and 1, which is consistent with his 
image as a cornerstone of the political center. However, before his last party switch, which 
happened at the tail end of his tenure in Congress (2009), he experienced a slow yet 
consistent drift toward the more liberal direction according to the metric, an omen of things 
to come. Considering that party switching was always a calculated strategic decision that 
came with significant risk and loss of political capital, such a decision made by Senator 
Specter was likely a fruit of his gradual departure from the conservative ideology during 
Bush’s tenure. During an interview, he stated, “As the Republican Party has moved farther 
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and farther to the right, I have found myself increasingly at odds with the Republican 
philosophy and more in line with the philosophy of the Democratic Party.” 
Figure 14. Annual analysis of ideological slants of party switchers, where the color 
theme corresponds to the original party of belonging 
3.6 Contribution and Limitations of the New Metric, and Future Directions 
For a long time, understanding the ideology of the American elites has been essential 
for understanding how American politics operates, how consensus is established, and how 
bipartisan agreements are reached after long periods of struggles and infighting. It also for 
a long time puzzled political scientists due to the scarcity of survey data among Congress, 
where the beliefs of people on various opinion domains can be directly measured. 
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Researchers began to adopt an indirect approach by using voting records and congressional 
speeches. Traditional metrics using roll-call voting data successfully explained the voting 
behavior of congresspeople. One of the most successful examples is the DW, which 
leveraged the roll-call voting records to map every congressperson into a single- or 
two-dimensional space. However, as Kingdon et al. (2000) pointed out, all these metrics 
suffered from the criticism of the circular argument and the breakdown of the truthful 
voting assumption, as well as relying on several other presumptions that usually do not 
seem to hold realistically. By far, political scientists have been longing for a new metric 
that is derived from a different data source, to complement DW and its variants. 
In this paper, I have proposed a new metric that is derived from congressional reports. 
While this is not the first study that has sought to infer congresspeople’s ideology from 
their speeches, it is the first one that has used congressional records exclusively. Moreover, 
this is the first study that has connected the embedding of texts with the embedding of 
ideology and distinguished the concepts of topics and frames in the analysis. The latter 
offers the potential to translate this method to other applications that require the 
decomposition of speeches into topics components and framing components.  
One of the best-adopted metrics based upon congressional reports was developed by 
Gentzkow and Shapiro, and while convenient, it suffered from low performance accuracy 
(Gentzkow et al., 2010), in that they used partisan words and phrases as benchmarks to 
measure the party slant of news reports and news outlets. Later on, they extended their 
metrics with a discrete model to measure the “phrase” partisanship within Congress 
(Gentzkow et al., 2016). This method I presented is distinguished from GS methods in that 
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my model does not make structured assumptions regarding the decision-making process 
and utility gain of any congressperson, and that speeches were represented in the 
embedding space instead of the Bag of Words (BOW). The GS metric also did not 
incorporate the topic concept in the model specification, although they eventually measured 
a topic-wise partisanship.  
Here are the major contributions of this study: 
1. The metric I proposed in my thesis is the first measurement of ideology of the US 
congresspeople that is purely based on speeches and text analysis. The GS method (the 
2016 version) incorporated speaker characteristics in their discrete choice model, while 
Blei’s topic models (2015) and other improved topic models incorporated DW in their 
training, and thus were not independent metrics from DW.  
2. This metric can predict the slant and party affiliation of new party members or 
new speeches (here being new means not seen by the trained neural network), with more 
than 95% and 75% accuracy respectively, outperforming GS metrics (80% at best at 
predicting party affiliation of party members) and the RNN model (69% prediction of a 
new speech article) (Iyyer et al., 2014). 
3. In addition, the new slant score metric reliably predicted the party switchers and 
party “trespassers” (the latter being Democrats who represented a group of constituents 
who voted the opposite way during the general presidential election). This served both as 
a remarkable validation of the metric (since the neural machine did not see any speeches 
or labels of any party switchers), and as a valuable insight into the shifting ideological slant 
before, during, and after the party switch, and into the discrepancy between trespassers 
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from different parties in their action vs. their rhetoric.  
4. The slant score was only one of the output products of the method. The other 
one was the embedding vectors, which in theory would contain far more information 
than the ideological slant score. I validated the meaning of such embedding vectors 
against voting records, but will leave the exploration of the value of the embedding for 
future study.  
5. Our method can also be extrapolated to a broader range of problems. It can be 
applied to analyze any opinions as long as people from different sides have been given 
relatively structured arguments over any given issue, not just political ideology. For 
example, it could be applied to investment forums where investors are debating about 
the prospect of the stock market, or about whether to buy calls or puts for a stock option. 
It can be applied to a sport forum too, where fans from rival teams are making 
structured arguments (although it might fail if such arguments are too informal and 
contain too much name-calling, jargon and profanity). 
However, it is also imperative not to overstate the success of this new metric. It has 
a lot of value in that it offers new insights drawn from congressional speeches, 
differentiating itself from the mainstream studies that all relied on voting records, thus 
partially avoiding the systematic errors in measuring the ideology that was plaguing the 
voting-based metrics (e.g., the DW). Unfortunately, though, for various reasons, this metric 
also suffered from several problems due to limitations in the congressional records. 
The first issue was the assumption of truthful speeches. It is unclear whether or not 
those congresspeople speak their true minds or are simply performing or lying in their 
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speeches. I would argue that a congressperson would be less likely to deviate from their 
true beliefs in their speeches as compared to their votes simply for the following reasons: 
• It is much easier for congresspeople to remain silent on an issue when their 
beliefs on such an issue do not completely align with the party line or their 
constituents, than to not cast a vote (as abstention by itself is a revelation of 
their true belief and is seen as a consequential action that might cost a lot of 
political capital.) 
• Speaking against their party is much less consequential and costly than actually 
voting against their party, and thus observation of the former should happen 
much more frequently than the latter. 
• Also, importantly, many speeches in Congress are given by the sponsors of a 
bill, aimed at promoting such a bill or calling for a wilder endorsement, and 
thus it is much safer to assume that the ideology of the sponsors should locate 
closely to the ideal point of the bill. 
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that measuring the true ideology in an unbiased 
way is impossible when a congressperson is deliberately and consistently hiding their true 
ideology in both their speech and their vote. However, in this case, it could also be argued 
that knowing the true position of this member is not that important if they are acting 
consistently throughout their tenure in Congress. Furthermore, our new metric can still 
reliably predict or explain all their legislative behavior. My argument here is that when we 
observe disconnection between someone’s vote and speeches, it is more likely that our 
metric is closer to their true ideology while the DW is closer to their operational ideology, 
as the votes were much more consequential and more likely to be influenced by outside 
forces. 
The second problem with our metric, which is unique, is due to omission bias, which 
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states that congresspeople might choose not to give any speeches on a topic. The reason 
they might remain silent on such topics could vary. Such a topic might not be the focus of 
their agenda; or the constituents they represent might be too divided, or indifferent to such 
a topic. In both cases, the congresspeople may choose to remain silent as it is beneficial for 
them to do so. 
Another reason is that they might not agree with the stance taken by their party 
majority, or their party leaders, or the president who is from the same party, on the topic, 
and decide it is beneficial for them not to voice their disagreement in order to avoid political 
backlash. Since I do not know why those congresspeople chose to remain silent on a topic, 
it is difficult to impute their ideology based on existing data. Fortunately, the missing data 
problem was only prominent for congresspeople who served short terms, or topics that 
were generally niche within Congress (e.g., the topics of Vietnam, the postal service, and 
religion). For the most prominent topics such as fiscal spending, economics, military 
complex, and politics, they generally do not suffer from a severe missing observation 
problem. However, this problem is impossible to ignore when we want to measure the 
topic-wise ideology, which will be partially addressed in the next chapter. 
Lastly, I should note that congressional speeches are not completely independent 
from votes. As previously mentioned, many speeches in Congress were given by bill 
sponsors in order to promote their bills or call for more endorsement. It is a safe assumption 
that the sponsor of a bill would also vote favorably for a bill. As a result, there might be 
some degree of correlation between congressional speeches and votes. However, since 
most vote-based metrics only used roll-call votes, and some even only a subset of roll-call 
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votes, those metrics could be treated as largely independent from the speech-based metrics.  
Ultimately, for reasons mentioned above, I cannot claim our metric is superior to 
vote-based metrics such as DW in every way, nor can I assume that it captures true ideology 
without any bias. Although it might perform better than DW in dealing with some 
systematic bias (such as strong party influence), it also suffered more from missing 
observation problems. DW also functioned really well in explaining votes, despite the 
circular argument criticism. Here, I have proposed our metric as a valuable complement to 
DW and other vote-based metrics, as it is the first metric that is entirely based on a 





4.1 Outline of the Chapter 
This chapter will focus on the insights gained from measuring the ideology of the 
congresspeople. It should be recalled that in the previous chapter, I introduced a 
neural-network-based methodology that computes a) an ideological embedding vector, and 
b) an ideological slant score for each congressional speech. The latter could be interpreted 
as a projection of the former over the liberal–conservative ideological subspace (or axis). 
Both the embedding vector and the slant score can be aggregated at different levels to 
provide insights into the ideologies of parties, groups, and individuals, both overall and on 
different issues, and during different time frames. 
In Chapter 3, I used DW and voting records to validate our results. In addition, as a 
means of validating my metrics, I also looked into the predicted “marginal members” and 
have shown that those members were either party switchers or trespassers. In this chapter, 
I will focus on gaining more insights using my metrics, particularly the slant scores, to tell 
us important stories about the congresspeople that DW alone cannot uncover. The fact that 
some of those insights can be backed by previous reports and studies further consolidates 
the validity of my approach. 
I will focus on two different arenas: 
• The temporal evolution of Congress partisanship (or in other words, 
ideological divisions between the two major parties as well as fragmentation 
within each party). One interesting revelation would be how Congress tends to 
unite when the country faces an existential crisis, with one notable exception. 
As an important and interesting application, I also attempted to associate the 
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temporal profile of partisanship with bill-passing. 
• The ideology profiles of notable congresspeople, including famous senators 
such as Joseph Biden, John McCain, Mitch McConnell, etc. In particular, I will 
focus on their strategic movement in their slanted position preceding the 
general Senate election, hoping to reveal how their personalized campaign 
strategies differed. 
Lastly, I will leverage the valuable insights into the ideology of each congressperson 
and its evolution to classify them into different groups: the anchors, the shifters, the 
moderates, and the extremists. By doing so, I hopefully can paint a vivid picture of a 
diversified group. 
4.2 Background 
4.2.1  The trending polarization among the US elites 
Is US society becoming more polarized? On the one hand, growing evidence suggests 
that this is the case. For example, the relative favorability of party affiliates toward their 
own party increased by >50% between 1980 and 2015, and the proportion of voters voting 
for the same party in both presidential and House elections increased from 71% of reported 
voters in 1972 to 90% in 2012 (Gentzkow, 2018). According to a study of the 2018 
mid-term election, the vast majority of Democrats (87%) and Republicans (82%) hold a 
favorable view of their own party, whereas the overwhelming majority of Democrats (90%) 
and Republicans (87%) have an unfavorable opinion of the opposing party 
(Vandermaas-Peeler, 2020).  
On the other hand, there is conflicting evidence. For example, studies carried out by 
Fiorina et al. argued against the idea that the polarization of US society is increasing 
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(Fiorina et al., 2006), which was later criticized by Abramowitz (Abramowitz et al., 2008). 
The fact that Republicans and Democrats are more reluctant to vote for the opposite party 
and/or hold a more favorable view of their own party does not substantiate that the country 
is becoming more polarized. Another possible explanation is that the party elites are getting 
better at recognizing the ideology of their constituents and aligning their policy and 
ideology with them. In other words, people who hold more extreme views are more likely 
to identify themselves as party members while those in the moderate majority may be more 
reluctant to do so (Baldassarri and Bearman, 2007; Baldassarri and Bearman, 2012). Indeed, 
studies have shown that parties tend to shift their policies more when they have lost votes 
in the previous election (Somer-Topcu, 2009). It is entirely possible, therefore, that while 
the polarization within society did not change, the parties were simply more adept at 
aligning themselves with the more extreme fractions of society. 
In addition, Baldassarri et al. have claimed to observe the simultaneous presence and 
absence of political polarization. This dilemma is partly due to the multidimensionality of 
the ideology domain (the official definition of ideology will be provided in Section 5.3), 
so that while attitudes over some issue dimension might remain or become polarized, 
attitudes over most dimensions remained non-polarized. For example, Democratic and 
Republican party members might agree with each other over many constitutional rights 
such as freedom of speech, but disagree with how to implement the Second Amendment 
(Baldassarri & Bearman, 2007). In other words, the growing ideological constraints may 
offset the increasing divisions on several issues. However, Christopher et al. (2014) 
observed reduced ideological constraints between social conservatism domains and 
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economical conservatism domains. They claimed that the liberal–conservative conflict has 
expanded to a wider range of social and cultural conflicts in US society, resulting in the 
polarization of the Democratic and Republican Parties being higher than at any time since 
the end of the Civil War. Since their results were based on DW, which ultimately derives 
from the roll-call votes, their observation could also be explained by the increased strength 
of party influence (or constituents’ influence, among others). Due to the natural constraint 
on the vote-based metrics, all mainstream studies that used DW to proxy the ideology of 
the political elites will inevitably suffer from systematic bias. (See subsection 3.3.3 for 
factors that caused such bias.) While our speech-based metric does not completely resolve 
the bias issue, it provides valuable insights that are at least partially independent from a 
pure vote-based metric, and hence alleviated the systematic bias. 
Lastly, it is still not clear which factors drive the political division, and whether those 
social issues such as gun control, abortion, immigration, etc. are indeed the “take-off issues” 
(i.e., issues that bore disproportional impact on the increasing ideological division.) In other 
words, it remained to be verified whether or not the partisan polarization among the elites 
(manifested through increased partisan voting) was indeed a consequence of true 
ideological separation, and whether those social issues were indeed the focus of infighting 
among congresspeople (Baldassarri and Bearman, 2007). 
There are a few reasons why understanding the polarization of the US politics is 
complicated and why many controversial conclusions were drawn in previous studies: 
• Ideological polarization is a complicated and abstract concept, which is 
difficult to define, and even more difficult to measure. 
• Discerning between elite polarization and mass (or public, or societal) 
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polarization, two distinct and yet interconnected concepts, can be extremely 
challenging. 
• Data sources typically used to study and measure party ideology and party 
polarization are diversified and may lead to conflicting conclusions. Pros and 
cons of approaches that leverage different data sets have been reviewed in 
Section 3.3. 
Due to the lack of data and the complexity of the tasks involved, I will narrow the 
scope here and focus on studying the partisan polarization of elites in this chapter. The 
polarization of party elites (e.g., Senators and House representatives) has drawn great 
interest in academia because it could have an overarching impact on the whole of society. 
Not only could the division of party elites be a reflection of the divisions among the general 
population, but those elites can also conveniently relay their attitudes and opinions among 
their followers through media and social media, and thereby disproportionally impact the 
ideology of those followers (Bail, 2018; Druckman, 2013; Levendusky, 2017; Prior, 2013; 
Tucker, 2018). By giving a mathematical definition of partisan polarization in Congress, 
which will focus on the ideological extremity, I will demonstrate in the first subsection how 
partisan division is driving the two parties apart from each other. I will focus on the 
similarities, and more importantly, the differences between conclusions derived from my 
metric and the DW. And lastly, I will drill down into the forces driving partisan division. 
In the next subsection, I will leverage the topic-dependent characteristic of the new 
metric and offer a more nuanced picture of Congress members. I will use the ideological 
constraint to bundle up topics into domains of issues, and provide an issue-wise, time-lapse 
breakdown of both individual congresspeople and the Democratic and Republican parties 
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as a whole.  
Finally, in the last section, I will touch on the heterogeneity within Congress. So far, 
numerous studies have been focused on the heterogeneity of the constituents and its impact 
on the extremity of their congressional representatives (Harden et al., 2012; Gomez et al., 
2006; Ensley et al., 2012; Levendusky et al., 2010). Little study has been done, however, 
about the heterogeneity of the congresspeople themselves. Here, I have demonstrated that 
congresspeople differ from each other both in their ideological (non-)extremity and in their 
ideological consistency. Identifying the extreme/moderate, consistent/fast-changing 
members within Congress will eventually help us understand why and how politics evolves 
among those elites over different eras. Going forward, it might help us to understand 
whether the ideological shift of the elites is the cause or the consequence, or both, of the 
ideological shift in society. 
4.3 Illustrating the Evolution of Partisanship Within Congress 
This section will focus on gaining both macro-level and micro-level insights into 
Congress. The whole section will be organized as follows. The first subsection will report 
on insights on the macro-level, the goal being to try to understand how the partisan division 
within congress evolved over time, attempting to offer an answer to the question “Is 
Congress becoming increasingly partisan and divided?” from a completely novel 
perspective (compared to the perspective from legislative voting behavior). In terms of 
methodology, I will represent the partisanship in three different ways: a) the difference 
between the aggregated ideology embeddings between D and R; b) a transformed affinity 
graph of Congress based on a distance metric defined in the embedding space; and c) an 
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ideology profile based on an issue-wise slant score. Understanding this question from 
congressional speeches in which each congressperson stated their opinions and framed 
their supporting argument accordingly would allow us to peek into the true stance of each 
congressperson. This, coupled with insights drawn from roll-call voting, would further 
confirm whether there is truly an ideological division or partisanship that has been growing 
among the elites. As an important by-product of this study, I will also report how Congress 
has reacted to crisis. 
The next two subsections will focus on the micro-level insights, answering two 
questions: 
• What were the stances of those prominent congresspeople on different issues 
and how did their stance evolve over time? Unlike DW, which uses legislative 
data to explain legislative behavior, my metrics can help understand, explain 
or even predict legislative behavior based on congressional speeches, and thus 
avoid the problems of circular arguments. 
• How can we visualize and quantify the level of heterogeneity within Congress? 
More specifically, are there any congresspeople who are anchoring the 
ideology within Congress against the growing partisanship? Are there any 
members who constantly adjusted and re-adjusted their position over time? 
Who were the more extreme and moderate members within Congress? 
4.3.1  The ideological divisions within Congress: a temporal perspective 
With the powerful tools obtained through neural network training, I can now attempt 
drill deep to address two questions that have been the focus of recent studies on politics: 
• Are the American party elites (such as the senate and house) becoming 
increasingly divided? 
• If so, why are they becoming more divided?  
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4.3.1.1  The temporal evolution of partisanship, illustrated by the difference between 
embedding vectors 
The answer to the first question is not as straightforward as it seems. This is because 
polarization can be caused by either high ideological extremity or high ideological 
constraint, or both. Ideological extremity is easy to understand. To understand the 
importance of constraint, imagine if everyone in Congress takes up a random, yet extreme, 
position on any given issue. Congress will end up being extremely fragmented with no 
political coalition that could be formed between even a small group of politicians. In this 
case, everyone is fighting their own battle and having trouble finding allies. Low 
constraints would result in a fragmented but not polarized Congress.  
In this section, I will investigate the temporal evolution of ideological partisanship 
(i.e., the overall distances between the two parties).  
In Figure 15, I plotted the overall difference between 𝑰𝑫 and 𝑰𝑹 using Euclidean 
distance. It should be borne in mind that this is only a primitive measure of extremity. I 
will offer a more visualized depiction of Congress later.  
Overall, ideological partisanship grew over time, as is demonstrated by the larger 
distance between two parties, spanning from the Clinton to the Obama presidency. 
However, there are two very notable exceptions: a short period immediately after 9.11, and 
another short period following the great recession of 2008. This suggests the top echelon 
of US politics has an innate mechanism for coping with significant crisis, whereby the two 




Figure 15. Ideological extremity as measured by Euclidian distance between left, 
party ideology vectors; and right, the first dimension of DW. The arrows track the 
timeline of the 9.11 event and the 2008 recession. 
A similar trend can be observed with the first dimension of DW. However, despite 
showing a growing extremity within Congress, it failed to capture the brief unification 
during both 9.11 and the Recession. Not only does DW assume that ideology is a linear or 
quadratic function of time, which may make it deal poorly with the temporal trend of 
ideological evolution, but it also suffers from lower resolution, measuring the score every 
2 years (spanning a Congress term). This suggests my measurement of ideology is a 
consistent, yet superior, method for measuring growing partisanship/bipartisanship 
compared to DW. 
Is Congress becoming more polarized? My metric gives an answer that was 
consistent with DW overall, but different in detail. DW yields a picture of a steady growing 
partisanship, while the slant score metric shows an oscillating, unstable, and upward-
trending partisanship. What is particularly interesting is that the new slant score metric 
revealed a very brief period of unification of Congress (both the House and the Senate) 
when facing into a crisis. The two most prominent crises during the past two decades were 
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9.11 in 2001 and the Depression in 2008, both of which correspond to significant reductions 
in partisanship according to my slant score metric. One natural assumption is that US 
politics has been developing a “coping” mechanism for crisis, wherein every fraction of 
the political elites decides to cast aside their differences in beliefs and political stance and 
unite under a common cause.  
How does such a “coping” mechanism work? Why is unification only transient? Can 
we expect such a mechanism to consistently govern congressional behavior in any crisis 
during any era? While my thesis will not tackle these questions systematically, I will aim 
to offer some insights.  
Insight #1. Brief ideological unification is not due to true convergence among the 
elites, but rather because the politicians, particularly those among the Senate and the House, 
decided to set aside their difference in key issues and focused on issues they can agree on 









Figure 16. The evolution of partisanship by year 
 
Here, I used the 9.11 crisis as an example. The topic-wise partisanship was analyzed 
in the same way as overall partisanship. I picked out four cornerstone topics that were 
commonly the focus of partisan struggle, two of them related to coping with the 9.11 crisis 
(Military Complex & Terrorism), and the other two not as intimately related (Healthcare & 
Abortion). The evolution of partisanship over different topics is strikingly different. It is 
clear that Congress united briefly on topics such as Military Complex & Terrorism, but 
somehow remained divided on Healthcare & Abortion. (Somehow, they became even more 




divided over these two topics during this period.) But due to urgency over the post-9.11 
action response, the latter two topics were no longer the foci of argument for a brief period, 
thus creating a façade of unification. 
Insight #2. The unification of ideology was short-lived as it was only a coping 
mechanism by the country facing a crisis – and it failed to outlast the crisis. Here, I 
speculated the reasons were twofold. First, the consensus over the crisis-related topics (e.g., 
Military Complex & Terrorism) could no longer be maintained once the crisis was largely 
solved, supported by the evidence that the partisan division over Military Complex & 
Terrorism quickly grew over time after 2001, and reached its peak around 2007, when the 
argument against the Iraqi War became the most heated issue within Congress, causing 
major infighting between parties and within each party.  
Insight #3. Such coping mechanisms in the face of crisis were not institutionalized, 
and thus cannot be deemed as guaranteed to happen. The absence of unification can be seen 
from Congress’ handling of the COVIDCOVID-19 pandemic during the Trump era. (The 
analysis on Congress during the Trump era is done as an extension of this study, which will 
be a focus of the follow-up study. This is due to the uniqueness of Congress during the 
Trump presidency.) I noticed no significant drop in partisanship during 2020, the year that 
marked the main outbreak of COVID-19. This observation was largely supported by 
reports about infighting between D and R over lockdowns, stimulation packages, attitudes 
towards mask mandates, and enforcement of the social distancing rules. The non-
unification among the elites over the battle against COVID-19 may explain the lack of 
success of the US leadership in handling such a crisis.  
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Figure 17. The evolution of partisanship by year during the Obama and Trump eras 
To conclude, unless there is a significant event such as a crisis, the ideological 
partisanship between elite party members in Congress is consistently growing over time, 
suggesting that a significant portion of Congress are drifting toward more extreme beliefs 
on various issues. In the following subsections, I will delve into the detail to validate this 
claim. 
4.3.1.2  A graphical representation of Congress 
As previously mentioned, approximation of ideological extremity with Euclidean 
distance between ideology vectors aggregated at the party level is a very crude measure, 
and a lot of nuanced features could be lost. Here, I adopted the graph theory and represented 
Congress with a simple graph in which each node represents a congressperson. Two nodes 
are connected if and only if their distance is lower than a threshold. Once such a graph is 
obtained, I can a) visualize the graph to show how members of either party are separated 
(Figure 15); b) calculate the spectrum to real the lower-level structure of the graph; and c) 
identify communities of congresspeople who are ideologically close and investigate why 
 
128 
they are close. In Figure 18, different Congresses from different years were separated into 
communities, under the principle that nodes of congresspeople were connected based on 
ideological proximity. Two large communities, either of which mostly contains members 
from the same party, were easily seen to be gradually pulling apart and drifting away. This 
is again a solid validation of the claim of the growing ideological partisanship within 
Congress.  
 
Figure 18 Visualization of Congress. Two large clusters representing two parties are 
shown. 
However, this graph, along with previous research on political parties, painted both 
parties as homogeneous entities. Such simplification is convenient for studying bill-passing, 
polarization in elite politics, or the social impact of partisan infighting, etc., but would 
inevitably ignore the important nuances. Not every congressperson is the same, and parties 
are not homogenous. This will be the focus of the next two subsections. 
To answer the question of why Congress is polarized, one needs to look at various 
issues where ideological extremity is dominant, as those issues are likely the driven force 
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behind the various infights within the House and Senate, and eventually drive the division. 
Figure 19 presents a WordCloud visualization of the most divided topic, where the size of 
a topic word corresponds to the difference in party ideology of such a topic in different 
years, i.e. ||𝑰𝑫𝜽 − 𝑰𝑹𝜽||. Larger sizes obviously indicate how opinions regarding such 
topics are often extreme and divided. Not surprisingly, after 2008, abortion remained as 
one of the most heated issues every year, whereas immigration is almost always the most 
divided issue. Other heated issues across the years include the gun issue, education, and 
the economy. These issues are often the center of social debate and political infighting, as 
demonstrated throughout the media. The results show that the topics that divided society 
also divided Congress, or maybe the other way around – the division among the party elites 
on those topics may largely influence the mass population through media propaganda, 
sowing the seeds of social division and ideological segregation.  
Figure 19. Evolution of the most divided topics 
 
130 
Going forward, I am interested in extending this analysis into the Trump presidency, 
during which many significant events have taken place. So far, my preliminary data have 
shown an enormous shake-up within Congress whereby both parties are seeing 
fragmentation and division at an unprecedented level. Again, the questions are, What drives 
such fragmentation? What will be the consequence leading to future election? and What 
role does President Trump play in all these political earthquakes? In particular, I want to 
investigate whether and how the US congress deviated from the previous coping 
mechanism during the handling of the COVIDCOVID-19 crisis; why I did not observe a 
similar ideological unification following the COVIDCOVID-19 outbreak and subsequent 
economic hardship? and does it explain why Congress has been sending out non-uniform, 
or even contradictory, messages regarding the national mask mandate, the necessity of 
lockdown, the strictness of social distancing rules, etc.? A lot of questions remain 
unanswered, and they will be the key areas of study going forward. 
4.3.1.3  The temporal profile of partisanship based upon slant scores, bill passing, and 
its insight 
So far, little research has been done into understanding whether a bill will be passed, 
and more importantly why it will get passed or rejected. DW, for example, calculated an 
ideal point not just for each congressperson, but for each bill as well. By doing so, it can 
claim that the congressperson will be more likely to vote Yea if their ideal point is located 
closer to the Yea position of a bill than the Nay position. This approach, however, is 
revisionist, as the positions of a bill can only be decided after all votes are cast. Furthermore, 
since it did not incorporate any information on the content of the bill in the model, DW was 
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also lacking in offering insights into how and why a bill was or was not passed. It does, 
however, offer a numerical representation of how “liberal” or “conservative” a bill was, 
which is in itself a valuable insight.  
On the other hand, researchers in computer science have sought to connect a bill’s 
text with the likelihood of its survival. Yano et al. (2012) used the sponsorship information 
of a bill to predict the survival of a bill, i.e., whether it can make it all the way to be voted 
on. From another direction, Carrubba et al. (2006) carefully examined how bills were 
selected to enter the roll-call process, disputing the previous presumption by research based 
on roll-call voting that roll-call bills were randomly decided. In addition, numerous studies 
have explored the impact of party influence, constituents’ preference, and campaign donors 
(Ansolabehere et al., 2001; Bonica et al., 2018; Roscoe et al., 2005; Snyder et al., 2000). 
These approaches, while offering valuable insights into bill-passing and votes, were 
generally difficult to scale, and it is extremely difficult to incorporate all these factors in 
one model that can comprehensively weigh the contributions from each factors together 
with one missing latent variable: the congressperson’s own belief.   
Returning to our model, which utilized congresspeople’s speeches to extract their 
ideology, and looking at it the other way, it measured the rhetorical 
agreement/disagreement between members on various issues. The bill sponsors and their 
supporting colleagues debated with opponents who might be from their own party or from 
the other side. The congressional report comprehensive recorded those struggles and 
partisan fights related to the bill. Would a heated debate on issues related to the bill indicate 
its likelihood of failing? Could some rhetorical convergence on opinions on related issues 
 
132 
be a reliable predictor of the bill’s passing? 
Note that I have simplified the question by switching from “predicting each vote by 
each congress member” to “predicting the overall likelihood that a bill is approved.” The 
former is a far more difficult question for reasons discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Each 
vote by a congressperson is a strategic decision that is influenced by many factors, such as 
party influence, voter preference, personal beliefs, campaign sponsorships, lobbyists, etc. 
It is almost impossible to know, at a specific time, for a specific instance of a bill, for a 
specific person, which one of the above-mentioned factors triumph in the decision making. 
Under many circumstances, these factors might not conflict with each other, but also under 
many circumstances, they do.  
Now, “predicting the overall likelihood that a bill is approved” itself is easier, since 
we simply need to find some macro-level predictor(s) that correlate with the bill passing 
well. By itself, though, it is still a very challenging task. One problem is the selection issue 
as mention by Carrubba (2006). Most bills were not randomly selected, as they were chosen 
to be passed. The dialogues/discussions/debates related to the selection process take place 
largely behind closed doors by party leaders. As a consequence, most bills passed by 
Congress went through by a landslide, and even fewer bills were rejected. Hence, a naïve 
model that predicts “yes” for each bill to pass will perform really well; and any 
machine-learning model built on bill texts will probably cheat by assigning “yes” to all 
“trivial” issues (such as the appointment of someone to some position, changes in trade 
duties, agriculture-related bills, etc.), which are quite common in roll calls.  
One way to prevent a “cheating” model would be to filter out those “inconsequential” 
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bills, which could be done either manually or by some reliable classifiers. Unfortunately, 
this part has a long way to go before being fully developed. Instead, I scaled down the 
problem by investigating a selective portfolio of so-called “landmark” bills during the past 
20 years (i.e., bills that had a vast and lasting impact on US society). Eventually, five 
influential bills were chosen for my analysis.  
Investigating the passing of landmark bills during the Bush/Obama eras 
About 70% of bills were passed in a landslide fashion: i.e., less than 10% of Congress 
members voted Nay. Of the rest, the majority were passed uneventfully: Although the 
majority of one party voted Yea, and the majority of the other voted Nay, the bills still 
passed with a significantly gap between the overall Yea and Nay votes (>30 for the Senate 
and >60 for the House). This is possibly because of selection bias: The most unwelcoming 
bills were likely to be killed before being fully developed, and thus would not make it all 
the way to the table to be voted on. There were very few bills that were extremely 
controversial, recent examples being the confirmation of the last three Supreme Court 
judges in the Senate.  
The influence of a bill cannot solely be decided by how (bi)partisan it is, though. For 
example, Authorization for Use of Military Force of 2001 (AUMF), which authorized the 
use of the United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the September 11 
attacks (mainly referring to Afghanistan at that time), was passed in a landslide pattern (98–
0 in the Senate, and 420–1 in the House) on September 14, barely 3 days after the 9.11 
attack. On many accounts, AUMF should be regarded as a vastly influential bill.  
On the contrary, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) bill, formally known as the Patient 
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Protection and Affordable Care Act, went through an intensive partisan fight and enormous 
struggle before being signed into law in March 2010. It was narrowly passed in the House 
on a 220–215 vote (no Yea from the Republican party). In the senate, it took Sen. Arlen 
Specter switching party (R to D) to reach 60 seats to end the filibuster from the minority 
(the Republican party at that time). The controversy over the ACA still lasts to this day. 
The million-dollar question that deserves consideration is, “How does a bill get 
passed?” This is a crucial question, yet exceedingly difficult to address. Here, I confined 
the scale to only those “landmark” bills to narrow down the scale of the study. The passing 
of any influential bill will inevitably involve many political moves: powerplays, filibusters, 
threats, compromises, or log-rolling (i.e., vote-trading). It also involves many players: the 
Democrats, the Republicans, the influence groups, the activists, the lobbyists, the 
constituents, the president, and party leaders, etc. Then there is the true belief/ideology of 
Congress members, whose actions are often influenced/swayed by all the influencers 
mentioned above, and thus they elect not to vote according to their own will. Understanding 
why each congress member voted the way they voted on each landmark bill is too ambitious. 
Instead, I should scale down the question again, and ask the following questions: 
• Is there a certain pattern of changes of the ideological profile of the whole 
Congress (the House and the Senate) and the parties (Democratic and 
Republican) that corresponded to the passing of the prominent bills?  
• What happened ideologically among Congress members that preceded the 
bill-passing event? 
Ideally, these questions need to be addressed systematically as a separate study, first 
by laying out a portfolio of all landmark bills, then by pinning each bill-passing event on 
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the temporal ideology profile of Congress. The bills also need to be treated differently: For 
bills that passed narrowly, it is usually one or two votes that truly matter, since all other 
votes are essentially partisan votes. So, it is imperative to focus on the individual profile in 
this case. For bills that passed either by a landslide or uneventfully, we shall instead 
investigate the ideology profile on the macro-scale: Is there a convergence of beliefs (i.e., 
diminishing partisanship) surrounding the issue they voted on? 
The following analysis will use the two bills mentioned above (the AUMF and the 
ACA) as examples. Three more influential bills will also be added to the portfolio: the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (or the IR, as in 
Iraq Resolution); the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA); and the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). Of those five bills, ACA and 
ARRA were controversial passes, while AUMF, as mentioned above, was a landslide pass. 
The EESA and IR were non-eventful (74–25 in the Senate for EESA, and 77–23 in the 
Senate for IR). For the ARRA, three senators from the Republican party made the crucial 
cross-aisle votes that helped swing the results: Sen. Susan Collins, Sen. Olympia Snowe, 
and Sen. Arlen Specter. For the ACA, it was only Sen. Arlen Specter. 
In the following analysis, I will focus on the Senate because a) all of these bills have 
to be passed in the Senate in order to be signed into law; and b) the ideology profiles of the 




Table 10. The portfolio of selective landmark bills 
 AUMF IR EESA ARRA ACA 
Passed on Sept 2001 Oct 2002 Oct 2008 Feb 2009 Mar 2010 
House 420–1 296–133 263–171 244–188 219–212 
Senate 98–0 77–23 74–25 61–37 60–39 
Controversiality Very Low Low Low High Very High 
 
The analysis will be organized in the following way: 
• The temporal profiles of the partisan division over time in the Senate 
• The connection between the partisan division and the passing of the selected 
landmark bills 
• The ideology profile of Sen. Arlen Specter and the connection to his vote on 
the ARRA and ACA. 
The partisanship profile of Congress based upon slant scores s is computed in the 
following way: 
1. Step 1. I computed an issue-wise ideology profile by aggregating slant scores 
on the individual level. For an individual a, for issue10 𝑖 ∈ {0, 	1, … }, his/her 
ideology profile is a vector defined as 
𝑰𝒑𝒇𝒂 ≜ [𝑠?, 𝑠$, … ]1 
2. Step 2. Extending such a definition to the whole Congress, supposing that we 
have an ideology profile (through aggregation from individuals) of both D and 
R, denoted as 𝑰𝒑𝒇𝑫 and 𝑰𝒑𝒇𝑹, then the partisanship profile of Congress is 
given by 
𝑷𝒑𝒇 ≜ 𝑰𝒑𝒇𝑫 − 𝑰𝒑𝒇𝑹 
 
10 The definition of issues will be formally given in the next subsection. For now, it can be 
treated as a concept similar to topics 
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Firstly, the overall ideological partisan division between two parties matters much 
less to the passing of a bill than the division over the relevant issues. Congress can 
be as divided as ever on abortion, but if they united on the issue of the economy 
and fiscal spending, the bill on fiscal spending can still be passed. In the following 
panels of Figure 20, I will focus on showing the division over issues such as 
LawEnforcement, Politics, Health, Welfare&Care, FiscalEconFin (Fiscal spending, 
Economy and Finance), Foreign (Relationship), SocialCsvt (Conservatism such as 
issues of abortion, gun control and religious freedom), and War&Terror(ism), all of 









To calculate the partisanship in the figure above, the slants of each party over issues 
were calculated following the same formula (1) as in Subsection 4.3.2, by switching the 
individual subscript with the party subscript. The Democratic slants 𝑆.  were typically 
positive, while the Republican slants 𝑆8 were typically negative. The partisan division 
was defined by subtracting 𝑆8 from 𝑆..  
There are a few notable observations: 
• While the partisan divisions across issues were growing over time, they did not 
grow as the same pace, nor did they grow monotonically. In the short term, 
partisanship may wane and gain, but overall, it is trending upward.  
• A temporary decrease in partisanship preceded the passing of almost all 
landmark bills, on most of the issues listed above, even on issues not so relevant 
to the bills, although there are a few exceptions.  
The AUMF 
Two issues that are closely related to the AUMF bill are Terror(ism)&War, which 
involved military action, weapon deployment, invasion, battles, and terrorism, etc., and 
Foreign (Relationship), which involved diplomatic negotiation, foreign government, etc. It 
is not surprising that partisanship dropped sharply over these two issues preceding the 
passing of the AUMF. Noticeably, on issues such as FiscalEconFin, which dealt with the 
economy, fiscal spending and the finance sector, and issues such as Politics, which involved 
the political infighting between politicians such as impeachment, voting, calling for 
bipartisanship, calling out opponents for divisiveness, etc., the partisan division of ideology 
also significantly decreased, and maintained a relatively low level shortly after the AUMF, 
as the US was mobilizing troops preparing for the ground invasion against Afghanistan. 
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All of these signaled unifications in Congress, signified by the landslide approval of the 
AUMF bill. This also resonated with my previous assertion that the US leaderships 
installed the mechanisms to cope with the national crises by the two major parties setting 
aside differences and acting in a bipartisan way.  
The IR 
The passing of the IR was more of a struggle than the AUMF, despite being very 
similar in the areas of issues it involved. The temporal ideological profile was vastly 
different for the IR. The partisanship over the “Foreign” issue did drop, but over issues like 
politics, FiscalEconFin, and Terror&War, it either remained the same, or continued to grow. 
This suggested Congress members might agree on Iraq being an outside adversary/threat, 
but disagreed on an all-out military operation due to fiscal constraints, such as spending on 
logistics etc.  
The EESA vs. the ARRA 
Both bills aimed at relieving the economic crisis of 2008. One was about purchasing 
toxic assets from banks, while the other was about increasing public spending to create 
jobs. Although with similar purposes, these two bills suffered different fates. The ARRA 
met with much stronger resistance from the minority party (the Republican party) than the 
EESA. Looking closer at the temporal profile, it reveals that partisanship over issues such 
as FiscalEconFin and Politics was shrinking before the EESA, but growing instead before 
the ARRA, suggesting that the ideologies of members from the two parties were converging 
before the EESA, but began to diverge before the ARRA. There are two possible 
explanations here. One is that the unification of the two parties on these two issues 
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(decreased partisanship) cleared the path for the EESA, causing it to be passed easily. The 
other explanation may be that Congress was facing a much more dire situation during 2008 
(such as the banking systems being on the verge of complete breakdown) than in 2009, 
forcing Congress elites to take quick action to mitigate imminent threats, and hence 
creating a façade of reluctant unification.  
The ACA 
This was the most controversial bill among those chosen for this study. According 
to the profile, there was a huge peak immediately before the passing of the ACA, on very 
relevant issues such as Health, and Welfare&Care, indicating an intense partisan struggle 
since the introduction of this bill. Although the peak did indeed drop to a normal level (still 
equal to or higher than the baseline) on those two issues, the partisan division either 
remained high, or even grew on issues such as FiscalEconFin and Politics. Similarly to the 
previously mentioned bills, this pattern predicted a difficult pass for the ACA, which turned 
out to be true. 
One single senator played a crucial role in the passing of the ACA bill: Sen. Arlen 
Specter. (His vote prevented a minority filibuster.) In addition, his vote was also very 
important for the passing of the ARRA. It is important to understand why Sen. Specter 
voted with the Democratic party on these two crucial bills. Below, I present the ideological 
profile of Sen. Specter, on the issues of FiscalEconFin, Health, and Welfare&Care. The 
calculation of the ideological slant values for each issue of a single congressperson is 
demonstrated in Section 4.3.2. 
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Figure 21. The temporal ideological profile of Sen. Specter 
The first three panels of Figure 211 depict the temporal pattern of the evolution of 
the slant scores of Sen. Specter on three major issues: FiscalEconFin, Health, and 
Welfare&Care, while the last panel compares his overall slant against the overall slant of 
the Republican party. Despite being a Republican, Sen. Specter has remained largely 
neutral over the course of his whole tenure. However, he departed from the Republican 
majority at the tail end of his career, as their courses began to diverge after 2004. The 
divergence speeded up after 2008, which may have propelled his eventual party switch. 
However, what is interesting is the major disagreement between him on all the 
above-mentioned issues, during the very time of the ARRA and the ACA, which might 
explain why he voted against his own party at that time, knowing well how influential his 
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vote might be. 
Obviously, we need more landmark bills to confirm a reliable temporal partisan 
pattern of ideology that was related to bill passing. Based on the limited observations 
regarding the five most influential bills of the past decade, it is tentative to suggest that the 
passing of a bill (confined to the landmark bills) might be associated with ideological 
convergence on relevant issues (such as Health or Welfare&Care for the ACA, or Foreign 
for the AUMF). Ideological convergence on Politics or FiscalEconFin did not predict the 
passing all the time, but was typically associated with its controversiality.  
4.3.2  The issue-wise ideology profile of individual congresspeople: a revelation of 
heterogeneity 
Understanding the political landscape of Congress at the macro-level, while 
informative and valuable, misses a significant amount of nuanced (yet important) 
information regarding the heterogeneity of each individual congressperson. And such 
heterogeneity may extend into both the temporal and the spatial dimensions (as in the 
opinion space).  
Temporal heterogeneity 
Unlike DW, which is based upon the relative difference in the roll-call voting records 
among congresspeople to calculate their ideological differences, and thus did not accurately 
capture the temporal changes in the ideological slant, especially of those who served 
different Congresses and voted on completely different sets of bills, the slant score was 
obtained from training over the whole congressional speech corpora across multiple 
different eras. Speeches by different congresspeople from the same or different congresses 
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were pooled together and compared with each other to derive the slant scores and frames 
embeddings. This allowed us to depict the evolution of ideology both microscopically and 
macroscopically.  
Spatial heterogeneity 
In Section 4.3.1, I depicted the overall evolution of the ideological division within 
Congress, including the partisan divide, and the fragmentation within the party. One 
important aspect that was left out of the picture is how Congress is divided (or united) over 
specific issues, and how the ideological partisanship over different issues evolved over 
years. Understanding issue-specific ideology and ideological partisanship can offer 
valuable insights into the “take-off” issues of different eras (i.e., issues that are hotly 
contested and debated by members from either party, or issues on which bills will be 
difficult to pass), and help us navigate through individual senators and house 
representatives’ positions on various issues to see where they stood in each contest. 
Eventually, this might help us better understand the legislative behavior of each 
congressperson. 
Here, I outline how issue-wise the ideological slant score is calculated for each 
congressperson as follows. Recall that in Chapter 3, the newly developed metrics assign 
each congressional speech given by a congressperson A slant score s, as well as a 
probabilistic distribution of topic assignment (similar to the probabilistic distribution of 
topic models such as LDA). This allowed us to derive the topic-wise ideological slant score 
for each congressperson A by computing the probability-weighted sum of slant scores of 
all his/her speeches. Since in this thesis, I have mostly focused on the projection of ideology 
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of each congressperson around the liberal–conservative axis, the topic-wise ideology will 
be temporarily represented by the ideological slant score.  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, one caveat with the congressional speeches data is 
missing observations. As the congressperson may elect not to talk about a specific topic, I 
cannot measure their opinion on that topic if they have given insufficient speeches. This 
was particularly an issue with respect to rare/niche topics. So, instead of measuring 
topic-wise slants, I elected to measure issue-wise slants where the concept “issue” 
represented a cluster of topics that have high constraints between them. In the following 
sessions, how topic constraints are measured and how issues are defined will be discussed 
in detail.  
Identification of key issues as coherent topic clusters 
The distribution of topics is largely uneven. For example, the topic “Federal,” which 
captured the daily routine of both the senate and the house, consisted of 23% of all speeches, 
and the topic “Fiscal,” which deals with the fiscal spending of the government, comprised 
another 10%, while topics such as China and Vietnam combined to less than 2%. This 
becomes an issue when calculating any topic-related metrics, as congresspeople rarely 
spoke on all of the 67 topics I identified, leading to a lot of missing observations.  
To solve this issue, I went back to the definition of ideology, which is represented by 
multiple opinion domains, each domain consisting of opinions of highly correlated topics 
(to use a more specific term, high constraints, or high coherence.) The basic idea here is to 
“bundle” topics with high coherence into clusters.  
For two topics, e.g., “Gun” and “Abortion”, their corresponding D–R axes (as defined 
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in Chapter 3) represented a partisan division in ideological belief. Now, if “Gun” and 
“Abortion” are highly constrained topics, then people who held opposing views regarding 
one topic are likely to also hold opposing views regarding the other, which means the D– R 
axes of these two topics are similar. I captured such similarity by measuring the pairwise 
cosine distances (1 – cosine similarity) of all D– R axes of all topics. The lower the distance, 
the higher the constraints (or coherence), and the more likely the opinions on these topics 
are correlated. 
By proxying the value of constraints with pairwise cosine distance, topics with low 
cosine distances should be bundled together as a coherent topic clusters, corresponding to 
the forementioned opinion domains. For simplicity, these clusters will be referred to as 
“issues” going forward.  
Table 11. Clustering of topics based on constraints 
Cluster 0 “commerce”, “disadvantaged”, “finance”, “healthcare”, “housing”, “trade”, “workforce” 
Cluster 1 “business”, “children”, “culture”, “disaster”, “education”, “family” 
Cluster 2 “immigration”, “renewable”, “traditionalenergy” 
Cluster 3 “detainee”, “international”, “iransyrialibya”, “israel”, “russia”, “vietnam” 
Cluster 4 “academic”, “police”, “sport”, “veteran” 
Cluster 5 “homelandsecurity”, “environment”, “food”, “health”, “industry”, “randd”, “safety” 
Cluster 6 “ip”, “it”, “china”, “crime”, “hightech”, “media”, “nuclear”, “postal”, “woman” 
Cluster 7 “disease”, “cyber”, “iraq”, “militarycomplex”, “terrorism” 
Cluster 8 “economy”, “fiscal”, “tax”, “welfar” 
Cluster 9 “agricultur”, “federal”, “jury”, “politicalact”, “reserves”, “vote”, “waste”, “other” 
Cluster 10 “abortion”, “addictives”, “gun” 
Cluster 11 “discrimination”, “lgbtq”, “religion” 
Cluster 12 “infrastructure”, “natives”, “‘transportation” 
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While it is true that topics belonging to the same opinion domain usually have high 
constraints, the reverse may not always be true. As a result, the semantic meaning of each 
topic needs to be checked to affirm that they belong to the same issue clusters. For example, 
Cluster 3 above makes a coherent group of topics related to “Foreign” relationships, while 
the Cluster 5 seems to consist of a few different issues that are not well separated. 
Combining results from Table 11 and the semantic meaning of topics, in the end I 
designated 14 topics clusters/issues, as shown in Table 12. 
Table 12. The designation of topics to issues 
Infra “agriculture”, “infrastructure” “disaster”, “reserves”, “transportation”, “postal”, “food”, “waste”, “industry”, “safety”, “postal” 
Science&Info “academic”, “safety”, “randd”, “it”, “ip”, “hightech”, “nuclear” 
Enviro “traditionalenergy”, “environment”, “renewable”, “industry” 
LawEnforce “crime”, “police”, “jury”, “gun” 
Terror&War “iraq”, “homelandsecurity”, “terrorism”, “militarycomplex”, “detainee”, “cyber” 
Livelihood “business”, “children”, “culture”, “education”, “family”, “housing”, “workforce”, “disadvantaged”, “veteran” 
FiscalEconFin “fiscal”, “economy”, “finance”, “tax”, “business”, “commerce”, “welfare” 
Politics “vote”, “politicalact”, “media” 
Welfare&Care “healthcare”, “veteran”, “housing”, “welfare”, “education”, “workforce”, “children” 
Foreign “international”, “iransyrialibya”, “china”, “russia”, “vietnam”, “trade”, “israel”, “detainee” 
Health “disease”, “health”, “addictives” 
SocialCsvtism “abortion”, “immigration”, “woman”, “addictives”, “gun”, “children” 
Equal&Discrim “woman”, “lgbtq”, “discrimination”, “religion” 
Misc “sport”, “natives” 
 
Two things are of interest here. One is that each topic usually belongs to only one 
issue, with a few exceptions such as “Women” and “Gun”. This is because topics such as 
“Women” could be either about equality issues such as equal payment, or abortion issues 
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such as “pro-life vs. pro-choice”, depending on the context, allowing it to belong to both 
the issue of “Equal&Discrim” (equality and discrimination) and the issue of “Social 
Csvtsim” (social conservatism). The other is that I intentionally left out the “Federal” topic, 
because as the most prominent topic, it often dealt with the daily routines of Congress such 
as introducing the next speaker, announcement of the agenda etc., and is thus of little 
significance to this study.  
For each speech, its probabilistic distribution of topic assignment will be converted 
to distribution of issue assignment, which is a vector that sums to 1 and assigns the 
probability of such a speech belonging to different issues. Again, I used the soft assignment 
instead of the hard assignment of each speech to issues, as it is not impossible for a speech 
to involve multiple issues. For each congressperson, I calculated their opinions/stance on 
each issue. (I used slant scores instead of the frame embedding here because again in this 
thesis I will mostly focus on the liberal–conservative dimension of ideology.)  
Below is the formula to calculate the issue-wise slant score. If Congressperson A 
gave N speeches within an observed time period, the slant score for each speech is given 
by vector 𝑆> of length N, and the probabilistic distribution of issue assignment is given 
by N *14 matrix 𝛩, where each row of 𝛩 is a probability vector describing the issue 




where the dominator is taking the row sum of Θ7.  
Since it is not imperative to investigate the issue-wise stance/opinion of every single 
congressperson, the following part of the paper will focus on comparing a few key senators, 
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including Joseph Biden, John McCain, and Mitch McConnell, who are/were senior senators 
with significant influence on American politics.  
The first candidate to be focused on is Senator Joseph Biden, who was also in the 
running for the 2020 US presidential election. I calculated his issue-wise slant score every 
two years (the same for the rest of the senators or house representatives). The radar plots 
below show Senator Joseph Biden’s stance on various important issues US politics, as well 
as how his stance has changed and evolved over time. To see where Joseph Biden’s stance 
was among all senators, I also compared his issue-wise slant scores with one of his 
colleagues, Republican Senator Mitch McConnell, though for McConnell the score needs 
to be flipped by adding a negative sign, because this slant score metric usually assigned the 




Figure 22. Comparison of issue-wise slant scores of Joe Biden (blue) and Mitch 
McConnell (red), from 1991 to 2007 
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According to the results, Joseph Biden largely took a moderate stance on many key 
issues during the Bush-Clinton era, but gradually became more extreme compared to his 
peers and by contrast, the senior Republican senator Mitch McConnell remained consistent 
as a more extreme conservative. Issues that Biden consistently held a partisan stance on are 
infrastructure and law enforcement, while McConnell constantly maintained a conservative 
stance on issues such as Fiscal Spending/Economy and politics-related issues (such as 
election, voting etc.). These observations suggest that these two counterparts were often 
fighting separate wars in Congress.  
Another example is Senator John McCain, who served the Senate during 1987 and 
2018, and has long been a staple of the Republican party. He also ran for the 2008 
presidential election again Barack Obama and eventually lost his bid for the White House. 
Again, for reference, I also ran a similar comparison between John McCain and Mitch 
McConnell, as their tenures in the Senate largely overlapped. Though both are members of 
the Republican party, their political stances on various issues are significantly different. 
McCain consistently held a more moderate stance on almost all the important issues 
compared to McConnell, the only exception being during 1999 and 2001, when McCain 
held a more conservative stance on issues such as Wars&Terrorism. In addition, McCain’s 
stance was largely consistently stable compared to both McConnell and Biden, as he rarely 
shifted to the extreme end of the ideological continuum like Mitch McConnell did, and 




Figure 23. Comparison of issue-wise slant scores between John McCain (yellow) and 
Mitch McConnell (red), from 1991 to 2007 
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Now, if I expand the issue-wise analysis to either party as a whole and compute the 
difference in slant scores between Democrats and Republicans, this allows us to reliably 
identify the take-off issues, i.e., the issues driving the partisan division. 
  




Figure 25. Comparison of issue-wise slant scores between D and R, continued. 
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A few observations are noteworthy here: Firstly, the large overlapping area 
indicated that for many issues at most times, the Democratic and Republican parties were 
equally responsible for the partisan division, as neither was more polarized than the other. 
Secondly, there were indeed some different take-off issues for both parties during different 
years; for example, during 2009 to 2012, the Republicans generally took a more 
conservative stance on issues such as Fiscal&Economy&Finance, possibly in response to 
the bailout plan after the recession, while during 2007 and 2012, the Democrats took a 
more extreme position on issues such as Terrorism and Foreign(-relationship). Thirdly, 
consistent with previous findings, it was clear that the partisan division in ideology on all 
issues was growing over time, just at different speeds. Lastly, during the Bush/Obama era, 
the Democrats were generally more extreme on issues such as infrastructure, welfare, and 
equality, while the Republicans were generally more extreme on politics, 
Fiscal&Economy&Finance, and Law-enforcement. In Figure 26, I calculated the overall 
partisanship between the two parties by subtracting the slant score of the Republicans from 
that of Democrats, issue by issue. The top six most divided issues, according to my metric, 
were SocialIssue (guns, abortion, etc.), Fiscal&Economy&Finance, Welfare (such as social 
security and healthcare), Environment (including renewable energy), Health (including 
disease, recreational drugs, and addictions), and Equality&Discrimination (such as racism, 
equal payment, women’s rights, BLM etc.)  
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Figure 26. The partisan division between two parties averaged over years 
The ideology profile and its connection to general Senate elections 
Understanding the ideological profile of the US Congress elites may have a lot of 
implication and application. Here in this subsection, I will focus briefly on one simple 
question: whether congresspeople (re)adjust their ideology facing into elections and 
re-elections.  
There might be three potential strategies a Senator could choose from: a) moving to 
the more extreme, b) pandering to the moderate, and c) staying put.  
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We will first look at Sen. Biden’s overall profile: 
In this figure, I also plotted the overall slant score of the Democrats in a blue curve 
as a reference point (similarly, the overall slant score of the Republicans in a red curve for 
Republican senators). The slant score of each individual was calculated and averaged in a 
window of every 6 months (to ensure there were enough data). Sen. Biden was re-elected 
as a US senator in 1996, 2002, and 2008. As a well-known moderate, Sen. Biden was 
typically less liberal than his majority of his party, as his slant curve always lay below the 
blue line. However, he indeed moved his position toward the more liberal side to fall in 
line with the Democratic party during the election year 1996, the year when Bill Clinton 
was the elected as president. However, he made the opposite move during the years 2002 
and 2008 by moving significantly to the more moderate side.  
Figure 27. The temporal pattern of the ideology profile of Sen. Joe Biden 
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The senior Republican member of the Senate, Sen. Grassley, was re-elected in 1992, 
1998, 2004, 2010 and 2016. He was one of the more moderate Senator during the Bush era, 
but he consistently adopted the moving-to-more-extreme strategy during his election 
campaign.  




The case of Sen. McConnell was rather interesting, as he was differentiated from the 
majority of the party in the early stage of his career, but later on his slant curve almost 
overlapped with the Republican party, suggesting that he was either a) the leader of the 
party ideology by setting the tone for the Republicans, or b) a politician who rarely went 
“against the trend” and always blended in with the majority of his group, or both. 
Another senior member, Sen. Patrick Leahy of the Democratic party, who was elected 
in 1992, 1998, 2004, 2010, and 2016, was a more liberal Democrat than Sen. Biden, who 
would move to the even more extreme position facing into the election, possibly enhancing 
his liberal identity in the eyes his peers and constituents. 
Lastly, Sen. John McCain, who was for the most time a moderate Republican, was 
elected in 1992, 1998, 2004, 2010 and 2016. His strategy for election could be classified 
as closer to Type 3 (“stay put”), rather than Type 2 (“moving to the moderate”), though he 
did move slightly toward the more moderate side during 2004, but not by much. One 
noticeable trend, though, was his significant pivot toward the middle during 2008, the year 
he ran for the presidential election. This was to be expected, as he needed to pander to the 








4.3.3  Classifying congresspeople based on their profiles: Who were the anchors, the 
shifters, the moderates, and the extremists? 
Figure 13 revealed the vast heterogeneity of congresspeople, not only among 
members from different parties but also within each party. They vary in terms of absolute 
position over the liberal–conservative continuum, and in terms of the extent to which they 
hold a consistent belief. Some congresspeople maintained a consistent position throughout 
their tenure, while others constantly switched or shifted their positions, sometimes in a 
single direction, sometimes back and forth. Notable examples of the latter highlighted party 
switchers, who very often made a drastic shift of their ideological slant in the direction of 
the party switch, just before or after the switch, and later on often migrated back to the 
opposite side.  
In this section, I will dive into a detailed portrait of Congress by answering a key 
question: Who are the anchors, shifters, moderates, and extremists of Congress? This will 
be followed by further exploration of the issue-wise anchors, shifters, moderates, and 
extremists. Answering both questions could provide some valuable insight into 




Classes of congresspeople 
The definitions of classes of congresspeople are as follows: 
The anchors. Anchors are congresspeople who served at least two terms in the 
Senate or three terms in the House and held a consistent ideological stance throughout their 
tenure.  
The shifters. Shifters are congresspeople who served at least two terms in the Senate 
or three terms in the House and held rapidly changing ideological stances throughout their 
tenure. 
The moderates/extremists. These are moderate/extremely conservative or liberal 
party members of Congress who served at least two terms in the Senate or three terms in 
the House. 
These definitions will be translated in mathematical terms as shown in Table 12, as 
different quantiles will be used as the cut-off line for each class. I used different cut-off 
quantiles for the Senate and the House due to the latter having a lot more members.  
Following the mathematical definition, I apply my analysis to congresspeople from 
two different eras: the Clinton/Bush era and the Bush/Obama era. I used at least four terms 
of presidency due to the typical long tenure of the senators: two terms in the Senate is at 
least 12 years, which usually encompass at least three terms of presidency. Here are groups 




Table 13. The anchors and shifters in the Senate 
Anchors Shifters 
MOYNIHAN, Daniel Patrick MURRAY, Patty  
 WELLSTONE, Paul David  BYRD, Robert Carlyle  
ENZI, Michael B.  KENNEDY, Edward Moore (Ted)  
BURNS, Conrad   CRAPO, Michael Dean  
FEINSTEIN, Dianne  ROBERTS, Charles Patrick (Pat)  
CRAIG, Larry Edwin   THOMAS, Craig Lyle  
 GRASSLEY, Charles Ernest   WYDEN, Ronald Lee  
 ROBB, Charles Spittal   INOUYE, Daniel Ken  
 HOLLINGS, Ernest Frederick   DORGAN, Byron Leslie  
 INHOFE, James Mountain   SMITH, Gordon Harold  
 MACK, Connie, III   REID, Harry  
 BUMPERS, Dale   JOHNSON, Timothy Peter (Tim)  
 NELSON, Clarence William (Bill)   KOHL, Herbert H.  
CARPER, Thomas Richard   HARKIN, Thomas Richard (Tom)  
 THURMOND, James Strom   CAMPBELL, Ben Nighthorse  
 DURBIN, Richard Joseph   HAGEL, Charles Timothy (Chuck)  
 BOND, Christopher Samuel (Kit)   SHELBY, Richard C.  
 HUTCHISON, Kathryn Ann Bailey (Kay)   FRIST, William H.  
 KYL, Jon Llewellyn   JEFFORDS, James Merrill  
 SPECTER, Arlen   FORD, Wendell Hampton  




Table 14. The extremists and moderates in the Senate 
Extremists Moderates 
 WELLSTONE, Paul David   ROBB, Charles Spittal  
 CRAIG, Larry Edwin   CARPER, Thomas Richard  
 DURBIN, Richard Joseph   SPECTER, Arlen  
 NICKLES, Donald Lee   LINCOLN, Blanche Lambert  
 ALLARD, A. Wayne   NELSON, Earl Benjamin (Ben)  
 SESSIONS, Jefferson Beauregard III (Jeff)   LANDRIEU, Mary L.  
 CLINTON, Hillary Rodham   ROTH, William Victor, Jr.  
 CANTWELL, Maria E.   BAUCUS, Max Sieben  
 AKAKA, Daniel Kahikina   BIDEN, Joseph Robinette, Jr.  
 BOXER, Barbara   BREAUX, John Berlinger  
 CONRAD, Kent   BAYH, Evan  
 STABENOW, Deborah Ann   COLLINS, Susan Margaret  
 SMITH, Robert C.   LIEBERMAN, Joseph I.  
 BROWNBACK, Sam Dale   SNOWE, Olympia Jean  
 SARBANES, Paul Spyros   KERREY, J. Robert  
 MURRAY, Patty   McCAIN, John Sidney, III  
 KENNEDY, Edward Moore (Ted)   VOINOVICH, George Victor  
 CRAPO, Michael Dean   ROBERTS, Charles Patrick (Pat)  
 THOMAS, Craig Lyle   CAMPBELL, Ben Nighthorse  
 SMITH, Gordon Harold   SHELBY, Richard C.  




Here are some notable names: 
Senator Hillary Clinton. She was both an anchor and an extremist, as her 
ideological slant score consistently ranked in the top 10% of all Democrats. This is 
consistent with her gradual alignment with the progressive arm of the party, and she 
constantly spoke and voted against the opposing parties. In her own words, “I consider 
myself a modern progressive, someone who believes strongly in individual rights and 
freedoms, who believes that we are better as a society when we’re working together and 
when I find ways to help those who may not have all the advantages in life get the tools 
they need to lead a more productive life for themselves and their family. So, I consider 
myself a proud modern American progressive, and I think that's the kind of philosophy and 
practice that I need to bring back to American politics”11. 
Senator Joseph Biden. He represented the more moderate arm of the Democratic 
party. However, his position quickly shifted in a more extreme direction during the Bush 
presidency, and even more so during the Obama era, though he was no longer a senator at 
that time. Thus, he was also a shifter, but the shift in his slant is relatively unidirectional, 
as there is no backtracking in his stance.  
Senator John McCain. He was the epitome of the moderate Republican. However, 
he was not the anchor in Congress. Based on Figure 23, this is possibly a result of his 
significantly changed position on issues such as Infra(structure) and 
Equal(ity)&Discr(imination). One support for the latter was McCain’s “constant reversal 
 
11 CNN: Democratic presidential debate transcript, part I 
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on issues like gays in the military”12.  
Senator Arlen Spector. He was widely regarded as the symbol of the political 
neutral, and the slant score metric showed that, despite changing party affiliations multiple 
times during his tenure, he largely remained consistent in his political slant as a true neutral 
moderate, lying within the [-3, -3] interval for the majority of his career. However, he would 
later on switch party and became more liberal afterward. 
Senators Ben Campbell, Richard Shelby, and James Jeffords were the other three 
party switchers, and not surprisingly, all appeared in the moderate group. However, unlike 
Senator Spector, these three were also shifters in terms of consistency, as their slant scores 
typically varied within a much larger interval.  
Going forward, in addition to the overall anchors, shifters, moderates, and 
extremists, it is also possible to define the similar classes for each issue (i.e., topic clusters), 
coined as issue-anchors, issue-shifters, issue-moderates, and issue-extremists. Being an 
extremist does not mean the person will be more extreme in every issue. For example, 
Hillary Clinton often took a more moderate stance than Joe Biden on certain issues, even 
though overall she was far more progressive.  
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